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Author SHA1 Message Date
Andrew Gunnerson 461392c226 [BROKEN] Proof of concept implementation of option 5
This adds a wrapper for /init that spawns a child process to ptrace the
parent. When stage 1 execs stage 2, the tracer will bind mount the new
otacerts.zip, detach, and exit.

The mount process works, but stage 2 panics and reboots to the
bootloader for unknown reasons. The conditions that lead to the reboot
don't result in the kernel log being preserved.

Issue: #225

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-16 00:20:36 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 077a80f4ce CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #226
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-12 21:41:30 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 1e43930f3c Merge pull request #226 from chenxiaolong/critical
cli/ota: Limit critical partition check to bootloader-verified partitions
2023-12-12 21:39:39 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson d00e53fb2a cli/ota: Limit critical partition check to bootloader-verified partitions
dm-verity partitions don't necessarily have AVB descriptors inside the
root vbmeta images. The fstab might verify them against a public key on
disk using the `avb_keys` fs_mgr option. We have no way to statically
check for this scenario and it's becoming increasingly common on newer
OnePlus devices. Instead, we'll just limit the checks to partitions that
are verified by the bootloader.

Fixes: #223

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-12 21:30:24 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 0b5f3b30cf CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #227
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-12 21:30:09 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 10c2a0969f Merge pull request #227 from chenxiaolong/symlink
workflows/ci: Fix overwriting symlink for target/output
2023-12-12 21:29:25 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 83218a747d workflows/ci: Fix overwriting symlink for target/output
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-12 21:19:26 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 6fb7d568cd CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #224
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-12 19:12:11 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 6cbf690e17 Merge pull request #224 from chenxiaolong/static
workflows/ci: Build statically linked executables where possible
2023-12-12 19:07:02 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson e097f98404 workflows/ci: Build statically linked executables where possible
This way, the precompiled executables can run on distros that ship an
older version of glibc or don't use glibc at all.

Fixes: #222

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-12 18:34:02 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson d5605eabc0 workflows/ci: Use Rust triple instead of LLVM triple
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-12 18:05:00 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson d1bcf2da80 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #221
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-11 18:23:49 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson bbf8e28a28 Merge pull request #221 from chenxiaolong/otacerts
cli/ota: Add new --otacerts-partition option for the patch subcommand
2023-12-11 18:22:03 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson dc93b17888 cli/ota: Add new --otacerts-partition option
The autodetection logic for `@otacerts` is based on the presence of the
`recovery`, `vendor_boot`, and `boot` partitions (in that order). Some
devices have `vendor_boot`, but put `system/etc/security/otacerts.zip`
inside `boot`.

With the way things are written now, we don't have the ability to
inspect the actual partition images for the autodetection. It is based
on the name only. So, for now, we'll just allow the user to override the
autodetected partition similar to what we already do with the
`--boot-partition` option.

Issue: #218

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-10 23:32:14 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson f83a408dc4 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #220
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-10 16:03:08 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 798fddc4d5 Merge pull request #220 from chenxiaolong/odm
cli/ota: Fine tune `is_critical_to_avb()` for odm partition
2023-12-10 16:01:43 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson dfed06dcf8 cli/ota: Fine tune is_critical_to_avb() for odm partition
AOSP primarily cares about `odm` and `odm_dlkm`, so update the logic to
check for that specifically. This fixes patching some OTAs that include
an unprotected OEM-specific `odm_ext` image.

Issue: #218

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-10 15:54:02 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 02fd92a640 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #219
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-10 13:47:33 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson dd4faf72ae Merge pull request #219 from chenxiaolong/decode-avb
key: Add new decode-avb subcommand
2023-12-10 13:43:58 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson adbe249edb key: Add new decode-avb subcommand
This does the reverse of `avbroot key extract-avb`. It's useful for
reconstructing a PKCS8-encoded RSA public key when working with the
`public_key` fields in `avb.toml`.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-10 13:29:45 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson b7028b13a2 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #214
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-03 18:44:11 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 8122b0eece Merge pull request #214 from chenxiaolong/RUSTSEC-2023-0071
deny.toml: Temporarily ignore RUSTSEC-2023-0071
2023-12-03 18:41:17 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 0613de4ee4 deny.toml: Temporarily ignore RUSTSEC-2023-0071
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071

This is a side-channel vulnerability where secrets can be leaked to an
attacker that is able to measure the timing of a large number of RSA
operations. As of 2023-12-03, there is no released version of the rsa
crate that contains a fix.

For avbroot specifically, this vulnerability is not too critical for a
couple reasons:

1. avbroot performs RSA signing only at the end of lengthy processes
   that involve a lot of disk I/O. It's very expensive to run avbroot
   the millions of times needed to capture a sufficient amount of timing
   data.
2. During a single run of avbroot, it will only perform RSA signing a
   handful of times. To get sufficient measurements, the attacker would
   need to rerun avbroot. If they are able to rerun avbroot, then they
   are also able to just read and steal the private key directly.

avbroot has no network capabilities, so this is not inherently remotely
exploitable.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-03 18:02:48 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 1a18eb7f85 README.md: Document OnePlus boot issues
Issue: #186
Issue: #195
Issue: #212

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-12-03 14:58:38 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 1e1ca9dcbf CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #211
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-22 19:51:39 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 6924783f48 Merge pull request #211 from chenxiaolong/lints
Fix new lint warnings from rustc and clippy 1.74.0
2023-11-22 19:50:27 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 98071daa33 Fix new lint warnings from rustc and clippy 1.74.0
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-22 19:30:52 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 8e1adae947 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #210
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-22 19:29:00 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson d6705f4f00 Merge pull request #210 from chenxiaolong/avb_2.0_format_1.3
avb: Add support for AVB 2.0 format 1.3.0
2023-11-22 19:27:24 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson a648df1695 avb: Add support for AVB 2.0 format 1.3.0
Format version 1.3.0 adds a new 32-bit big endian `flags` field to
chain descriptors, carved out from the `reserved` array. There is only
one possible flag, which indicates that the target partition is not A/B
and so the bootloader should not append the `_a` or `_b` suffix.

There are no known AVB images in the wild where the first four bytes of
the `reserved` field are not zero. Thus, to keep the logic simple, the
AVB parser will unconditionally parse those bytes as if they were the
`flags` field, regardless of the file format version.

AOSP changes:

* https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/a1fe228b86543a21739c51352f5ce72f134fccfa%5E%21/
* https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/d00d02c390e267ef43d93562864dd6e45966c435%5E%21/

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-22 18:47:35 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson a7c872be3e Version 2.3.3
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-15 18:59:43 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson cf1ab6ecca CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #208
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-15 18:58:53 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 7364e8d725 Merge pull request #208 from chenxiaolong/descriptors
cli/ota: Merge property and kernel cmdline descriptors from child into parent
2023-11-15 18:57:26 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 935a86e72c cli/ota: Merge property and kernel cmdline descriptors from child into parent
Some devices use the legacy Android/ChromiumOS-specific `dm=` kernel
command line option to configure dm-verity without userspace helpers.
These options are specified in kernel command line descriptors in the
system partition's vbmeta header, which need to be merged into the
parent vbmeta image for the bootloader to see them.

This commit adds support for merging property descriptors and kernel
command line descriptors. Property descriptors are merged based on an
exact string match of the property key. Kernel command line descriptors
are merged based on the (non-empty) text before the first equal sign.

Issue: #203

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-15 18:39:55 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson a9a6107043 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #207
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-15 17:46:49 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 3c1d5a8bb3 Merge pull request #207 from chenxiaolong/xz
compression: Add support for XZ-compressed ramdisks
2023-11-15 17:11:23 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 26ec8098e5 compression: Add support for XZ-compressed ramdisks
`lineage-20.0-20231109-nightly-taimen-signed.zip` is an example of an
OTA that uses XZ-compressed ramdisks.

Issue: #203

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-15 16:37:00 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2a293147b1 Version 2.3.2
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-14 19:19:15 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson aea12c8d58 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #206
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-14 19:18:43 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 5545b0fe1b Merge pull request #206 from chenxiaolong/promote
cli/avb: Promote insecure hash algorithms to secure ones
2023-11-14 19:17:18 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 9c818fb165 cli/avb: Promote insecure hash algorithms to secure ones
This is done unconditionally because there shouldn't be any real-world
device that uses AVB2 and has a kernel compiled without sha256 support.

Issue: #203

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-14 19:10:07 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson d174af8969 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #205
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-14 18:54:14 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2cf11094de Merge pull request #205 from chenxiaolong/cmdline
cli/avb: Update kernel cmdline descriptor for devices that use `dm=`
2023-11-14 18:52:16 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 6f565969b7 cli/avb: Update kernel cmdline descriptor for devices that use dm=
Older Pixel devices (and ChromiumOS) specify the dm-verity options on
the kernel command line using a custom `dm=` parameter instead of using
dm-init or a userspace helper. This commit updates the avb pack and
repack commands to automatically update the relevant kernel command line
descriptor if it exists.

Issue: #203

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-14 18:36:07 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson da2eb6b717 Merge pull request #204 from chenxiaolong/readme
README.md: Make sections easier to follow
2023-11-13 15:50:01 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2f8d0264eb README.md: Make sections easier to follow
* Split out requirements from the warnings/caveats section and move it
  to the top. Hopefully this helps new users determine whether they can
  even use avbroot quicker.
* Split usage section into separate usage, initial install, and updates
  sections. This should hopefully make the steps much easier to follow
  without a bunch of steps being prefixed with `[Initial setup only]`.
* Explicitly state what arguments are required for Magisk, KernelSU, and
  unrooted setups instead of directing users to the advanced usage
  section.
* Don't assume that everyone will use Magisk in the other sections.
* Explicitly state the assumption that the device should already running
  the OS build that the user wants to patch during initial install.
* Add step to updates section for installing an updated Magisk or
  KernelSU app.
* Move command for building the modules from the modules section to the
  building from source section.
* Update sample error message in the clear vbmeta flags section to match
  what avbroot will actually print out.
* General rewording to try and make things clearer (especially reducing
  parenthesized parts).

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-13 03:51:17 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson ec1fe74900 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #202
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-12 18:53:13 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson b3b7c7b738 Merge pull request #202 from chenxiaolong/error
cli/ota: Improve error reporting when descriptor types are mismatched
2023-11-12 18:51:56 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2f1ee1ae4f cli/ota: Improve error reporting when descriptor types are mismatched
Issue: #201

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-12 18:32:55 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson cb62996b9f Version 2.3.1
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-06 16:59:49 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 54c06835c5 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #199
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-06 16:59:16 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 65a1b80da5 Merge pull request #199 from chenxiaolong/magisk_26.4
boot.rs: Bump Magisk version upper bound to 26500
2023-11-06 16:58:50 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 76ff1ddcda boot.rs: Bump Magisk version upper bound to 26500
There are no upstream changes that impact avbroot.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-11-06 16:40:14 -05:00
Andrew Gunnerson 0a4dda14cd README.md: Clarify that dmesg step should be run on the device
Fixes: #198

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-29 14:02:57 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson bde8dbfbcd Version 2.3.0
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-27 18:10:51 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson fbafbafe90 CHANGELOG.md: Fix typo: Reword -> Rework
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-27 18:03:51 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson a14cab71e5 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #197
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-27 18:01:17 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson c2f4297bb7 Merge pull request #197 from chenxiaolong/deps
Update dependencies
2023-10-27 17:59:15 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 9d63c9759d Update dependencies
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-27 17:44:25 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 73b893f3ed changelog.txt: Add entry for PR #196
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-27 17:42:00 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson fd7bbf5751 Merge pull request #196 from chenxiaolong/legacy
ota: Add support for legacy OTA metadata
2023-10-27 17:36:03 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 409867a8e5 ota: Add support for legacy OTA metadata
Android 11 OTAs use the same `payload.bin` format, but lack the
`metadata.pb` protobuf representation of the OTA metadata. This commit
adds support for parsing the legacy plain-text `metadata` format. Like
before, the output files will still contain both the legacy and
protobuf representations.

Note that the legacy format allowed OEMs to specify arbitrary key/value
pairs. These will be discarded during patching because they cannot be
represented in the protobuf format, which is used in avbroot's internal
representation.

Issue: #195

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-27 15:15:13 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson f96a2887df README.md: Add instructions for reverting to stock firmware
Fixes: #194

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-17 15:47:27 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 8140e25620 Merge pull request #193 from pascallj/patch-1
Update README.md to use new options
2023-10-15 15:55:52 -04:00
Pascal Roeleven ce05477ab1 Update README.md to use new options
During the migration to avbroot 2.0, these options have been renamed. Reflect this in the Readme.

Signed-off-by: Pascal Roeleven <dev@pascalroeleven.nl>
2023-10-15 21:36:35 +02:00
Andrew Gunnerson 1c4800c0cb CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #191
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-14 17:05:53 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson d402fdf5f1 Merge pull request #191 from chenxiaolong/sign
boot: Avoid setting signature algorithm when image is indirectly signed
2023-10-14 17:04:29 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 4930527598 boot: Avoid setting signature algorithm when image is indirectly signed
Previously, the AVB `algorithm_type` field was unconditionally being set
to a value that is compatible with the AVB private key. However, for
indirectly-signed boot images, the value should be set to `None`. Pixel
bootloaders accept the incorrect value, but other devices' bootloaders
might not.

Issue: #186

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-13 18:46:52 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 9b970c6d25 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #190
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-13 18:04:44 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson e7fb4004cd Merge pull request #190 from chenxiaolong/sha1
avb: Allow computing insecure SHA1 hashes for verification
2023-10-13 18:03:04 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2773dcddcf avb: Allow computing insecure SHA1 hashes for verification
Some partitions, like system_ext in the Pixel Experience build for
`avicii`, use SHA1 for the dm-verity hash tree. This is technically
valid, so allow the `avb verify` command to compute these hashes. SHA1
will still be rejected when creating AVB images.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-13 17:33:45 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 36765290fd CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-13 17:32:33 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 6d8268e472 Merge pull request #189 from chenxiaolong/reopen
Move reopen functionality to a new trait
2023-10-13 17:31:15 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2e8e86766b Move reopen functionality to a new trait
This is still not the ideal API, but it makes the code quite a bit more
readable since we no longer have to pass around closures everywhere that
multithreaded reads and writes to the same file are needed.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-11 22:09:45 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 8ae1c54c13 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #188
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-11 20:47:03 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 5212d4de51 Merge pull request #188 from chenxiaolong/avb_check
Add more checks to ensure AVB is actually providing security
2023-10-11 20:43:07 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 61bb9d6a81 Add more checks to ensure AVB is actually providing security
avbroot currently has a check to ensure that AVB signature verification
isn't completely disabled by non-zero vbmeta header flags. This is done
to ensure that the user isn't given a false sense of security when the
OS is built in an insecure way. This commit makes a few changes better
reject insecure OTAs.

The first change is extending the non-zero flags check to all vbmeta
images. Previously, only vbmeta images that needed to be updated as a
result of patching/re-signing were checked.

The second change is ensuring that there are no critical partitions
present in `payload.bin`, but missing from the vbmeta descriptors. For
example, if the vbmeta descriptor for `system.img` is missing, the
patching process will fail with a fatal error that cannot be bypassed.

Unfortunately, it's not feasible to check every partition because there
is no known device where every partition is protected by AVB. Google's
Tensor-based devices are the best and only have a single partition not
protected by AVB: `modem`. Qualcomm-based devices have many partitions
not protected by AVB. OnePlus devices have many partitions that are
checked directly (against the appended header) and thus, aren't listed
in any vbmeta image.

Due to this, only partitions that AOSP understands are checked. OEM-
specific partitions (which, security-wise, may be just as important) are
not checked.

The third change is ensuring that there's only a single root of trust
among the vbmeta images. This way, it's impossible to have, for example,
a `vbmeta_unused` image that contains all the descriptors and an empty
`vbmeta` image that's actually read by the bootloader.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-11 20:28:32 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 6d86fbf8a0 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #184
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-08 20:56:35 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 621ccc254c Merge pull request #184 from chenxiaolong/patch
Group `ota patch --help` options into sections
2023-10-08 20:55:19 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson f41ef844e0 Group ota patch --help options into sections
There are a ton of options and simply displaying them in a giant list is
not very readable.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-07 17:04:38 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 42f8769e48 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #183
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-07 16:38:46 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson d2187676d1 Merge pull request #183 from chenxiaolong/avb
avb.rs: Fix missing help text for --ignore-invalid
2023-10-07 16:36:52 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 3de5194c46 avb.rs: Fix missing help text for --ignore-invalid
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-06 21:05:52 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson e0c1d4ad3a CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #182
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-04 17:53:39 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson c94af49009 Merge pull request #182 from chenxiaolong/payload
payload: Bump maximum manifest size to 4 MiB
2023-10-04 17:51:51 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 5ed7dd7dca payload: Bump maximum manifest size to 4 MiB
The Android 13 -> 14 incremental OTA has a 1.7 MiB manifest.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-04 15:49:20 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson dac4e8d328 Version 2.2.0
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-04 14:58:01 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 3cc078ccfb CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #181
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-03 21:03:32 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson b47b51114f Merge pull request #181 from chenxiaolong/deps
Update ring to 0.17.0
2023-10-03 21:02:26 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 09048a00d2 Update ring to 0.17.0
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-03 20:51:16 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson ca0e80521f README.md: Fix typo in magisk-info subcommand
Fixes: #180

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-03 14:02:57 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 6491106df0 Add names to all Github Actions workflows
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-01 19:33:58 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2e8fa31207 Merge pull request #179 from chenxiaolong/ci
ci.yml: Only cancel previous runs for pull requests
2023-10-01 19:24:48 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson d69fdaadae ci.yml: Only cancel previous runs for pull requests
Fixes: #177

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-01 19:09:58 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson f0a631951a CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #178
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-01 16:39:13 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 83265e584a Merge pull request #178 from chenxiaolong/cpio
cpio: Only reassign inodes when missing
2023-10-01 16:38:13 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson ddb8911efd cpio: Only reassign inodes when missing
This way, archives with hard links can pass through `cpio unpack` and
`cpio pack`, even though there's no explicit support for hard links.

This also changes the trailer entry logic to not set an inode number.
AOSP's mkbootfs and magiskboot both start at 300000 and increment by one
for each entry, including the trailer. However, GNU cpio, bsdcpio,
busybox, and toybox all set it to 0, which makes more sense given that
it doesn't represent anything on disk.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-10-01 16:16:04 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 72be84b2fc CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #176
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 23:19:53 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 81d77d8610 Merge pull request #176 from chenxiaolong/prost
Switch to prost for protobuf encoding/decoding
2023-09-30 23:18:55 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 4651b755ba Switch to prost for protobuf encoding/decoding
There are several things we had to work around with quick-protobuf, like
forcing no_std mode to use BTreeMaps and avoiding helper functions to
read and write non-size-delimited messages. In addition, the pb-rs code
generator doesn't support adding #[derive]s to enums and the existing
support for adding derives to structs is broken due to incorrect string
concatenation.

Prost doesn't have these limitations and bugs. I originally avoided it
because prost_build required the external `protoc` binary, but now that
the protox library exists, the code generation can be done entirely in
Rust without external tools.

Prost also fully supports adding custom attributes to structs, enums,
and fields. This will be helpful for future payload unpack and pack
commands where the payload manifest would have to be serialized to TOML.

The e2e checksums had to be updated because prost's serialized bytes on
the wire differ from quick-protobuf, despite having the same semantic
meaning. Since all checksums need to be updated anyway, the Magisk apk
and OTA images have all been updated to the latest versions.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 22:27:46 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 979699e3dc CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #175
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 20:03:06 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson beee2c7c90 Merge pull request #175 from chenxiaolong/boot
boot: Rename header.toml to boot.toml for consistency
2023-09-30 20:00:11 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 206916e544 boot: Rename header.toml to boot.toml for consistency
This also changes the serialization to use a `type` field instead of
spewing the enum variant name everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 19:43:04 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson aaed44ad73 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #174
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 19:42:47 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 37b33f803a Merge pull request #174 from chenxiaolong/deps
Update dependencies
2023-09-30 19:41:30 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson e72b55dc57 Update dependencies
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 19:23:30 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 5b01feb344 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #173
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 17:51:18 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2f7556b530 Merge pull request #173 from chenxiaolong/cpio
Add CLI for packing and unpacking cpio archive
2023-09-30 17:49:54 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson f25196f0a2 Add CLI for packing and unpacking cpio archive
The new commands behave exactly like the existing `avb` and `boot`
subcommands. This completes the last piece of the puzzle for exposing
useful interfaces to avbroot's internal parsers.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-30 00:50:30 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2735a6558e CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #172
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-29 19:10:39 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 0c03fceb96 Merge pull request #172 from chenxiaolong/cpio
Add streaming CPIO reader and writer
2023-09-29 19:09:20 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 164274eb97 Add streaming CPIO reader and writer
The Magisk boot image patcher still reads all the entries into memory
for simplicity, but everything else now uses the streaming reader.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-29 18:47:37 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 61129e8ec7 Version 2.1.1
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 21:53:15 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson e1f4fa1ee8 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #171
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 21:51:15 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson d15a29e9a7 Merge pull request #171 from chenxiaolong/openat
Use handle-based directory operations instead of path-based
2023-09-28 21:37:44 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 26a3bafc3d Use handle-based directory operations instead of path-based
This prevents avbroot writing to locations where it shouldn't due to
manipulation from external processes. For example, replacing the output
directory for `avbroot ota extract` with a symlink.

Regardless of what symlinks or other changes an external process does to
the directory, the cap-std library will use the appropriate `openat2()`
options (or equivalent) to prevent writes outside of the directory.

Fixes: #166

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 21:26:35 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 999e31cdf3 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #170
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 19:53:01 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson ae2ebbf2aa Merge pull request #170 from chenxiaolong/payload
payload: Add size limit for protobuf manifest
2023-09-28 19:52:21 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson fea860a382 payload: Add size limit for protobuf manifest
This is the only part of the payload that we have to read entirely into
memory. The limit is currently set to 1 MiB, which is around ~5-6x the
manifest size in all the e2e test suite's images.

Issue: #169

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 19:38:38 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 98339aee13 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #169
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 19:38:19 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson f8772ef327 Merge pull request #169 from chenxiaolong/ota
ota: Don't preallocate buffer when reading OTA metadata
2023-09-28 19:33:47 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 7d62ddc64e ota: Don't preallocate buffer when reading OTA metadata
This way we can't run out of memory if the zip entry lists an invalid
file size that's much bigger than the actual file.

Issue: #157

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 19:22:17 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson d93378cc24 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #168
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 19:19:14 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 4885e978ee Merge pull request #168 from chenxiaolong/fec
fec: Ensure FEC data size and grid size won't overflow
2023-09-28 19:18:33 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson ecb2caf47d fec: Ensure FEC data size and grid size won't overflow
This also limits the block size to 16384. There are currently no known
images that use anything larger than 4096.

Issue: #157

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 19:07:04 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 525e2a409e CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #167
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 18:55:07 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 7e89e9081a Merge pull request #167 from chenxiaolong/fuzz
Add fuzzer for FEC image parser
2023-09-28 18:54:25 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2a57343094 Add fuzzer for FEC image parser
Issue: #160

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-28 18:41:47 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson cd779e62cb CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #165
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 23:50:08 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 96fb8ddc9c Merge pull request #165 from chenxiaolong/cpio
Add fuzzer for cpio
2023-09-27 23:49:23 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 0aba185c85 Add fuzzer for cpio
Issue: #160

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 23:21:04 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 36dcbe092f CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #164
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 22:22:34 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson aab9f5216f Merge pull request #164 from chenxiaolong/cpio
cpio: Read data by incremental reallocation after a threshold
2023-09-27 22:21:55 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 2a2515c5ef cpio: Read data by incremental reallocation after a threshold
This prevents avbroot from being killed for excessive memory usage due
to the entry header specifying a very large file name or file size
(larger than what's actually contained in the file).

This threshold for switching to incremental reallocation is 1 KiB for
file names and 1 MiB for file data.

Issue: #157

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 21:21:29 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 111ec6ff1e CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #133
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 20:55:48 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson cfd1dfb2eb Merge pull request #133 from chenxiaolong/deny
cargo-deny: Block executables in dependencies
2023-09-27 20:54:45 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson d7977bab93 cargo-deny: Block executables in dependencies
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 20:44:22 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson c29d78181a CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #163
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 20:36:59 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 42a9a9a12b Merge pull request #163 from chenxiaolong/fuzz
avb: Use checked addition when computing auth/aux block size
2023-09-27 20:35:54 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson e293331952 avb: Use checked addition when computing auth/aux block size
(Found by honggfuzz)

Issue: #160

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 19:43:15 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson bf97444f4b CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #162
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 19:42:48 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 1fa068b465 Merge pull request #162 from chenxiaolong/fuzz
bootimage: Fix potential divide-by-0 and multiplication overflow
2023-09-27 19:41:53 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson f85b6eec46 bootimage: Fix panic when validating vendor v4 table size
The multiplication can overflow.

(Found by honggfuzz)

Issue: #160

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 19:28:53 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 07f2e30430 bootimage: Ensure page_size is never 0
Otherwise, we'll panic due to dividing by 0.

(Found by honggfuzz)

Issue: #160

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 19:28:52 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 9f34198f07 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #161
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 19:28:23 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 9d8e82651e Merge pull request #161 from chenxiaolong/honggfuzz
Add initial honggfuzz fuzzing infrastructure
2023-09-27 19:27:00 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 5b22d7b603 Add initial honggfuzz fuzzing infrastructure
This initially includes fuzzers for the AVB and boot image parsers. The
initial input corpus are the same test files we use for the round trip
tests.

Issue: #160

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-27 19:15:42 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 11d19de0a1 CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #158, #159
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-26 23:21:44 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson fc4c2e63da Merge pull request #159 from chenxiaolong/limits
bootimage: Enforce size limits to prevent DoS
2023-09-26 23:17:40 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson ee28a57a74 bootimage: Enforce size limits to prevent DoS
The kernel, ramdisk(s), second stage bootloader, and device tree
components are limited to 64 MiB. In practice, no device has boot
partitions larger than 64 MiB, so this limit should never be hit. The
vendor v4 bootconfig component is limited to 1 KiB, which is about ~25x
the size of the Pixel 7 Pro's bootconfig.

Issue: #157

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-26 23:02:24 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 101512b894 Merge pull request #158 from chenxiaolong/limits
avb: Enforce size limits to prevent DoS
2023-09-26 20:52:18 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 50913db375 avb: Enforce size limits to prevent DoS
AVB 2.0 mandates that the header is 64 KiB or less, so enforce this both
when parsing and when writing vbmeta headers. Hash trees and FEC data
are also read into memory, so enforce limits corresponding to a 4 GiB
partition image.

Since these limits are so small, this lets us remove nearly all checked
integer conversions since a direct cast will never result in truncation.

Issue: #157

Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-26 20:38:19 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 699ea92dbf CHANGELOG.md: Add entry for PR #156
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-21 01:47:08 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson 667b99254c Merge pull request #156 from chenxiaolong/passphrase
Consolidate logic for determining passphrase source priority
2023-09-21 01:45:46 -04:00
Andrew Gunnerson e41814a425 Consolidate logic for determining passphrase source priority
Signed-off-by: Andrew Gunnerson <accounts+github@chiller3.com>
2023-09-20 23:35:25 -04:00
72 changed files with 4394 additions and 1751 deletions
+3 -3
View File
@@ -30,14 +30,14 @@ runs:
key: e2e-${{ github.sha }}-${{ runner.os }}
fail-on-cache-miss: true
path: |
target/release/e2e
target/release/e2e.exe
target/output/e2e
target/output/e2e.exe
- name: Downloading device image for ${{ inputs.device }}
if: ${{ ! steps.cache-img.outputs.cache-hit }}
shell: sh
working-directory: e2e
run: ../target/release/e2e download --stripped -d ${{ inputs.device }}
run: ../target/output/e2e download --stripped -d ${{ inputs.device }}
- if: ${{ ! steps.cache-img.outputs.cache-hit }}
name: Creating sparse archive from image
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ runs:
key: e2e-${{ github.sha }}-${{ runner.os }}
fail-on-cache-miss: true
path: |
target/release/e2e
target/release/e2e.exe
target/output/e2e
target/output/e2e.exe
- name: Downloading Magisk
if: ${{ ! steps.cache-magisk.outputs.cache-hit }}
shell: sh
working-directory: e2e
run: ../target/release/e2e download --magisk
run: ../target/output/e2e download --magisk
+38 -20
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ on:
- master
pull_request:
# This allows a subsequently queued workflow run to interrupt previous runs
# This allows a subsequently queued workflow run to interrupt previous runs, but
# only in pull requests.
concurrency:
group: '${{ github.workflow }} @ ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.label || github.head_ref || github.ref }}'
group: '${{ github.workflow }} @ ${{ github.head_ref || github.sha }}'
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
RUSTFLAGS: -C strip=symbols
RUSTFLAGS: -C strip=symbols -C target-feature=+crt-static
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
@@ -39,28 +40,35 @@ jobs:
| sed -E "s/^v//g;s/([^-]*-g)/r\1/;s/-/./g" \
>> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
- name: Get Rust LLVM target triple
- name: Get Rust target triple
id: get_target
shell: bash
env:
RUSTC_BOOTSTRAP: '1'
run: |
echo -n 'name=' >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
rustc -Z unstable-options --print target-spec-json \
| jq -r '."llvm-target"' \
>> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
rustc -vV | sed -n 's|host: ||p' >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
- name: Cache Rust dependencies
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
- name: Clippy
run: cargo clippy --release --workspace --features static
shell: bash
run: |
cargo clippy --release --workspace --features static \
--target ${{ steps.get_target.outputs.name }}
- name: Build
run: cargo build --release --workspace --features static
shell: bash
run: |
cargo build --release --workspace --features static \
--target ${{ steps.get_target.outputs.name }}
- name: Tests
run: cargo test --release --workspace --features static
shell: bash
run: |
cargo test --release --workspace --features static \
--target ${{ steps.get_target.outputs.name }}
- name: Archive documentation
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
@@ -70,22 +78,32 @@ jobs:
LICENSE
README.md
# Due to https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/78210, we have to use
# the --target option, which puts all output files in a different path.
# Symlink that path to the normal output directory so that we don't need
# to specify the Rust triple everywhere.
- name: Symlink target directory
shell: bash
run: |
rm -rf target/output
ln -s ${{ steps.get_target.outputs.name }}/release target/output
# This is separate so we can have a flat directory structure.
- name: Archive executable
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: avbroot-${{ steps.get_version.outputs.version }}-${{ steps.get_target.outputs.name }}
path: |
target/release/avbroot
target/release/avbroot.exe
target/output/avbroot
target/output/avbroot.exe
- name: Cache e2e executable
uses: actions/cache@v3
with:
key: e2e-${{ github.sha }}-${{ runner.os }}
path: |
target/release/e2e
target/release/e2e.exe
target/output/e2e
target/output/e2e.exe
setup:
name: Prepare workflow data
@@ -107,8 +125,8 @@ jobs:
key: e2e-${{ github.sha }}-${{ runner.os }}
fail-on-cache-miss: true
path: |
target/release/e2e
target/release/e2e.exe
target/output/e2e
target/output/e2e.exe
- name: Loading test config
id: load-config
@@ -116,7 +134,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
echo 'config-path=e2e/e2e.toml' >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
echo -n 'device-list=' >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
../target/release/e2e list \
../target/output/e2e list \
| jq -cnR '[inputs | select(length > 0)]' \
>> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
@@ -208,10 +226,10 @@ jobs:
key: e2e-${{ github.sha }}-${{ runner.os }}
fail-on-cache-miss: true
path: |
target/release/e2e
target/release/e2e.exe
target/output/e2e
target/output/e2e.exe
# Finally run tests
- name: Run test for ${{ matrix.device }}
working-directory: e2e
run: ../target/release/e2e test --stripped -d ${{ matrix.device }}
run: ../target/output/e2e test --stripped -d ${{ matrix.device }}
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
---
name: cargo-deny
on:
push:
branches:
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
---
name: Modules
on:
push:
branches:
+1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
---
name: Github Release
on:
push:
# Uncomment to test against a branch
+129
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,81 @@
to update the actual links at the bottom of the file.
-->
### Unreleased
* Add support for AVB 2.0 format 1.3.0 (for Android 15) ([PR #210])
* Add new `avbroot key decode-avb` command for converting AVB-encoded public keys to the standard PKCS8-encoded format ([PR #219])
* Adjust AVB sanity check to validate `*_dlkm` and `odm` specifically because some devices have an unprotected `odm_ext` partition ([PR #220])
* Add new `--otacerts-partition` option to override the autodetected partition for replacing `otacerts.zip` ([Issue #218], [PR #221])
* Build precompiled executables as statically linked executables ([Issue #222], [PR #224], [PR #227])
* Limit critical partition check to bootloader-verified partitions ([Issue #223], [PR #226])
Behind-the-scenes changes:
* Fix lint warnings introduced in Rust 1.74.0 ([PR #211])
* Temporarily silence [RUSTSEC-2023-0071](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071) warning in cargo-deny ([PR #214])
### Version 2.3.3
* Add support for XZ-compressed ramdisks ([Issue #203], [PR #207])
* Merge property and kernel command line AVB descriptors when replacing partitions ([Issue #203], [PR #208])
### Version 2.3.2
* Improve error messages when using `--replace` with an image that has the wrong AVB descriptor type ([Issue #201], [PR #202])
* Automatically update legacy `dm=` kernel command line descriptor when packing AVB images ([Issue #203], [PR #205])
* Automatically promote insecure hash algorithms (eg. sha1) to sha256 when packing AVB images ([Issue #203], [PR #206])
### Version 2.3.1
* Mark Magisk 264xx as supported ([PR #199])
### Version 2.3.0
* Fix missing `--help` text for `avbroot avb unpack`'s `--ignore-invalid` option ([PR #183])
* Group `avbroot ota patch --help` output into more readable sections ([PR #184])
* Add more checks to ensure that the OTA has a secure AVB setup ([PR #188])
* OTAs with blatantly insecure or missing AVB configuration are now more likely to be rejected by avbroot to avoid providing a false sense of security.
* Allow `avbroot avb verify` and `avbroot ota verify` to work for dm-verity partitions that use insecure SHA1 hashes ([PR #190])
* Add support for legacy Android 11 OTAs ([Discussion #195], [PR #196])
Behind-the-scenes changes:
* Bump maximum payload manifest size to 4 MiB ([PR #182])
* Rework file handle reopen functionality to use traits instead of callbacks ([PR #189])
* Don't set signature algorithm field for indirectly signed boot images ([PR #191])
* Update dependencies ([PR #197])
### Version 2.2.0
It's Android 14 release day! All versions of avbroot, including the old Python version, are compatible with Android 14 OTAs.
Changes:
* Add new unpack and pack commands for cpio archives (ramdisks) ([PR #173], [PR #178])
* Rename `header.toml` to `boot.toml` for the boot image unpack and pack commands ([PR #175])
* Also changes the file format a bit to make it more readable.
Behind-the-scenes changes:
* Add streaming CPIO reader and writer ([PR #172])
* Update dependencies ([PR #174], [PR #181])
* Switch to prost for protobuf encoding/decoding ([PR #176])
### Version 2.1.1
This release is all about hardening avbroot against untrusted (or corrupted) inputs. While all of avbroot's parsers are memory-safe, it's still possible for crashes to occur due to logic issues like allocating too much memory or dividing by zero. With this release, most of these potential issues have been fixed and fuzz tests have been added to help find more of these situations.
On the filesystem side of things, it is no longer possible for a nefarious program to cause avbroot to write to unintended locations by eg. swapping out an output directory or temp directory with a symlink while it is running.
Behind-the-scenes changes:
* Consolidate logic for handling `--pass-file` and `--pass-env-var` ([PR #156])
* cargo-deny: Block executables in dependencies ([PR #133])
* Implement size limits for parsers to prevent allocating too much memory ([Issue #157], [PR #158], [PR #159], [PR #164], [PR #168], [PR #169], [PR #170])
* Add fuzzers to help catch panics/crashes ([Issue #160], [PR #161], [PR #162], [PR #163], [PR #165], [PR #167])
* Use handle-based directory operations instead of path-based directory operations ([Issue #166], [PR #171])
### Version 2.1.0
* Add support for dm-verify FEC (forward error correction) ([Issue #145], [PR #146])
@@ -46,12 +121,22 @@ Behind-the-scenes changes:
* Initial Rust release. The old Python implementation can be found in the `python` branch. ([PR #130])
<!-- Do not manually edit the lines below. Use `cargo xtask update-changelog` to regenerate. -->
[Discussion #195]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/discussions/195
[Issue #138]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/138
[Issue #144]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/144
[Issue #145]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/145
[Issue #148]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/148
[Issue #157]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/157
[Issue #160]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/160
[Issue #166]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/166
[Issue #201]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/201
[Issue #203]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/203
[Issue #218]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/218
[Issue #222]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/222
[Issue #223]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/223
[PR #130]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/130
[PR #132]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/132
[PR #133]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/133
[PR #135]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/135
[PR #136]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/136
[PR #137]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/137
@@ -63,3 +148,47 @@ Behind-the-scenes changes:
[PR #150]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/150
[PR #152]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/152
[PR #153]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/153
[PR #156]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/156
[PR #158]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/158
[PR #159]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/159
[PR #161]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/161
[PR #162]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/162
[PR #163]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/163
[PR #164]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/164
[PR #165]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/165
[PR #167]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/167
[PR #168]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/168
[PR #169]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/169
[PR #170]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/170
[PR #171]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/171
[PR #172]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/172
[PR #173]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/173
[PR #174]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/174
[PR #175]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/175
[PR #176]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/176
[PR #178]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/178
[PR #181]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/181
[PR #182]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/182
[PR #183]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/183
[PR #184]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/184
[PR #188]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/188
[PR #189]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/189
[PR #190]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/190
[PR #191]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/191
[PR #196]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/196
[PR #197]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/197
[PR #199]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/199
[PR #202]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/202
[PR #205]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/205
[PR #206]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/206
[PR #207]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/207
[PR #208]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/208
[PR #210]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/210
[PR #211]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/211
[PR #214]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/214
[PR #219]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/219
[PR #220]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/220
[PR #221]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/221
[PR #224]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/224
[PR #226]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/226
[PR #227]: https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/pull/227
Generated
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+2 -2
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@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
[workspace]
default-members = ["avbroot"]
members = ["avbroot", "e2e", "xtask"]
members = ["avbroot", "e2e", "fuzz", "xtask"]
resolver = "2"
[workspace.package]
version = "2.1.0"
version = "2.3.3"
license = "GPL-3.0-only"
edition = "2021"
repository = "https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot"
+45 -25
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@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ This subcommand packs a new AVB image from the `avb.toml` file and, for appended
* To force an image to be signed, use `--key <path> --force`.
* To force an image to be unsigned, use `--force` without specifying `--key`.
Note that if the image is an appended image and its hash or hash tree descriptor uses an insecure algorithm, like `sha1`, then it will automatically be promoted to `sha256`.
### Repacking an AVB image
```bash
@@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ By default, this command will not write to any file and fails if an image is cor
avbroot boot unpack -i <input boot image>
```
This subcommand unpacks all of the components of the boot image into the current directory by default (see `--help`). The header fields are saved to `header.toml` and each blob section is saved to a separate file. Each blob is written to disk as-is, without decompression.
This subcommand unpacks all of the components of the boot image into the current directory by default (see `--help`). The header fields are saved to `boot.toml` and each blob section is saved to a separate file. Each blob is written to disk as-is, without decompression.
### Packing a boot image
@@ -94,6 +96,48 @@ avbroot boot info -i <input boot image>
All of the `boot` subcommands show the boot image information. This specific subcommand just does it without performing any other operation. To show avbroot's internal representation of the information, pass in `-d`.
## `avbroot cpio`
### Unpacking a cpio archive
```bash
avbroot cpio unpack -i <input cpio archive>
```
This subcommand unpacks the cpio archive. The list of file entries and their metadata, like permissions, are written to `cpio.toml`. The contents of regular files are extracted to `cpio_tree/`. Other file types, like symlinks and block devices, are not extracted at all. Their information only exists in the TOML file.
The files inside the tree will have default permissions, ownership, and modification timestamps. This metadata exists only inside the TOML file in order to ensure that the behavior is the same across all platforms.
Both uncompressed archives and compressed archives (gzip or legacy lz4) are supported.
### Packing a cpio archive
```bash
avbroot cpio pack -o <output cpio archive>
```
This subcommand packs a new cpio archive from the file entries listed in `cpio.toml` and the file contents in `cpio_tree/`. Note that **only entries listed in the TOML file are packed**. Extra files inside the tree are silently ignored.
The files are packed in the order listed in the TOML file. When packing ramdisks specifically, it's important to ensure that files are listed after their parent directories (which also **must** exist). Otherwise, the kernel will ignore them. As long as the file paths don't contain anything weird (eg. `a//b` or `a/./b`), sorting the entires with `--sort` should do the trick.
The new archive will be written in the same format (compressed or uncompressed) as the original archive.
### Repacking a cpio archive
```bash
avbroot cpio repack -i <input cpio archive> -o <output cpio archive>
```
This is almost equivalent to running `avbroot cpio unpack` followed by `avbroot cpio pack`, except inode numbers will not be reassigned.
### Showing information about a cpio archive
```bash
avbroot cpio info -i <input cpio archive>
```
All of the `cpio` subcommands show details about all the entries in the archive. This specific subcommand just does it without performing any other operation.
## `avbroot fec`
This set of commands is for working with dm-verity FEC (forward error correction) data. The FEC data allows small errors in partition data to be corrected. This increases reliability of the system because when dm-verity encounters data that doesn't match the expected checksum, it will either trigger a kernel panic or reboot the system.
@@ -150,27 +194,3 @@ avbroot fec repair -i <input/output data file> -f <input FEC file>
This will repair the file in place. As described above, in each column, up to `parity / 2` bytes can be corrected.
Note that FEC is **not** a replacement for checksums, like SHA-256. When there are too many errors, the file can potentially be "successfully repaired" to some incorrect data.
## `avbroot ramdisk`
### Dumping a cpio archive
```bash
avbroot ramdisk dump -i <cpio archive>
```
This subcommand dumps all information about a cpio archive to stdout. This includes the compression format, all header fields (including the trailer entry), and all data. If an entry's data can be decoded as UTF-8, then it is printed out as text. Otherwise, the binary data is printed out `\x##`-encoded for non-ASCII bytes. The escape-encoded data is truncated to 512 bytes by default to avoid outputting too much data, but this behavior can be disabled with `--no-truncate`.
### Repacking a cpio archive
```bash
avbroot ramdisk repack -i <input cpio archive> -o <output cpio archive>
```
This subcommand repacks a cpio archive, including recompression if needed. This is useful for roundtrip testing of avbroot's cpio parser and compression handling. The uncompressed output should be identical to the uncompressed input, except:
* files are sorted by name
* inodes are reassigned, starting from 300000
* there is no excess padding at the end of the file
The compressed output may differ from what other tools produce due to differences in compression levels and header metadata. avbroot avoids specifying header information where possible (eg. gzip timestamp) for reproducibility.
+167 -78
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@@ -1,49 +1,114 @@
# avbroot
avbroot is a program for patching Android A/B-style OTA images for root access while preserving AVB (Android Verified Boot) using custom signing keys. It is compatible with both Magisk and KernelSU.
avbroot is a program for patching Android A/B-style OTA images for root access while preserving AVB (Android Verified Boot) using custom signing keys. It is compatible with both Magisk and KernelSU. If desired, it can also just re-sign an OTA without enabling root access.
Having a good understanding of how AVB and A/B OTAs work is recommended prior to using avbroot. At the very least, please make sure the [warnings and caveats](#warnings-and-caveats) are well-understood to avoid the risk of hard bricking.
**NOTE:** avbroot 2.0 has been rewritten in Rust and no longer relies on any AOSP code. The CLI is fully backwards compatible, but the old Python implementation can be found in the `python` branch if needed.
## Requirements
* Only devices that use modern A/B partitioning are supported. This is the case for most non-Samsung devices launched with Android 10 or newer. To check if a device uses this partitioning scheme, open the OTA zip file and check that:
* `payload.bin` exists
* `META-INF/com/android/metadata` (Android 10-11) or `META-INF/com/android/metadata.pb` (Android 12+) exists
* The device must support using a custom public key for the bootloader's root of trust. This is normally done via the `fastboot flash avb_custom_key` command. All Pixel devices with unlockable bootloaders since the Pixel 2 support this. Other devices may support it as well, but there's no easy way to check without just trying it.
* NOTE: Some OnePlus devices have a broken implementation where a custom public key can be set, but the device won't boot despite having proper signatures. Downgrading the bootloader to the version shipped with Android 11 might potentially help. This problem has been reported across multiple OnePlus models ([#186](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/186), [#195](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/discussions/195), [#212](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/212)).
## Patches
avbroot applies two patches to the boot images:
* Magisk is applied to the `boot` or `init_boot` image, depending on device, as if it were done from the Magisk app.
* The `boot` or `init_boot` image, depending on device, is patched to enable root access. For Magisk, the patch is equivalent to what would be normally done by the Magisk app.
* The `boot`, `recovery`, or `vendor_boot` image, depending on device, is patched to replace the OTA signature verification certificates with the custom OTA signing certificate. This allows future patched OTAs to be sideloaded after the bootloader has been locked. It also prevents accidental flashing of the original OTA package while booted into recovery.
* The `boot`, `recovery`, or `vendor_boot` image, depending on device, is patched to replace the OTA signature verification certificates with the custom OTA signing certificate. This allows future patched OTAs to be sideloaded from recovery mode after the bootloader has been locked. It also prevents accidental flashing of the original unpatched OTA.
## Warnings and Caveats
* The device must use (non-legacy-SAR) A/B partitioning. This is the case on newer Pixel and OnePlus devices. To check if a device uses this partitioning sceme, open the OTA zip file and check that:
* **Always leave the `OEM unlocking` checkbox enabled when using a locked bootloader with root.** This is critically important. Root access allows the boot partition to potentially be overwritten, either accidentally or intentionally, with an image that is not properly signed. In this scenario, if the checkbox is turned off, both the OS and recovery mode will be made unbootable and `fastboot flashing unlock` will not be allowed. This effectively renders the device **_hard bricked_**.
* `payload.bin` exists
* `META-INF/com/android/metadata.pb` exists
* `META-INF/com/android/metadata` contains the line: `ota-type=AB`
Repeat: **_ALWAYS leave `OEM unlocking` enabled if rooted._**
* The device must support using a custom public key for the bootloader's root of trust. This is normally done via the `fastboot flash avb_custom_key` command. All Pixel devices with unlockable bootloaders support this, as well as most OnePlus devices. Other devices may support it as well, but there's no easy way to check without just trying it.
* Any operation that causes an improperly-signed boot image to be flashed will result in the device being unbootable and unrecoverable without unlocking the bootloader again (and thus, triggering a data wipe). This includes:
* **Do not ever disable the `OEM unlocking` checkbox when using a locked bootloader with root.** This is critically important. With root access, it is possible to corrupt the running system, for example by zeroing out the boot partition. In this scenario, if the checkbox is turned off, both the OS and recovery mode will be made unbootable and `fastboot flashing unlock` will not be allowed. This effectively renders the device **_hard bricked_**.
* Performing a unpatched A/B OTA update while booted into Android via the OS' default updater. This can be blocked via a Magisk/KernelSU module (see: [Blocking A/B OTA Updates](#blocking-ab-ota-updates)).
* Any operation that causes an unsigned or differently-signed boot image to be flashed will result in the device being unbootable and unrecoverable without unlocking the bootloader again (and thus, triggering a data wipe). This includes:
* The `Direct install` method for updating Magisk. Magisk updates **must** be done by repatching the OTA, not via the app.
* Performing a regular (unpatched) A/B OTA update. This can be blocked via a Magisk module (see: [Blocking A/B OTA Updates](#blocking-ab-ota-updates)).
If the boot image is ever modified, **do not reboot**. [Open an issue](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/issues/new) for support and be very clear about what steps were done that lead to the situation. If Android is still running and root access works, it might be possible to recover without wiping and starting over.
* The `Direct install` method for updating Magisk. Magisk updates must be done by repatching as well.
## Usage
1. Make sure the [caveats listed above](#warnings-and-caveats) are understood. It is possible to hard brick by doing the wrong thing!
2. Download the latest version from the [releases page](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/releases). To verify the digital signature, see the [verifying digital signatures](#verifying-digital-signatures) section.
avbroot is a standalone executable. It does not need to be installed and can be run from anywhere.
3. Follow the steps to [generate signing keys](#generating-keys).
4. Patch the OTA zip. The base command is:
```bash
avbroot ota patch \
--input /path/to/ota.zip \
--key-avb /path/to/avb.key \
--key-ota /path/to/ota.key \
--cert-ota /path/to/ota.crt \
```
Add the following additional arguments to the end of the command depending on how you want to configure root access.
* To enable root access with Magisk:
```bash
--magisk /path/to/magisk.apk \
--magisk-preinit-device <name>
```
If you don't know the Magisk preinit partition name, see the [Magisk preinit device section](#magisk-preinit-device) for steps on how to find it.
If you prefer to manually patch the boot image via the Magisk app instead of letting avbroot handle it, use the following arguments instead:
```bash
--prepatched /path/to/magisk_patched-xxxxx_yyyyy.img
```
* To enable root access with KernelSU:
```bash
--prepatched /path/to/kernelsu/boot.img \
--boot-partition @gki_kernel
```
* To leave the OS unrooted:
```bash
--rootless
```
For more details on the options above, see the [advanced usage section](#advanced-usage).
If `--output` is not specified, then the output file is written to `<input>.patched`.
5. The patched OTA is ready to go! To flash it for the first time, follow the steps in the [initial setup section](#initial-setup). For updates, follow the steps in the [updates section](#updates).
## Generating Keys
avbroot signs a few components while patching an OTA zip:
avbroot signs several components while patching an OTA zip:
* the root `vbmeta` image
* the boot image `vbmeta` footers (if the original ones were signed)
* the boot images
* the vbmeta images
* the OTA payload
* the OTA zip itself
The boot-related components are signed with an AVB key and OTA-related components are signed with an OTA key. They can be the same RSA keypair, though the following steps show how to generate two separate keys.
The first two components are signed with an AVB key and latter two components are signed with an OTA key. They can be the same key, though the following steps show how to generate two separate keys.
1. Generate the AVB and OTA signing keys:
When patching OTAs for multiple devices, generating unique keys for each device is strongly recommended because it prevents an OTA for the wrong device being accidentally flashed.
1. Generate the AVB and OTA signing keys.
```bash
avbroot key generate-key -o avb.key
@@ -56,44 +121,23 @@ The boot-related components are signed with an AVB key and OTA-related component
avbroot key extract-avb -k avb.key -o avb_pkmd.bin
```
3. Generate a self-signed certificate for the OTA signing key. This is used by recovery for verifying OTA updates.
3. Generate a self-signed certificate for the OTA signing key. This is used by recovery to verify OTA updates when sideloading.
```bash
avbroot key generate-cert -k ota.key -o ota.crt
```
The commands above are provided for convenience. avbroot is compatible with any standard PKCS8-encoded 4096-bit RSA private key and X509 certificate (eg. like those generated by openssl).
The commands above are provided for convenience. avbroot is compatible with any standard PKCS8-encoded 4096-bit RSA private key and PEM-encoded X509 certificate, like those generated by openssl.
If you lose your AVB or OTA signing key you will no longer be able to sign new OTA zips. You will have to generate new signing keys and unlock your bootloader again (including a data wipe). Follow the [Usage section](#usage) as if doing an initial setup.
If you lose your AVB or OTA signing key, you will no longer be able to sign new OTA zips. You will have to generate new signing keys and unlock your bootloader again (including a data wipe). Follow the [Usage section](#usage) as if doing an initial setup.
## Usage
## Initial setup
1. Make sure the caveats listed above are understood. It is possible to hard brick by doing the wrong thing!
1. Reboot into fastboot mode and unlock the bootloader if it isn't already unlocked. This will trigger a data wipe.
2. Download the latest version from the [releases page](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/releases). To verify the digital signature, see the [verifying digital signatures](#verifying-digital-signatures) section.
2. When setting things up for the first time, the device must already be running the correct OS. Flash the original unpatched OTA if needed.
3. Follow the steps to [generate signing keys](#generating-keys).
4. Patch the full OTA ZIP.
```bash
avbroot ota patch \
--input /path/to/ota.zip \
--privkey-avb /path/to/avb.key \
--privkey-ota /path/to/ota.key \
--cert-ota /path/to/ota.crt \
--magisk /path/to/magisk.apk
```
If `--output` is not specified, then the output file is written to `<input>.patched`.
**NOTE:** If you are using Magisk version >=25211, you need to know the preinit partition name (`--magisk-preinit-device <name>`). For details, see the [Magisk preinit device section](#magisk-preinit-device).
If you prefer to use an existing boot image patched by the Magisk app or you want to use KernelSU, see the [advanced usage section](#advanced-usage).
5. **[Initial setup only]** Unlock the bootloader. This will trigger a data wipe.
6. **[Initial setup only]** Extract the patched images from the patched OTA.
3. Extract the partition images from the patched OTA that are different from the original.
```bash
avbroot ota extract \
@@ -101,73 +145,108 @@ If you lose your AVB or OTA signing key you will no longer be able to sign new O
--directory extracted
```
7. **[Initial setup only]** Flash the patched images and the AVB public key metadata. This sets up the custom root of trust. Future updates are done by simply sideloading patched OTA zips.
If you are using KernelSU, also add `--boot-partition @gki_kernel` to the command.
4. Flash the partition images that were extracted.
This can be done by manually running `fastboot flash <partition> extracted/<partition>.img` for each image in the `extracted/` directory or by using the following script:
```bash
# Flash the boot images that were extracted
for image in extracted/*.img; do
partition=$(basename "${image}")
partition=${partition%.img}
fastboot flash "${partition}" "${image}"
done
```
# Flash the AVB signing public key
5. Set up the custom AVB public key in the bootloader.
```bash
fastboot erase avb_custom_key
fastboot flash avb_custom_key /path/to/avb_pkmd.bin
```
8. **[Initial setup only]** Run `dmesg | grep libfs_avb` as root to verify that AVB is working properly. A message similar to the following is expected:
6. **[Optional]** Before locking the bootloader, reboot into Android once to confirm that everything is properly signed.
Install the Magisk or KernelSU app and run the following command:
```bash
adb shell su -c 'dmesg | grep libfs_avb'
```
If AVB is working properly, the following message should be printed out:
```bash
init: [libfs_avb]Returning avb_handle with status: Success
```
9. **[Initial setup only]** Lock the bootloader. This will trigger a data wipe again. **Do not uncheck `OEM unlocking`!**
7. Reboot back into fastboot and lock the bootloader. This will trigger a data wipe again.
Remember: **Do not uncheck `OEM unlocking`!**
**WARNING**: If you are flashing CalyxOS, the setup wizard will [automatically turn off the `OEM unlocking` switch](https://github.com/CalyxOS/platform_packages_apps_SetupWizard/blob/7d2df25cedcbff83ddb608e628f9d97b38259c26/src/org/lineageos/setupwizard/SetupWizardApp.java#L135-L140). Make sure to manually reenable it again from Android's developer settings. Consider using [avbroot's `oemunlockonboot` Magisk module](#oemunlockonboot-enable-oem-unlocking-on-every-boot) to automatically ensure OEM unlocking is enabled on every boot.
8. That's it! To install future OS, Magisk, or KernelSU updates, see the [next section](#updates).
For extra safety, consider flashing [avbroot's Magisk/KernelSU modules](#avbroot-modules).
## Updates
To update Android or Magisk:
Updates to Android, Magisk, and KernelSU are all done the same way by patching (or repatching) the OTA.
1. Follow step 4 in [the previous section](#usage) to patch the new OTA (or an existing OTA with a newer Magisk APK).
1. If Magisk or KernelSU is being updated, first install their new `.apk`. If you happen to open the app, make sure it **does not** flash the boot image. Cancel the boot image update prompts if needed.
2. Reboot to recovery mode. If stuck at a `No command` screen, press the volume up button once while holding down the power button.
2. Follow the step in the [usage section](#usage) to patch the new OTA.
3. Sideload the patched OTA.
3. Reboot to recovery mode. If the screen is stuck at a `No command` message, press the volume up button once while holding down the power button.
4. Reboot.
4. Sideload the patched OTA with `adb sideload`.
## avbroot Magisk modules
5. That's it!
avbroot's Magisk modules can be found on the [releases page](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/releases) or they can be built locally by running:
## Reverting to stock firmware
```bash
cargo xtask modules -a
```
To stop using avbroot and revert to the stock firmware:
This requires Java and the Android SDK to be installed. The `ANDROID_HOME` environment variable should be set to the Android SDK path.
1. Reboot into fastboot mode and unlock the bootloader. This will trigger a data wipe.
### `clearotacerts`: Blocking A/B OTA Updates
2. Erase the custom AVB public key.
Unpatched OTA updates are already blocked in recovery because the original OTA certificate has been replaced with the custom certificate. To disable automatic OTAs while booted into Android, turn off `Automatic system updates` in Android's Developer Options.
```bash
fastboot erase avb_custom_key
```
The `clearotacerts` module additionally makes A/B OTAs fail while booted into Android to prevent accidental manual updates. The module simply overrides `/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip` at runtime with an empty zip so that even if an OTA is downloaded, signature verification will fail.
3. Flash the stock firmware.
At least in CalyxOS the Updater app does not respect the `Automatic system updates` setting and may enter an infinite loop downloading the OTA update and restarting the download when signature verification fails. If this happens on your ROM, you can try to either remove network access from the Updater app or disable the Updater app altogether (if your ROM allows you to do so). In CalyxOS it is possible to go to `Settings > Apps > See all apps`, open the three-dot menu, `Show system`, then find the `System updater` app and disable it.
4. That's it! There are no other remnants to clean up.
Alternatively, see [Custota](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/Custota) for a custom OTA updater app that pulls from a self-hosted OTA server.
## avbroot modules
avbroot's Magisk/KernelSU modules can be downloaded from the [releases page](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/avbroot/releases).
### `clearotacerts`: Block OTA Updates from default updater app
Unpatched OTA updates are already blocked when booted into recovery mode because the original OTA certificate has been replaced with the custom certificate. However, this doesn't prevent the Android's system updater app from attempting to install an unpatched OTA update.
Disabling the system updater app is recommended. To do so:
* Stock OS: Turn off `Automatic system updates` in Android's Developer Options.
* Custom OS: Disable the system updater app (or block its network access) from Settings -> Apps -> See all apps -> (three-dot menu) -> Show system -> (find updater app).
As an extra safety measure, flashing the `clearotacerts` module will intentionally make OTAs fail to install while booted into Android. It does so by overriding `/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip` with an empty zip containing no certificates so that even if an OTA is downloaded, signature verification will fail. This may cause some custom OS' system updater app to get stuck in an infinite loop downloading an OTA update and then retrying when signature verification fails, so make sure the system updater app is disabled.
As an alternative to this module, see [Custota](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/Custota) for a custom OTA updater app that installs updates from a self-hosted OTA server.
### `oemunlockonboot`: Enable OEM unlocking on every boot
To help reduce the risk of OEM unlocking being accidentally disabled (or intentionally disabled as part of some OS's initial setup wizard), this module will attempt to enable the OEM unlocking option on every boot.
To help reduce the risk of OEM unlocking being accidentally disabled (or intentionally disabled as part of some OS' initial setup wizard), this module will attempt to enable the OEM unlocking option on every boot.
The logs for this module can be found at `/data/local/tmp/avbroot_oem_unlock.log`.
## Magisk preinit device
Magisk versions 25211 and newer require a writable partition for storing custom SELinux rules that need to be accessed during early boot stages. This can only be determined on a real device, so avbroot requires the partition's block device name to be specified via `--magisk-preinit-device <name>`. To find the partition name:
Magisk versions 25211 and newer require a writable partition for storing custom SELinux rules that need to be accessed during early boot stages. This can only be determined on a real device, so avbroot requires the partition to be explicitly specified via `--magisk-preinit-device <name>`. To find the partition name:
1. Extract the boot image from the original/unpatched OTA:
@@ -178,9 +257,9 @@ Magisk versions 25211 and newer require a writable partition for storing custom
--boot-only
```
2. Patch the boot image via the Magisk app. This **MUST** be done on the target device! The partition name will be incorrect if patched from Magisk on a different device.
2. Patch the boot image via the Magisk app. This **MUST** be done on the target device or a device of the same model! The partition name will be incorrect if patched from Magisk on a different device model.
The Magisk app will include a line like the following in the output:
The Magisk app will print out a line like the following in the output:
```
- Pre-init storage partition device ID: <name>
@@ -189,7 +268,7 @@ Magisk versions 25211 and newer require a writable partition for storing custom
Alternatively, avbroot can print out what Magisk detected by running:
```bash
avbroot ota magisk-info \
avbroot boot magisk-info \
--image magisk_patched-*.img
```
@@ -210,6 +289,8 @@ avbroot ota verify \
--public-key-avb /path/to/avb_pkmd.bin
```
This command works for any OTA, regardless if it's patched or unpatched.
If the `--cert-ota` and `--public-key-avb` options are omitted, then the signatures are only checked for validity, not that they are trusted.
## Tab completion
@@ -252,15 +333,15 @@ Invoke-Expression (& avbroot completion -s powershell)
### Using a prepatched boot image
avbroot can replace the boot image with a prepatched image instead of applying the Magisk root patch itself. This is useful for using a boot image patched by the Magisk app or for KernelSU. To use a prepatched boot image, pass in `--prepatched <boot image>` instead of `--magisk <apk>`. When using `--prepatched`, avbroot will skip applying the Magisk root patch, but will still apply the OTA certificate patch.
avbroot can replace the boot image with a prepatched image instead of applying the root patch itself. This is useful for using a boot image patched by the Magisk app or for KernelSU. To use a prepatched Magisk boot image, pass in `--prepatched <boot image>` instead of `--magisk <apk>`. When using `--prepatched`, avbroot will skip applying the Magisk root patch, but will still apply the OTA certificate patch.
For KernelSU, also pass in `--boot-partition @gki_kernel` for both the `patch` and `extract` commands. avbroot defaults to Magisk's semantics where the boot image containing the GKI ramdisk is needed, whereas KernelSU requires the boot image containing the GKI kernel. This only affects devices launching with Android 13, where the GKI kernel and ramdisk are in different partitions (`boot` vs. `init_boot`), but it is safe and recommended to always use this option for KernelSU.
For KernelSU, also pass in `--boot-partition @gki_kernel` for both the `patch` and `extract` commands. avbroot defaults to Magisk's semantics where the boot image containing the GKI ramdisk is needed, whereas KernelSU requires the boot image containing the GKI kernel. This only affects devices launching with Android 13+, where the GKI kernel and ramdisk are in different partitions (`boot` vs. `init_boot`), but it is safe and recommended to always use this option for KernelSU.
Note that avbroot will validate that the prepatched image is compatible with the original. If, for example, the header fields do not match or a boot image section is missing, then the patching process will abort. The checks are not foolproof, but should help protect against accidental use of the wrong boot image. To bypass a somewhat "safe" subset of the checks, use `--ignore-prepatched-compat`. To ignore all checks (strongly discouraged!), pass it in twice.
### Skipping root patches
avbroot can be used for just resigning an OTA by specifying `--rootless` instead of `--magisk`/`--prepatched`. With this option, the patched OTA will not be rooted. The only modification applied is the replacement of the OTA verification certificate so that the OS can be upgraded with future (patched) OTAs.
avbroot can be used for just re-signing an OTA by specifying `--rootless` instead of `--magisk`/`--prepatched`. With this option, the patched OTA will not be rooted. The only modification applied is the replacement of the OTA verification certificate so that the OS can be upgraded with future (patched) OTAs.
### Replacing partitions
@@ -275,7 +356,7 @@ This has no impact on what patches are applied. For example, when using Magisk,
Some Android builds may ship with a root `vbmeta` image with the flags set such that AVB is effectively disabled. When avbroot encounters these images, the patching process will fail with a message like:
```
ValueError: vbmeta flags disable AVB: 0x3
Verified boot is disabled by vbmeta's header flags: 0x3
```
To forcibly enable AVB (by clearing the flags), pass in `--clear-vbmeta-flags`.
@@ -284,7 +365,7 @@ To forcibly enable AVB (by clearing the flags), pass in `--clear-vbmeta-flags`.
avbroot prompts for the private key passphrases interactively by default. To run avbroot non-interactively, either:
* Supply the passphrases via files:
* Supply the passphrases via files.
```bash
avbroot ota patch \
@@ -339,11 +420,19 @@ The output binary is written to `target/release/avbroot`.
Debug builds work too, but they will run significantly slower (in the sha256 computations) due to compiler optimizations being turned off.
By default, the build links to the system's bzip2 and liblzma libraries, which are the only external libraries avbroot depends on. To compile and statically link these two libraries, pass in `--features static`.
By default, the executable links to the system's bzip2 and liblzma libraries, which are the only external libraries avbroot depends on. To compile and statically link these two libraries, pass in `--features static`.
To build avbroot's modules from source, run:
```bash
cargo xtask modules -a
```
This requires Java and the Android SDK to be installed. The `ANDROID_HOME` environment variable must be set to the Android SDK path.
## Verifying digital signatures
First, save the public key to a file listing the keys to be trusted.
First, save the public key to a file listing the keys to be trusted. This is the same key listed in [the author's profile](https://github.com/chenxiaolong/).
```bash
echo 'avbroot ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDOe6/tBnO7xZhAWXRj3ApUYgn+XZ0wnQiXM8B7tPgv4' > avbroot_trusted_keys
+7 -5
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ anyhow = "1.0.75"
base64 = "0.21.3"
bstr = "1.6.2"
byteorder = "1.4.3"
cap-std = "2.0.0"
cap-tempfile = "2.0.0"
clap = { version = "4.4.1", features = ["derive"] }
clap_complete = "4.4.0"
cms = { version = "0.2.2", features = ["std"] }
@@ -27,7 +29,7 @@ num-bigint-dig = "0.8.4"
num-traits = "0.2.16"
phf = { version = "0.11.2", features = ["macros"] }
pkcs8 = { version = "0.10.2", features = ["encryption", "pem"] }
quick-protobuf = "0.8.1"
prost = "0.12.1"
rand = "0.8.5"
rayon = "1.7.0"
regex = { version = "1.9.4", default-features = false, features = ["perf", "std"] }
@@ -35,7 +37,7 @@ regex = { version = "1.9.4", default-features = false, features = ["perf", "std"
# because sha2 is significantly slower on older x86_64 CPUs without the SHA-NI
# instructions. sha2 is still used for signing purposes.
# https://github.com/RustCrypto/hashes/issues/327
ring = "0.16.20"
ring = "0.17.0"
rpassword = "7.2.0"
rsa = { version = "0.9.2", features = ["sha1", "sha2"] }
serde = { version = "1.0.188", features = ["derive"] }
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@ sha1 = "0.10.5"
sha2 = "0.10.7"
tempfile = "3.8.0"
thiserror = "1.0.47"
toml_edit = { version = "0.19.14", features = ["serde"] }
toml_edit = { version = "0.20.1", features = ["serde"] }
topological-sort = "0.2.2"
x509-cert = { version = "0.2.4", features = ["builder"] }
@@ -75,8 +77,8 @@ features = ["deflate"]
rustix = { version = "0.38.9", default-features = false, features = ["process"] }
[build-dependencies]
# Disable the clap feature since it pulls in an ancient version of clap.
pb-rs = { version = "0.10.0", default-features = false }
prost-build = "0.12.1"
protox = "0.5.0"
[dev-dependencies]
assert_matches = "1.5.0"
+5 -11
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
use std::{env, ffi::OsStr, fs, io, path::Path};
use pb_rs::{types::FileDescriptor, ConfigBuilder};
fn main() {
let out_dir = Path::new(&env::var("OUT_DIR").unwrap()).join("protobuf");
let in_dir = Path::new(&env::var("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR").unwrap()).join("protobuf");
@@ -30,14 +28,10 @@ fn main() {
fs::create_dir_all(&out_dir).unwrap();
let config = ConfigBuilder::new(&protos, None, Some(&out_dir), &[in_dir])
.unwrap()
.dont_use_cow(true)
// We're using this as a means to force quick-protobuf to use BTreeMap
// instead of HashMap so that the serialized messages are reproducible.
// https://github.com/tafia/quick-protobuf/issues/251
.nostd(true)
.build();
let file_descriptors = protox::compile(&protos, [&in_dir]).unwrap();
FileDescriptor::run(&config).unwrap();
prost_build::Config::new()
.btree_map(["."])
.compile_fds(file_descriptors)
.unwrap();
}
+148 -71
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ use crate::{
avb::{self, Descriptor},
bootimage::{self, BootImage, BootImageExt, RamdiskMeta},
compression::{self, CompressedFormat, CompressedReader, CompressedWriter},
cpio::{self, CpioEntryNew},
cpio::{self, CpioEntry, CpioEntryData},
},
stream::{self, FromReader, HashingWriter, SectionReader, ToWriter},
};
@@ -73,18 +73,25 @@ pub enum Error {
type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
fn load_ramdisk(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(Vec<CpioEntryNew>, CompressedFormat)> {
fn load_ramdisk(
data: &[u8],
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<(Vec<CpioEntry>, CompressedFormat)> {
let raw_reader = Cursor::new(data);
let mut reader = CompressedReader::new(raw_reader, false)?;
let entries = cpio::load(&mut reader, false)?;
let entries = cpio::load(&mut reader, false, cancel_signal)?;
Ok((entries, reader.format()))
}
fn save_ramdisk(entries: &[CpioEntryNew], format: CompressedFormat) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
fn save_ramdisk(
entries: &[CpioEntry],
format: CompressedFormat,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let raw_writer = Cursor::new(vec![]);
let mut writer = CompressedWriter::new(raw_writer, format)?;
cpio::save(&mut writer, entries, false)?;
cpio::save(&mut writer, entries, false, cancel_signal)?;
let raw_writer = writer.finish()?;
Ok(raw_writer.into_inner())
@@ -110,7 +117,7 @@ impl MagiskRootPatcher {
// RULESDEVICE config option, which stored the writable block device as an
// rdev major/minor pair, which was not consistent across reboots and was
// replaced by PREINITDEVICE
const VERS_SUPPORTED: &[Range<u32>] = &[25102..25207, 25211..26400];
const VERS_SUPPORTED: &'static [Range<u32>] = &[25102..25207, 25211..26500];
const VER_PREINIT_DEVICE: Range<u32> =
25211..Self::VERS_SUPPORTED[Self::VERS_SUPPORTED.len() - 1].end;
const VER_RANDOM_SEED: Range<u32> = 25211..26103;
@@ -193,7 +200,7 @@ impl MagiskRootPatcher {
/// entries as `.backup/<path>`.
///
/// Both lists and entries within the lists may be mutated.
fn apply_magisk_backup(old_entries: &mut [CpioEntryNew], new_entries: &mut Vec<CpioEntryNew>) {
fn apply_magisk_backup(old_entries: &mut [CpioEntry], new_entries: &mut Vec<CpioEntry>) {
cpio::sort(old_entries);
cpio::sort(new_entries);
@@ -205,20 +212,20 @@ impl MagiskRootPatcher {
loop {
match (old_iter.peek(), new_iter.peek()) {
(Some(&old), Some(&new)) => match old.name.cmp(&new.name) {
(Some(&old), Some(&new)) => match old.path.cmp(&new.path) {
Ordering::Less => {
to_back_up.push(old);
old_iter.next();
}
Ordering::Equal => {
if old.content != new.content {
if old.data != new.data {
to_back_up.push(old);
}
old_iter.next();
new_iter.next();
}
Ordering::Greater => {
rm_list.extend(&new.name);
rm_list.extend(&new.path);
rm_list.push(b'\0');
new_iter.next();
}
@@ -228,7 +235,7 @@ impl MagiskRootPatcher {
old_iter.next();
}
(None, Some(new)) => {
rm_list.extend(&new.name);
rm_list.extend(&new.path);
rm_list.push(b'\0');
new_iter.next();
}
@@ -236,22 +243,20 @@ impl MagiskRootPatcher {
}
}
// Intentially using 000 permissions to match Magisk.
new_entries.push(CpioEntryNew::new_directory(b".backup"));
new_entries.push(CpioEntry::new_directory(b".backup", 0));
for old_entry in to_back_up {
let mut new_entry = old_entry.clone();
new_entry.name = b".backup/".to_vec();
new_entry.name.extend(&old_entry.name);
new_entry.path = b".backup/".to_vec();
new_entry.path.extend(&old_entry.path);
new_entries.push(new_entry);
}
{
// Intentially using 000 permissions to match Magisk.
let mut entry = CpioEntryNew::new_file(b".backup/.rmlist");
entry.content = rm_list;
new_entries.push(entry);
}
new_entries.push(CpioEntry::new_file(
b".backup/.rmlist",
0,
CpioEntryData::Data(rm_list),
));
}
}
@@ -269,7 +274,7 @@ impl BootImagePatcher for MagiskRootPatcher {
BootImage::VendorV3Through4(b) => b.ramdisks.first(),
};
let (mut entries, ramdisk_format) = match ramdisk {
Some(r) if !r.is_empty() => load_ramdisk(r)?,
Some(r) if !r.is_empty() => load_ramdisk(r, cancel_signal)?,
_ => (vec![], CompressedFormat::Lz4Legacy),
};
@@ -280,13 +285,11 @@ impl BootImagePatcher for MagiskRootPatcher {
(b"overlay.d".as_slice(), 0o750),
(b"overlay.d/sbin".as_slice(), 0o750),
] {
let mut entry = CpioEntryNew::new_directory(path);
entry.mode |= perms;
entries.push(entry);
entries.push(CpioEntry::new_directory(path, perms));
}
// Delete the original init.
entries.retain(|e| e.name != b"init");
entries.retain(|e| e.path != b"init");
// Add magiskinit.
{
@@ -294,10 +297,11 @@ impl BootImagePatcher for MagiskRootPatcher {
let mut data = vec![];
zip_entry.read_to_end(&mut data)?;
let mut entry = CpioEntryNew::new_file(b"init");
entry.mode |= 0o750;
entry.content = data;
entries.push(entry);
entries.push(CpioEntry::new_file(
b"init",
0o750,
CpioEntryData::Data(data),
));
}
// Add xz-compressed magisk32 and magisk64.
@@ -326,10 +330,12 @@ impl BootImagePatcher for MagiskRootPatcher {
stream::copy(reader, &mut writer, cancel_signal)?;
let raw_writer = writer.finish()?;
let mut entry = CpioEntryNew::new_file(target);
entry.mode |= 0o644;
entry.content = raw_writer.into_inner();
entries.push(entry);
entries.push(CpioEntry::new_file(
target,
0o644,
CpioEntryData::Data(raw_writer.into_inner()),
));
}
// Create Magisk .backup directory structure.
@@ -359,17 +365,16 @@ impl BootImagePatcher for MagiskRootPatcher {
magisk_config.push_str(&format!("RANDOMSEED={:#x}\n", self.random_seed));
}
{
// Intentially using 000 permissions to match Magisk.
let mut entry = CpioEntryNew::new_file(b".backup/.magisk");
entry.content = magisk_config.into_bytes();
entries.push(entry);
}
entries.push(CpioEntry::new_file(
b".backup/.magisk",
0,
CpioEntryData::Data(magisk_config.into_bytes()),
));
// Repack ramdisk.
cpio::sort(&mut entries);
cpio::reassign_inodes(&mut entries);
let new_ramdisk = save_ramdisk(&entries, ramdisk_format)?;
cpio::assign_inodes(&mut entries, false)?;
let new_ramdisk = save_ramdisk(&entries, ramdisk_format, cancel_signal)?;
match boot_image {
BootImage::V0Through2(b) => b.ramdisk = new_ramdisk,
@@ -402,13 +407,16 @@ pub struct OtaCertPatcher {
}
impl OtaCertPatcher {
const OTACERTS_PATH: &[u8] = b"system/etc/security/otacerts.zip";
const OTACERTS_PATH: &'static [u8] = b"system/etc/security/otacerts.zip";
pub fn new(cert: Certificate) -> Self {
Self { cert }
}
pub fn get_certificates(boot_image: &BootImage) -> Result<Vec<Certificate>> {
pub fn get_certificates(
boot_image: &BootImage,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<Vec<Certificate>> {
let mut ramdisks = vec![];
match boot_image {
@@ -420,12 +428,15 @@ impl OtaCertPatcher {
let mut certificates = vec![];
for ramdisk in ramdisks {
let (entries, _) = load_ramdisk(ramdisk)?;
let Some(entry) = entries.iter().find(|e| e.name == Self::OTACERTS_PATH) else {
let (entries, _) = load_ramdisk(ramdisk, cancel_signal)?;
let Some(entry) = entries.iter().find(|e| e.path == Self::OTACERTS_PATH) else {
continue;
};
let CpioEntryData::Data(data) = &entry.data else {
continue;
};
let mut zip = ZipArchive::new(Cursor::new(&entry.content))?;
let mut zip = ZipArchive::new(Cursor::new(&data))?;
for index in 0..zip.len() {
let zip_entry = zip.by_index(index)?;
@@ -441,43 +452,46 @@ impl OtaCertPatcher {
Ok(certificates)
}
fn patch_ramdisk(&self, data: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Result<bool> {
let (mut entries, ramdisk_format) = load_ramdisk(data)?;
let Some(entry) = entries.iter_mut().find(|e| e.name == Self::OTACERTS_PATH) else {
/// Create a new otacerts archive. The old certs are ignored since flashing
/// a stock OTA will render the device unbootable.
fn create_zip(cert: &Certificate) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let raw_writer = Cursor::new(Vec::new());
let mut writer = ZipWriter::new(raw_writer);
let options = FileOptions::default().compression_method(CompressionMethod::Stored);
writer.start_file("ota.x509.pem", options)?;
crypto::write_pem_cert(&mut writer, cert)?;
let raw_writer = writer.finish()?;
Ok(raw_writer.into_inner())
}
fn patch_ramdisk(&self, data: &mut Vec<u8>, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<bool> {
let (mut entries, ramdisk_format) = load_ramdisk(data, cancel_signal)?;
let Some(entry) = entries.iter_mut().find(|e| e.path == Self::OTACERTS_PATH) else {
return Ok(false);
};
// Create a new otacerts archive. The old certs are ignored since
// flashing a stock OTA will render the device unbootable.
{
let raw_writer = Cursor::new(vec![]);
let mut writer = ZipWriter::new(raw_writer);
let options = FileOptions::default().compression_method(CompressionMethod::Stored);
writer.start_file("ota.x509.pem", options)?;
crypto::write_pem_cert(&mut writer, &self.cert)?;
let raw_writer = writer.finish()?;
entry.content = raw_writer.into_inner();
}
entry.data = CpioEntryData::Data(Self::create_zip(&self.cert)?);
// Repack ramdisk.
*data = save_ramdisk(&entries, ramdisk_format)?;
*data = save_ramdisk(&entries, ramdisk_format, cancel_signal)?;
Ok(true)
}
}
impl BootImagePatcher for OtaCertPatcher {
fn patch(&self, boot_image: &mut BootImage, _cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
fn patch(&self, boot_image: &mut BootImage, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
let patched_any = match boot_image {
BootImage::V0Through2(b) => self.patch_ramdisk(&mut b.ramdisk)?,
BootImage::V3Through4(b) => self.patch_ramdisk(&mut b.ramdisk)?,
BootImage::V0Through2(b) => self.patch_ramdisk(&mut b.ramdisk, cancel_signal)?,
BootImage::V3Through4(b) => self.patch_ramdisk(&mut b.ramdisk, cancel_signal)?,
BootImage::VendorV3Through4(b) => {
let mut patched = false;
for ramdisk in &mut b.ramdisks {
if self.patch_ramdisk(ramdisk)? {
if self.patch_ramdisk(ramdisk, cancel_signal)? {
patched = true;
break;
}
@@ -500,6 +514,70 @@ impl BootImagePatcher for OtaCertPatcher {
}
}
/// Replace /init with a wrapper that will bind mount otacerts.zip containing
/// the custom OTA certificate into the system partition.
pub struct InitWrapperPatcher {
cert: Certificate,
}
impl InitWrapperPatcher {
pub fn new(cert: Certificate) -> Self {
Self { cert }
}
fn patch_ramdisk(&self, data: &mut Vec<u8>, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<bool> {
let (mut entries, ramdisk_format) = load_ramdisk(data, cancel_signal)?;
if let Some(entry) = entries.iter_mut().find(|e| e.path == b"init") {
entry.path = b"avbroot/init.orig".to_vec();
} else {
return Ok(false);
};
entries.push(CpioEntry::new_directory(b"avbroot", 0o755));
entries.push(CpioEntry::new_file(b"avbroot/otacerts.zip", 0o644,
CpioEntryData::Data(OtaCertPatcher::create_zip(&self.cert)?)));
// TODO
// How do we pick ABI
let init_data = std::fs::read("/home/chenxiaolong/git/github/avbroot/init/libs/arm64-v8a/init").unwrap();
entries.push(CpioEntry::new_file(b"init", 0o750, CpioEntryData::Data(init_data)));
cpio::sort(&mut entries);
*data = save_ramdisk(&entries, ramdisk_format, cancel_signal)?;
Ok(true)
}
}
impl BootImagePatcher for InitWrapperPatcher {
fn patch(&self, boot_image: &mut BootImage, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
let patched_any = match boot_image {
BootImage::V0Through2(b) => self.patch_ramdisk(&mut b.ramdisk, cancel_signal)?,
BootImage::V3Through4(b) => self.patch_ramdisk(&mut b.ramdisk, cancel_signal)?,
BootImage::VendorV3Through4(b) => {
let mut patched = false;
for ramdisk in &mut b.ramdisks {
if self.patch_ramdisk(ramdisk, cancel_signal)? {
patched = true;
break;
}
}
patched
}
};
if !patched_any {
return Err(Error::Validation("No ramdisk contains init".to_owned()));
}
Ok(())
}
}
/// Replace the boot image with a prepatched boot image if it is compatible.
///
/// An image is compatible if all the non-size-related header fields are
@@ -517,7 +595,7 @@ impl PrepatchedImagePatcher {
const MAX_LEVEL: u8 = 2;
// We compile without Unicode support so we have to use [0-9] instead of \d.
const VERSION_REGEX: &str = r"Linux version ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+).[0-9]+-(android[0-9]+)-([0-9]+)-";
const VERSION_REGEX: &'static str = r"Linux version ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+).[0-9]+-(android[0-9]+)-([0-9]+)-";
pub fn new(
prepatched: &Path,
@@ -753,8 +831,6 @@ pub fn patch_boot(
patcher.patch(&mut boot_image, cancel_signal)?;
}
header.set_algo_for_key(key)?;
let mut descriptor_iter = header.descriptors.iter_mut().filter_map(|d| {
if let Descriptor::Hash(h) = d {
Some(h)
@@ -783,6 +859,7 @@ pub fn patch_boot(
}
if !header.public_key.is_empty() {
header.set_algo_for_key(key)?;
header.sign(key)?;
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
use anyhow::Result;
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use crate::cli::{avb, boot, completion, fec, key, ota, ramdisk};
use crate::cli::{avb, boot, completion, cpio, fec, key, ota};
#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
#[derive(Debug, Subcommand)]
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ pub enum Command {
Avb(avb::AvbCli),
Boot(boot::BootCli),
Completion(completion::CompletionCli),
Cpio(cpio::CpioCli),
Fec(fec::FecCli),
Key(key::KeyCli),
Ota(ota::OtaCli),
Ramdisk(ramdisk::RamdiskCli),
/// (Deprecated: Use `avbroot ota patch` instead.)
Patch(ota::PatchCli),
/// (Deprecated: Use `avbroot ota extract` instead.)
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ pub fn main(cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
Command::Avb(c) => avb::avb_main(&c, cancel_signal),
Command::Boot(c) => boot::boot_main(&c),
Command::Completion(c) => completion::completion_main(&c),
Command::Cpio(c) => cpio::cpio_main(&c, cancel_signal),
Command::Fec(c) => fec::fec_main(&c, cancel_signal),
Command::Key(c) => key::key_main(&c),
Command::Ota(c) => ota::ota_main(&c, cancel_signal),
Command::Ramdisk(c) => ramdisk::ramdisk_main(&c),
// Deprecated aliases.
Command::Patch(c) => ota::patch_subcommand(&c, cancel_signal),
Command::Extract(c) => ota::extract_subcommand(&c, cancel_signal),
+184 -54
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
use std::{
collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
ffi::{OsStr, OsString},
fs::{self, File, OpenOptions},
fs::{self, File},
io::{self, BufReader, BufWriter, Seek, SeekFrom, Write},
path::{Path, PathBuf},
str,
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ use std::{
};
use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
use cap_std::{
ambient_authority,
fs::{Dir, OpenOptions},
};
use clap::{Args, Parser, Subcommand};
use rayon::prelude::{IntoParallelRefIterator, ParallelIterator};
use rsa::RsaPublicKey;
@@ -24,12 +28,13 @@ use crate::{
crypto::{self, PassphraseSource},
format::avb::{
self, AlgorithmType, AppendedDescriptorMut, AppendedDescriptorRef, Descriptor, Footer,
Header,
HashTreeDescriptor, Header, KernelCmdlineDescriptor,
},
stream::{self, PSeekFile},
stream::{self, PSeekFile, Reopen},
util,
};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
struct AvbInfo {
header: Header,
footer: Option<Footer>,
@@ -87,6 +92,20 @@ fn write_info(path: &Path, info: &AvbInfo) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// Packing with insecure algorithms is intentionally not supported, so promote
/// to a secure algorithm if needed.
fn promote_insecure_hash_algorithm(algorithm: &str) -> &str {
const INSECURE_ALGORITHMS: &[&str] = &["sha1"];
const NEW_ALGORITHM: &str = "sha256";
if INSECURE_ALGORITHMS.contains(&algorithm) {
warning!("Changing insecure hash algorithm {algorithm} to {NEW_ALGORITHM}");
NEW_ALGORITHM
} else {
algorithm
}
}
/// Copy `size` bytes from `reader` into a new file `path` that's opened as
/// both readable and writable.
fn write_raw(
@@ -95,7 +114,7 @@ fn write_raw(
size: u64,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<PSeekFile> {
let file = OpenOptions::new()
let file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(true)
.create(true)
@@ -140,7 +159,7 @@ fn write_raw_and_verify(
let raw_file = write_raw(path, reader, copy_size, cancel_signal)?;
let result = verify_and_repair(None, raw_file.reopen(), descriptor, true, cancel_signal);
let result = verify_and_repair(None, raw_file.reopen()?, descriptor, true, cancel_signal);
// Chop off the old hash tree and FEC data.
raw_file.set_len(f.original_image_size)?;
@@ -174,15 +193,13 @@ fn write_raw_and_update(
match info.header.appended_descriptor_mut()? {
AppendedDescriptorMut::HashTree(d) => {
d.hash_algorithm = promote_insecure_hash_algorithm(&d.hash_algorithm).to_owned();
d.image_size = image_size;
d.update(
|| Ok(Box::new(raw_file.reopen())),
|| Ok(Box::new(raw_file.reopen())),
cancel_signal,
)
.context("Failed to update hash tree descriptor")?;
d.update(&raw_file, &raw_file, cancel_signal)
.context("Failed to update hash tree descriptor")?;
}
AppendedDescriptorMut::Hash(d) => {
d.hash_algorithm = promote_insecure_hash_algorithm(&d.hash_algorithm).to_owned();
d.image_size = image_size;
raw_file.rewind()?;
d.update(&mut raw_file, cancel_signal)
@@ -193,6 +210,121 @@ fn write_raw_and_update(
Ok(raw_file)
}
/// Compute the kernel command line arguments to allow the kernel to set up the
/// dm-verity block device without dm-init or userspace helpers. This is handled
/// by init/do_mounts_dm.c in older Pixel devices (and ChromiumOS).
fn compute_dm_verity_cmdline(descriptor: &HashTreeDescriptor) -> String {
use std::fmt::Write;
let mut result = String::new();
// Number of device mapper devices.
result.push_str("dm=\"1");
// Block device name.
result.push_str(" vroot");
// Block device UUID.
result.push_str(" none");
// Block device write mode.
result.push_str(" ro");
// Number of device mapper targets.
result.push_str(" 1,");
// Starting sector.
result.push('0');
// Sector count.
write!(&mut result, " {}", descriptor.image_size / 512).unwrap();
// dm-verity version.
write!(&mut result, " verity {}", descriptor.dm_verity_version).unwrap();
// Data block device (replaced by bootloader at runtime).
result.push_str(" PARTUUID=$(ANDROID_SYSTEM_PARTUUID)");
// Hash block device (replaced by bootloader at runtime).
result.push_str(" PARTUUID=$(ANDROID_SYSTEM_PARTUUID)");
// Data block size.
write!(&mut result, " {}", descriptor.data_block_size).unwrap();
// Hash block size.
write!(&mut result, " {}", descriptor.hash_block_size).unwrap();
// Number of data blocks.
write!(
&mut result,
" {}",
descriptor.image_size / u64::from(descriptor.data_block_size),
)
.unwrap();
// Hash starting block (in units of the hash block size).
write!(
&mut result,
" {}",
descriptor.image_size / u64::from(descriptor.hash_block_size),
)
.unwrap();
// Hash algorithm.
write!(&mut result, " {}", descriptor.hash_algorithm).unwrap();
// Root digest.
write!(&mut result, " {}", &hex::encode(&descriptor.root_digest)).unwrap();
// Salt.
write!(&mut result, " {}", &hex::encode(&descriptor.salt)).unwrap();
// Number of optional arguments.
let num_optional_args = if descriptor.fec_num_roots != 0 { 10 } else { 2 }
+ u8::from(descriptor.flags & HashTreeDescriptor::FLAG_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE != 0);
write!(&mut result, " {num_optional_args}").unwrap();
if descriptor.flags & HashTreeDescriptor::FLAG_CHECK_AT_MOST_ONCE != 0 {
// [n + 1] Only check blocks once instead of on each access.
result.push_str(" check_at_most_once");
}
// [0] Corruption handling mode (replaced by bootloader at runtime).
result.push_str(" $(ANDROID_VERITY_MODE)");
// [1] Force return zeros and skip validation for blocks expected to contain
// only zeros.
result.push_str(" ignore_zero_blocks");
if descriptor.fec_num_roots != 0 {
// [2-3] Enable FEC (replaced by bootloader at runtime).
result.push_str(" use_fec_from_device PARTUUID=$(ANDROID_SYSTEM_PARTUUID)");
// [4-5] Number of parity bytes per FEC codeword.
write!(&mut result, " fec_roots {}", descriptor.fec_num_roots).unwrap();
let fec_block_offset = descriptor.fec_offset / u64::from(descriptor.data_block_size);
// [6-7] Number of data blocks covered by FEC.
write!(&mut result, " fec_blocks {fec_block_offset}").unwrap();
// [8-9] Starting block (in data block size units) of FEC.
write!(&mut result, " fec_start {fec_block_offset}").unwrap();
}
// Root filesystem block device.
result.push_str("\" root=/dev/dm-0");
result
}
/// Update the dm-verity kernel command line descriptor to match the hash tree
/// descriptor. This is a no-op if there's no matching existing kernel command
/// line descriptor to update. Returns whether the descriptor was updated.
fn update_dm_verity_cmdline(info: &mut AvbInfo) -> Result<bool> {
assert!(info.footer.is_some(), "Not an appended image");
let new_cmdline = match info.header.appended_descriptor()? {
AppendedDescriptorRef::HashTree(d) => compute_dm_verity_cmdline(d),
AppendedDescriptorRef::Hash(_) => return Ok(false),
};
for d in &mut info.header.descriptors {
if let Descriptor::KernelCmdline(d) = d {
if d.flags & KernelCmdlineDescriptor::FLAG_USE_ONLY_IF_HASHTREE_NOT_DISABLED != 0
&& d.cmdline.starts_with("dm=")
&& d.cmdline != new_cmdline
{
d.cmdline = new_cmdline;
return Ok(true);
}
}
}
Ok(false)
}
/// Sign or clear header signatures based on whether the original header was
/// signed. If the original header was signed and is unchanged, then the
/// original signature is used as-is. If the force option is specified, then
@@ -242,14 +374,12 @@ fn sign_or_clear(info: &mut AvbInfo, orig_header: &Header, key_group: &KeyGroup)
bail!("Need to sign new AVB header, but no private key was specified");
};
let passphrase = if let Some(v) = &key_group.pass_env_var {
PassphraseSource::EnvVar(v.clone())
} else if let Some(p) = &key_group.pass_file {
PassphraseSource::File(p.clone())
} else {
PassphraseSource::Prompt(format!("Enter passphrase for {key_path:?}: "))
};
let private_key = crypto::read_pem_key_file(key_path, &passphrase)
let source = PassphraseSource::new(
key_path,
key_group.pass_file.as_deref(),
key_group.pass_env_var.as_deref(),
);
let private_key = crypto::read_pem_key_file(key_path, &source)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to load key: {key_path:?}"))?;
info.header.set_algo_for_key(&private_key)?;
@@ -292,7 +422,7 @@ fn ensure_name_is_safe(name: &str) -> Result<()> {
/// `seen` is used to prevent cycles. `descriptors` will contain all of the hash
/// and hash tree descriptors that need to be verified.
pub fn verify_headers(
directory: &Path,
directory: &Dir,
name: &str,
expected_key: Option<&RsaPublicKey>,
seen: &mut HashSet<String>,
@@ -304,9 +434,10 @@ pub fn verify_headers(
ensure_name_is_safe(name)?;
let path = directory.join(format!("{name}.img"));
let raw_reader =
File::open(&path).with_context(|| format!("Failed to open for reading: {path:?}"))?;
let path = format!("{name}.img");
let raw_reader = directory
.open(&path)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open for reading: {path:?}"))?;
let (header, _, _) = avb::load_image(BufReader::new(raw_reader))
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to load vbmeta structures: {path:?}"))?;
@@ -380,7 +511,7 @@ fn verify_and_repair(
AppendedDescriptorRef::HashTree(d) => {
status!("Verifying hash tree descriptor{suffix}");
match d.verify(|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())), cancel_signal) {
match d.verify(&file, cancel_signal) {
Err(
e @ avb::Error::InvalidRootDigest { .. }
| e @ avb::Error::InvalidHashTree { .. },
@@ -388,17 +519,12 @@ fn verify_and_repair(
warning!("Failed to verify hash tree descriptor{suffix}: {e}");
warning!("Attempting to repair using FEC data{suffix}");
d.repair(
|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())),
|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())),
cancel_signal,
)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to repair data{suffix}"))?;
d.repair(&file, &file, cancel_signal)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to repair data{suffix}"))?;
d.verify(|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())), cancel_signal)
.map(|_| {
status!("Successfully repaired data{suffix}");
})
d.verify(&file, cancel_signal).map(|_| {
status!("Successfully repaired data{suffix}");
})
}
ret => ret,
}
@@ -419,7 +545,7 @@ fn verify_and_repair(
/// Verify hash and hash tree descriptor digests and FEC data against their
/// corresponding input files.
pub fn verify_descriptors(
directory: &Path,
directory: &Dir,
descriptors: &HashMap<String, Descriptor>,
repair: bool,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
@@ -427,12 +553,10 @@ pub fn verify_descriptors(
descriptors
.par_iter()
.map(|(name, descriptor)| {
let path = directory.join(format!("{name}.img"));
let file = match OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(repair)
.open(&path)
.map(PSeekFile::new)
let path = format!("{name}.img");
let file = match directory
.open_with(&path, OpenOptions::new().read(true).write(repair))
.map(|f| PSeekFile::new(f.into_std()))
{
Ok(f) => f,
// Some devices, like bluejay, have vbmeta descriptors that
@@ -488,7 +612,11 @@ fn pack_subcommand(cli: &PackCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
format!("Failed to open raw image for reading: {:?}", cli.input_raw)
})?;
write_raw_and_update(&cli.output, &mut reader, &mut info, cancel_signal)?
let file = write_raw_and_update(&cli.output, &mut reader, &mut info, cancel_signal)?;
update_dm_verity_cmdline(&mut info)?;
file
} else {
File::create(&cli.output)
.map(PSeekFile::new)
@@ -514,15 +642,14 @@ fn repack_subcommand(cli: &RepackCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()>
let file = write_raw_and_verify(&cli.output, &mut reader, &info, false, cancel_signal)?;
// Write new hash tree and FEC data instead of copying the original.
// THere could have been errors in the original FEC data itself.
// There could have been errors in the original FEC data itself.
if let AppendedDescriptorMut::HashTree(d) = info.header.appended_descriptor_mut()? {
d.update(
|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())),
|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())),
cancel_signal,
)?;
d.hash_algorithm = promote_insecure_hash_algorithm(&d.hash_algorithm).to_owned();
d.update(&file, &file, cancel_signal)?;
}
update_dm_verity_cmdline(&mut info)?;
file
} else {
File::create(&cli.output)
@@ -559,7 +686,10 @@ fn verify_subcommand(cli: &VerifyCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()>
None
};
let directory = cli.input.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("."));
let authority = ambient_authority();
let parent_path = util::parent_path(&cli.input);
let directory = Dir::open_ambient_dir(parent_path, authority)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open directory: {parent_path:?}"))?;
let name = cli
.input
.file_stem()
@@ -571,13 +701,13 @@ fn verify_subcommand(cli: &VerifyCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()>
let mut descriptors = HashMap::<String, Descriptor>::new();
verify_headers(
directory,
&directory,
name,
public_key.as_ref(),
&mut seen,
&mut descriptors,
)?;
verify_descriptors(directory, &descriptors, cli.repair, cancel_signal)?;
verify_descriptors(&directory, &descriptors, cli.repair, cancel_signal)?;
status!("Successfully verified all vbmeta signatures and hashes");
@@ -659,7 +789,7 @@ struct UnpackCli {
#[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser, default_value = "raw.img")]
output_raw: PathBuf,
// Ignore invalid digests or FEC data.
/// Ignore invalid digests or FEC data.
#[arg(long)]
ignore_invalid: bool,
@@ -777,7 +907,7 @@ enum AvbCommand {
Verify(VerifyCli),
}
/// Show information about AVB-protected images.
/// Pack, unpack, and inspect AVB-protected images.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
pub struct AvbCli {
#[command(subcommand)]
+13 -9
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use crate::{
format::{avb::Header, bootimage::BootImage, compression::CompressedReader, cpio},
format::{avb::Header, bootimage::BootImage, compression::CompressedReader, cpio::CpioReader},
stream::{FromReader, ToWriter},
};
@@ -300,12 +300,16 @@ pub fn magisk_info_subcommand(cli: &MagiskInfoCli) -> Result<()> {
let reader = Cursor::new(ramdisk);
let reader = CompressedReader::new(reader, true)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to load ramdisk #{i}"))?;
let entries = cpio::load(reader, false)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to load ramdisk #{i} cpio"))?;
let mut cpio_reader = CpioReader::new(reader, false);
if let Some(e) = entries.iter().find(|e| e.name == b".backup/.magisk") {
io::stdout().write_all(&e.content)?;
return Ok(());
while let Some(entry) = cpio_reader
.next_entry()
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to read ramdisk #{i} cpio entry"))?
{
if entry.path == b".backup/.magisk" {
io::copy(&mut cpio_reader, &mut io::stdout())?;
return Ok(());
}
}
}
@@ -330,7 +334,7 @@ struct UnpackCli {
input: PathBuf,
/// Path to output header TOML.
#[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser, default_value = "header.toml")]
#[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser, default_value = "boot.toml")]
output_header: PathBuf,
/// Path to output kernel image.
@@ -390,7 +394,7 @@ struct PackCli {
output: PathBuf,
/// Path to input header TOML.
#[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser, default_value = "header.toml")]
#[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser, default_value = "boot.toml")]
input_header: PathBuf,
/// Path to input kernel image.
@@ -479,7 +483,7 @@ enum BootCommand {
MagiskInfo(MagiskInfoCli),
}
/// Pack or unpack boot images.
/// Pack, unpack, and inspect boot images.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
pub struct BootCli {
#[command(subcommand)]
+385
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 Andrew Gunnerson
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
*/
use std::{
fs::{self, File},
io::{BufReader, BufWriter, Seek},
path::{Path, PathBuf},
str,
sync::atomic::AtomicBool,
};
use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
use bstr::ByteSlice;
use cap_std::{ambient_authority, fs::Dir};
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use num_traits::ToPrimitive;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{
format::{
compression::{CompressedFormat, CompressedReader, CompressedWriter},
cpio::{self, CpioEntry, CpioEntryData, CpioEntryType, CpioReader, CpioWriter},
},
stream, util,
};
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
struct CpioInfo {
format: CompressedFormat,
entries: Vec<CpioEntry>,
}
fn open_reader(
path: &Path,
include_trailer: bool,
) -> Result<(
CpioReader<CompressedReader<BufReader<File>>>,
CompressedFormat,
)> {
let file =
File::open(path).with_context(|| format!("Failed to open cpio for reading: {path:?}"))?;
let reader = CompressedReader::new(BufReader::new(file), true)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open decompressor: {path:?}"))?;
let format = reader.format();
let cpio_reader = CpioReader::new(reader, include_trailer);
Ok((cpio_reader, format))
}
fn open_writer(
path: &Path,
format: CompressedFormat,
) -> Result<CpioWriter<CompressedWriter<BufWriter<File>>>> {
let file =
File::create(path).with_context(|| format!("Failed to open cpio for writing: {path:?}"))?;
let writer = CompressedWriter::new(BufWriter::new(file), format)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open compressor: {path:?}"))?;
let cpio_writer = CpioWriter::new(writer, false);
Ok(cpio_writer)
}
fn flush_writer(writer: CpioWriter<CompressedWriter<BufWriter<File>>>) -> Result<()> {
let compressed_writer = writer.finish().context("Failed to flush cpio writer")?;
let buf_writer = compressed_writer
.finish()
.context("Failed to flush compressor")?;
buf_writer.into_inner().context("Failed to flush file")?;
Ok(())
}
/// Read cpio information from TOML file.
fn read_info(path: &Path) -> Result<CpioInfo> {
let data = fs::read_to_string(path)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to read cpio info TOML: {path:?}"))?;
let info = toml_edit::de::from_str(&data)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to parse cpio info TOML: {path:?}"))?;
Ok(info)
}
/// Write cpio information to TOML file.
fn write_info(path: &Path, info: &CpioInfo) -> Result<()> {
let data = toml_edit::ser::to_string_pretty(info)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to serialize cpio info TOML: {path:?}"))?;
fs::write(path, data).with_context(|| format!("Failed to write cpio info TOML: {path:?}"))?;
Ok(())
}
/// Open reader to the corresponding file inside the tree if the entry is a
/// regular file. Unsafe paths will result in an error.
fn open_tree_file(tree: &Dir, entry: &CpioEntry) -> Result<Option<(BufReader<File>, u32)>> {
if entry.file_type == CpioEntryType::Regular {
let path = entry
.path
.as_bstr()
.to_path()
.with_context(|| format!("Invalid entry path: {:?}", entry.path.as_bstr()))?;
let mut reader = tree
.open(path)
.map(|f| BufReader::new(f.into_std()))
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open for reading: {path:?}"))?;
let file_size = reader
.seek(std::io::SeekFrom::End(0))
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to get file size: {path:?}"))?
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("File is too large: {path:?}"))?;
reader
.rewind()
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to seek file: {path:?}"))?;
Ok(Some((reader, file_size)))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
}
/// Open writer to the corresponding file inside the tree if the entry is a
/// regular file. Intermediate directories are automatically created as needed.
/// Unsafe paths will result in an error.
fn create_tree_file(tree: &Dir, entry: &CpioEntry) -> Result<Option<BufWriter<File>>> {
if entry.file_type == CpioEntryType::Regular {
let path = entry
.path
.as_bstr()
.to_path()
.with_context(|| format!("Invalid entry path: {:?}", entry.path.as_bstr()))?;
let parent = util::parent_path(path);
tree.create_dir_all(parent)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to create directory: {parent:?}"))?;
let writer = tree
.create(path)
.map(|f| BufWriter::new(f.into_std()))
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open for writing: {path:?}"))?;
Ok(Some(writer))
} else {
Ok(None)
}
}
fn display_format(cli: &CpioCli, format: CompressedFormat) {
if !cli.quiet {
println!("Compression format: {format:?}");
}
}
fn display_entry(cli: &CpioCli, entry: &CpioEntry) {
if !cli.quiet {
println!();
println!("{entry}");
}
}
fn unpack_subcommand(
cpio_cli: &CpioCli,
cli: &UnpackCli,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<()> {
let (mut reader, format) = open_reader(&cli.input, false)?;
let mut info = CpioInfo {
format,
entries: vec![],
};
display_format(cpio_cli, format);
let authority = ambient_authority();
Dir::create_ambient_dir_all(&cli.output_tree, authority)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to create directory: {:?}", cli.output_tree))?;
let tree = Dir::open_ambient_dir(&cli.output_tree, authority)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open directory: {:?}", cli.output_tree))?;
while let Some(entry) = reader.next_entry().context("Failed to read cpio entry")? {
display_entry(cpio_cli, &entry);
if let Some(mut writer) = create_tree_file(&tree, &entry)? {
let file_size = entry.data.size()?;
stream::copy_n(&mut reader, &mut writer, file_size.into(), cancel_signal)
.context("Failed to copy data")?;
writer.into_inner().context("Failed to flush data")?;
}
info.entries.push(entry);
}
write_info(&cli.output_info, &info)?;
Ok(())
}
fn pack_subcommand(cpio_cli: &CpioCli, cli: &PackCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
let mut info = read_info(&cli.input_info)?;
let mut writer = open_writer(&cli.output, info.format)?;
display_format(cpio_cli, info.format);
if cli.sort {
cpio::sort(&mut info.entries);
}
cpio::assign_inodes(&mut info.entries, true)?;
let authority = ambient_authority();
let tree = Dir::open_ambient_dir(&cli.input_tree, authority)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open directory: {:?}", cli.input_tree))?;
for entry in &mut info.entries {
let out = open_tree_file(&tree, entry)?;
if let Some((_, file_size)) = &out {
entry.data = CpioEntryData::Size(*file_size);
}
display_entry(cpio_cli, entry);
writer
.start_entry(entry)
.context("Failed to write cpio entry")?;
if let Some((mut reader, file_size)) = out {
stream::copy_n(&mut reader, &mut writer, file_size.into(), cancel_signal)
.context("Failed to copy data")?;
}
}
flush_writer(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
fn repack_subcommand(
cpio_cli: &CpioCli,
cli: &RepackCli,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<()> {
let (mut reader, format) = open_reader(&cli.input, false)?;
let mut writer = open_writer(&cli.output, format)?;
display_format(cpio_cli, format);
while let Some(entry) = reader.next_entry().context("Failed to read cpio entry")? {
display_entry(cpio_cli, &entry);
writer
.start_entry(&entry)
.context("Failed to write cpio entry")?;
if let CpioEntryData::Size(s) = &entry.data {
stream::copy_n(&mut reader, &mut writer, u64::from(*s), cancel_signal)
.context("Failed to copy cpio entry data")?;
}
}
flush_writer(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
fn info_subcommand(cpio_cli: &CpioCli, cli: &InfoCli) -> Result<()> {
let (mut reader, format) = open_reader(&cli.input, cli.trailer)?;
display_format(cpio_cli, format);
while let Some(entry) = reader.next_entry().context("Failed to read cpio entry")? {
display_entry(cpio_cli, &entry);
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn cpio_main(cli: &CpioCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
match &cli.command {
CpioCommand::Unpack(c) => unpack_subcommand(cli, c, cancel_signal),
CpioCommand::Pack(c) => pack_subcommand(cli, c, cancel_signal),
CpioCommand::Repack(c) => repack_subcommand(cli, c, cancel_signal),
CpioCommand::Info(c) => info_subcommand(cli, c),
}
}
/// Unpack a cpio archive.
///
/// Regular files will be extracted to the output tree directory, but not any
/// other type of file (eg. symlinks). All file metadata is written to the info
/// TOML file, like the UID/GID, permissions, and symlink targets.
///
/// If any paths inside the cpio archive are unsafe, the extraction process will
/// fail and exit. Extracted files are never written outside of the tree
/// directory, even if an external process tries to interfere.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct UnpackCli {
/// Path to input cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
input: PathBuf,
/// Path to output cpio info TOML.
#[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser, default_value = "cpio.toml")]
output_info: PathBuf,
/// Path to output files directory.
#[arg(long, value_name = "DIR", value_parser, default_value = "cpio_tree")]
output_tree: PathBuf,
}
/// Pack a cpio archive.
///
/// The new cpio archive will *only* contain files listed in the info TOML file.
/// Extra files inside the input tree directory that aren't listed will be
/// silently ignored. Entries are added to the archive in the order that they
/// are listed unless --sort is specified.
///
/// All fields inside the info TOML are used as-is. Missing fields in entries
/// are set to 0, aside from the inode number, which will be assigned a unique
/// value.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct PackCli {
/// Path to output cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
output: PathBuf,
/// Path to input info TOML.
#[arg(long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser, default_value = "cpio.toml")]
input_info: PathBuf,
/// Path to input files directory.
#[arg(long, value_name = "DIR", value_parser, default_value = "cpio_tree")]
input_tree: PathBuf,
/// Sort entries before packing.
#[arg(long)]
sort: bool,
}
/// Repack a cpio archive.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct RepackCli {
/// Path to input cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
input: PathBuf,
/// Path to output cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
output: PathBuf,
}
/// Display cpio entry information.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct InfoCli {
/// Path to input cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
input: PathBuf,
/// Show cpio trailer entry.
#[arg(long, global = true)]
trailer: bool,
}
#[derive(Debug, Subcommand)]
enum CpioCommand {
Unpack(UnpackCli),
Pack(PackCli),
Repack(RepackCli),
Info(InfoCli),
}
/// Pack, unpack, and inspect cpio archives.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
pub struct CpioCli {
#[command(subcommand)]
command: CpioCommand,
/// Don't print cpio entry information.
#[arg(short, long, global = true)]
quiet: bool,
}
+4 -8
View File
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ fn write_fec(path: &Path, fec: &FecImage) -> Result<()> {
fn generate_subcommand(cli: &GenerateCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()> {
let input = open_input(&cli.input, false)?;
let fec = FecImage::generate(|| Ok(Box::new(input.reopen())), cli.parity, cancel_signal)
let fec = FecImage::generate(&input, cli.parity, cancel_signal)
.context("Failed to generate FEC data")?;
write_fec(&cli.fec, &fec)?;
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ fn verify_subcommand(cli: &VerifyCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()>
let input = open_input(&cli.input, false)?;
let fec = read_fec(&cli.fec)?;
fec.verify(|| Ok(Box::new(input.reopen())), cancel_signal)
fec.verify(&input, cancel_signal)
.context("Failed to verify data")?;
Ok(())
@@ -78,12 +78,8 @@ fn repair_subcommand(cli: &RepairCli, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> Result<()>
// The separate buffered readers and writers are safe because the function
// guarantees that every thread touches disjoint offsets and every offset is
// read and written at most once.
fec.repair(
|| Ok(Box::new(input.reopen())),
|| Ok(Box::new(input.reopen())),
cancel_signal,
)
.context("Failed to repair file")?;
fec.repair(&input, &input, cancel_signal)
.context("Failed to repair file")?;
Ok(())
}
+34 -13
View File
@@ -18,29 +18,27 @@ use crate::{
format::avb,
};
fn get_passphrase(group: &PassphraseGroup, key_path: &Path) -> PassphraseSource {
if let Some(v) = &group.pass_env_var {
PassphraseSource::EnvVar(v.clone())
} else if let Some(p) = &group.pass_file {
PassphraseSource::File(p.clone())
} else {
PassphraseSource::Prompt(format!("Enter passphrase for {key_path:?}: "))
}
fn get_passphrase_source(group: &PassphraseGroup, key_path: &Path) -> PassphraseSource {
PassphraseSource::new(
key_path,
group.pass_file.as_deref(),
group.pass_env_var.as_deref(),
)
}
pub fn key_main(cli: &KeyCli) -> Result<()> {
match &cli.command {
KeyCommand::GenerateKey(c) => {
let passphrase = get_passphrase(&c.passphrase, &c.output);
let source = get_passphrase_source(&c.passphrase, &c.output);
let private_key =
crypto::generate_rsa_key_pair().context("Failed to generate RSA keypair")?;
crypto::write_pem_key_file(&c.output, &private_key, &passphrase)
crypto::write_pem_key_file(&c.output, &private_key, &source)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to write private key: {:?}", c.output))?;
}
KeyCommand::GenerateCert(c) => {
let passphrase = get_passphrase(&c.passphrase, &c.key);
let private_key = crypto::read_pem_key_file(&c.key, &passphrase)
let source = get_passphrase_source(&c.passphrase, &c.key);
let private_key = crypto::read_pem_key_file(&c.key, &source)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to load key: {:?}", c.key))?;
let validity = Duration::from_secs(c.validity * 24 * 60 * 60);
@@ -52,7 +50,7 @@ pub fn key_main(cli: &KeyCli) -> Result<()> {
}
KeyCommand::ExtractAvb(c) => {
let public_key = if let Some(p) = &c.input.key {
let passphrase = get_passphrase(&c.passphrase, p);
let passphrase = get_passphrase_source(&c.passphrase, p);
let private_key = crypto::read_pem_key_file(p, &passphrase)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to load key: {p:?}"))?;
@@ -73,6 +71,16 @@ pub fn key_main(cli: &KeyCli) -> Result<()> {
fs::write(&c.output, encoded)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to write public key: {:?}", c.output))?;
}
KeyCommand::DecodeAvb(c) => {
let encoded = fs::read(&c.key)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to load AVB public key: {:?}", c.key))?;
let public_key = avb::decode_public_key(&encoded)
.context("Failed to decode public key as AVB format")?;
crypto::write_pem_public_key_file(&c.output, &public_key)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to write public key: {:?}", c.output))?;
}
}
Ok(())
@@ -154,11 +162,24 @@ struct ExtractAvbCli {
passphrase: PassphraseGroup,
}
/// Convert an AVB-encoded public key to a PKCS8-encoded public key.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct DecodeAvbCli {
/// Path to output PKCS8-encoded public key.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
output: PathBuf,
/// Path to AVB-encoded public key.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
key: PathBuf,
}
#[derive(Debug, Subcommand)]
enum KeyCommand {
GenerateKey(GenerateKeyCli),
GenerateCert(GenerateCertCli),
ExtractAvb(ExtractAvbCli),
DecodeAvb(DecodeAvbCli),
}
/// Generate and convert keys.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ pub mod args;
pub mod avb;
pub mod boot;
pub mod completion;
pub mod cpio;
pub mod fec;
pub mod key;
pub mod ota;
pub mod ramdisk;
macro_rules! status {
($($arg:tt)*) => {
+510 -224
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-150
View File
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 Andrew Gunnerson
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
*/
use std::{
fs::File,
path::{Path, PathBuf},
str,
};
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use crate::format::{
compression::{CompressedFormat, CompressedReader, CompressedWriter},
cpio::{self, CpioEntryNew},
};
static CONTENT_BEGIN: &str = "----- BEGIN UTF-8 CONTENT -----";
static CONTENT_END: &str = "----- END UTF-8 CONTENT -----";
static CONTENT_END_NO_NEWLINE: &str = "----- END UTF-8 CONTENT (NO NEWLINE) -----";
static BINARY_BEGIN: &str = "----- BEGIN BINARY CONTENT -----";
static BINARY_END: &str = "----- END BINARY CONTENT -----";
static BINARY_END_TRUNCATED: &str = "----- END BINARY CONTENT (TRUNCATED) -----";
static NO_DATA: &str = "----- NO DATA -----";
fn print_content(data: &[u8], truncate: bool) {
if data.is_empty() {
println!("{NO_DATA}");
return;
}
if !data.contains(&b'\0') {
if let Ok(s) = str::from_utf8(data) {
if !s.contains(CONTENT_BEGIN)
&& !s.contains(CONTENT_END)
&& !s.contains(CONTENT_END_NO_NEWLINE)
{
println!("{CONTENT_BEGIN}");
print!("{s}");
if data.last() == Some(&b'\n') {
println!("{CONTENT_END}");
} else {
println!();
println!("{CONTENT_END_NO_NEWLINE}");
}
return;
}
}
}
println!("{BINARY_BEGIN}");
if data.len() > 512 && truncate {
println!("{}", data[..512].escape_ascii());
println!("{BINARY_END_TRUNCATED}");
} else {
println!("{}", data.escape_ascii());
println!("{BINARY_END}");
}
}
fn load_archive(
path: &Path,
include_trailer: bool,
) -> Result<(Vec<CpioEntryNew>, CompressedFormat)> {
let file = File::open(path)?;
let reader = CompressedReader::new(file, true)?;
let format = reader.format();
let entries = cpio::load(reader, include_trailer)?;
Ok((entries, format))
}
fn save_archive(path: &Path, entries: &[CpioEntryNew], format: CompressedFormat) -> Result<()> {
let file = File::create(path)?;
let mut writer = CompressedWriter::new(file, format)?;
cpio::save(&mut writer, entries, false)?;
writer.finish()?;
Ok(())
}
pub fn ramdisk_main(cli: &RamdiskCli) -> Result<()> {
match &cli.command {
RamdiskCommand::Dump(c) => {
let (entries, format) = load_archive(&c.input, true)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to read cpio: {:?}", c.input))?;
println!("Compression format: {format:?}");
println!();
for entry in entries {
println!("{entry}");
print_content(&entry.content, !c.no_truncate);
println!();
}
}
RamdiskCommand::Repack(c) => {
let (entries, format) = load_archive(&c.input, false)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to read cpio: {:?}", c.input))?;
save_archive(&c.output, &entries, format)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to write cpio: {:?}", c.output))?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Dump cpio headers and data.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct DumpCli {
/// Path to input cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
input: PathBuf,
/// Do not truncate binary file contents.
#[arg(long)]
no_truncate: bool,
}
/// Repack cpio archive.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
struct RepackCli {
/// Path to input cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
input: PathBuf,
/// Path to output cpio file.
#[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE", value_parser)]
output: PathBuf,
}
#[derive(Debug, Subcommand)]
enum RamdiskCommand {
Dump(DumpCli),
Repack(RepackCli),
}
/// Show information about ramdisk cpio archives.
#[derive(Debug, Parser)]
pub struct RamdiskCli {
#[command(subcommand)]
command: RamdiskCommand,
}
+28 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
use std::{
env::{self, VarError},
ffi::OsString,
ffi::{OsStr, OsString},
fs::{self, File, OpenOptions},
io::{self, BufReader, BufWriter, Read, Write},
path::{Path, PathBuf},
@@ -75,6 +75,16 @@ pub enum PassphraseSource {
}
impl PassphraseSource {
pub fn new(key_file: &Path, pass_file: Option<&Path>, env_var: Option<&OsStr>) -> Self {
if let Some(v) = env_var {
Self::EnvVar(v.to_owned())
} else if let Some(p) = pass_file {
Self::File(p.to_owned())
} else {
Self::Prompt(format!("Enter passphrase for {key_file:?}: "))
}
}
pub fn acquire(&self, confirm: bool) -> Result<String> {
let passphrase = match self {
Self::Prompt(p) => {
@@ -215,6 +225,23 @@ pub fn write_pem_cert_file(path: &Path, cert: &Certificate) -> Result<()> {
write_pem_cert(writer, cert)
}
/// Write PEM-encoded PKCS8 public key to a writer.
pub fn write_pem_public_key(mut writer: impl Write, key: &RsaPublicKey) -> Result<()> {
let data = key.to_public_key_pem(LineEnding::LF)?;
writer.write_all(data.as_bytes())?;
Ok(())
}
/// Write PEM-encoded PKCS8 public key to a file.
pub fn write_pem_public_key_file(path: &Path, key: &RsaPublicKey) -> Result<()> {
let file = File::create(path)?;
let writer = BufWriter::new(file);
write_pem_public_key(writer, key)
}
/// Read PEM-encoded PKCS8 private key from a reader.
pub fn read_pem_key(mut reader: impl Read, source: &PassphraseSource) -> Result<RsaPrivateKey> {
let mut data = String::new();
+326 -305
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+195 -108
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,15 @@ const VENDOR_HDR_V3_SIZE: u32 = 2112;
const VENDOR_HDR_V4_EXTRA_SIZE: u32 = 16;
const VENDOR_RAMDISK_TABLE_ENTRY_V4_SIZE: u32 = 108;
/// Maximum size of any individual boot image component, like the kernel. This
/// limit is currently 64 MiB, which should be sufficient since there is no
/// known device where the entire boot image exceeds this size.
const COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE: u32 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Maximum size of the bootconfig component in vendor v4 images. This limit is
/// currently 1 KiB, which is ~25x the size of the Pixel 7 Pro stock image's
/// bootconfig.
const BOOTCONFIG_MAX_SIZE: u32 = 1024;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Unknown boot image format")]
@@ -71,8 +80,8 @@ pub enum Error {
WriteFieldError(&'static str, #[source] io::Error),
#[error("{0:?} field: invalid value: {1}")]
InvalidFieldValue(&'static str, u32),
#[error("{0:?} field exceeds integer bounds")]
IntegerTooLarge(&'static str),
#[error("{0:?} field is out of bounds")]
FieldOutOfBounds(&'static str),
#[error("Invalid data: {0}")]
InvalidData(&'static str),
#[error("VTS signature is missing hash descriptor")]
@@ -257,6 +266,16 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for BootImageV0Through2 {
return Err(Error::UnknownHeaderVersion(header_version));
}
if kernel_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("kernel_size"));
} else if ramdisk_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("ramdisk_size"));
} else if second_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("second_size"));
} else if page_size == 0 {
return Err(Error::InvalidFieldValue("page_size", 0));
}
let os_version = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let name = reader
@@ -281,6 +300,10 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for BootImageV0Through2 {
let mut v1_data = if header_version >= 1 {
let recovery_dtbo_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if recovery_dtbo_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("recovery_dtbo_size"));
}
let recovery_dtbo_offset = reader.read_u64::<LittleEndian>()?;
let header_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
@@ -305,6 +328,10 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for BootImageV0Through2 {
let mut v2_data = if header_version == 2 {
let dtb_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if dtb_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("dtb_size"));
}
let dtb_addr = reader.read_u64::<LittleEndian>()?;
let v2_extra = V2Extra {
@@ -329,29 +356,39 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for BootImageV0Through2 {
let mut ramdisk = vec![];
let mut second = vec![];
kernel.resize(kernel_size.to_usize().unwrap(), 0);
reader.read_exact(&mut kernel)?;
kernel.resize(kernel_size as usize, 0);
reader
.read_exact(&mut kernel)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("kernel", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
ramdisk.resize(ramdisk_size.to_usize().unwrap(), 0);
reader.read_exact(&mut ramdisk)?;
ramdisk.resize(ramdisk_size as usize, 0);
reader
.read_exact(&mut ramdisk)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("ramdisk", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
second.resize(second_size.to_usize().unwrap(), 0);
reader.read_exact(&mut second)?;
second.resize(second_size as usize, 0);
reader
.read_exact(&mut second)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("second", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
if let Some(v1) = &mut v1_data {
v1.v1_extra
.recovery_dtbo
.resize(v1.recovery_dtbo_size.to_usize().unwrap(), 0);
reader.read_exact(&mut v1.v1_extra.recovery_dtbo)?;
.resize(v1.recovery_dtbo_size as usize, 0);
reader
.read_exact(&mut v1.v1_extra.recovery_dtbo)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("recovery_dtbo", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
}
if let Some(v2) = &mut v2_data {
v2.v2_extra.dtb.resize(v2.dtb_size.to_usize().unwrap(), 0);
reader.read_exact(&mut v2.v2_extra.dtb)?;
v2.v2_extra.dtb.resize(v2.dtb_size as usize, 0);
reader
.read_exact(&mut v2.v2_extra.dtb)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("dtb", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
}
@@ -381,30 +418,35 @@ impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for BootImageV0Through2 {
type Error = Error;
fn to_writer(&self, writer: W) -> Result<()> {
if self.kernel.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("kernel_size"));
} else if self.ramdisk.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("ramdisk_size"));
} else if self.second.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("second_size"));
} else if self.page_size == 0 {
return Err(Error::InvalidFieldValue("page_size", 0));
}
if let Some(v1) = &self.v1_extra {
if v1.recovery_dtbo.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("recovery_dtbo_size"));
}
}
if let Some(v2) = &self.v2_extra {
if v2.dtb.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("dtb_size"));
}
}
let mut writer = CountingWriter::new(writer);
let kernel_size = self
.kernel
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("kernel_size"))?;
let ramdisk_size = self
.ramdisk
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("ramdisk_size"))?;
let second_size = self
.second
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("second_size"))?;
writer.write_all(&BOOT_MAGIC)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(kernel_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.kernel.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.kernel_addr)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(ramdisk_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.ramdisk.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.ramdisk_addr)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(second_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.second.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.second_addr)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.tags_addr)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.page_size)?;
@@ -427,46 +469,44 @@ impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for BootImageV0Through2 {
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("extra_cmdline", e))?;
if let Some(v1) = &self.v1_extra {
let recovery_dtbo_size = v1
.recovery_dtbo
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("recovery_dtbo_size"))?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(recovery_dtbo_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(v1.recovery_dtbo.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u64::<LittleEndian>(v1.recovery_dtbo_offset)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.header_size())?;
}
if let Some(v2) = &self.v2_extra {
let dtb_size = v2
.dtb
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("dtb_size"))?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(dtb_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(v2.dtb.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u64::<LittleEndian>(v2.dtb_addr)?;
}
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
writer.write_all(&self.kernel)?;
writer
.write_all(&self.kernel)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("kernel", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
writer.write_all(&self.ramdisk)?;
writer
.write_all(&self.ramdisk)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("ramdisk", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
writer.write_all(&self.second)?;
writer
.write_all(&self.second)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("second", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
if let Some(v1) = &self.v1_extra {
writer.write_all(&v1.recovery_dtbo)?;
writer
.write_all(&v1.recovery_dtbo)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("recovery_dtbo", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
}
if let Some(v2) = &self.v2_extra {
writer.write_all(&v2.dtb)?;
writer
.write_all(&v2.dtb)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("dtb", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
}
@@ -572,12 +612,23 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for BootImageV3Through4 {
return Err(Error::UnknownHeaderVersion(header_version));
}
if kernel_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("kernel_size"));
} else if ramdisk_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("ramdisk_size"));
}
let cmdline = reader
.read_string_padded(BOOT_ARGS_SIZE + BOOT_EXTRA_ARGS_SIZE)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("cmdline", e))?;
let signature_size = if header_version == 4 {
Some(reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?)
let signature_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if signature_size > HDR_V4_SIGNATURE_SIZE as u32 {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("signature_size"));
}
Some(signature_size)
} else {
None
};
@@ -591,20 +642,26 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for BootImageV3Through4 {
let mut kernel = vec![];
let mut ramdisk = vec![];
kernel.resize(kernel_size.to_usize().unwrap(), 0);
reader.read_exact(&mut kernel)?;
kernel.resize(kernel_size as usize, 0);
reader
.read_exact(&mut kernel)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("kernel", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, PAGE_SIZE.into())?;
ramdisk.resize(ramdisk_size.to_usize().unwrap(), 0);
reader.read_exact(&mut ramdisk)?;
ramdisk.resize(ramdisk_size as usize, 0);
reader
.read_exact(&mut ramdisk)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("ramdisk", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, PAGE_SIZE.into())?;
// Don't preserve the signature. It is only used for VTS tests and is
// not relevant for booting.
let v4_extra = if let Some(s) = signature_size {
// OnePlus images have an invalid signature consisting of all zeros.
let mut data = vec![0u8; s.to_usize().unwrap()];
reader.read_exact(&mut data)?;
let mut data = vec![0u8; s as usize];
reader
.read_exact(&mut data)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("signature", e))?;
let signature = if s > 0 && !util::is_zero(&data) {
Some(Header::from_reader(Cursor::new(data))?)
@@ -634,22 +691,17 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for BootImageV3Through4 {
impl BootImageV3Through4 {
fn to_writer_internal(&self, writer: impl Write, skip_v4_sig: bool) -> Result<()> {
if self.kernel.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("kernel_size"));
} else if self.ramdisk.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("ramdisk_size"));
}
let mut writer = CountingWriter::new(writer);
let kernel_size = self
.kernel
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("kernel_size"))?;
let ramdisk_size = self
.ramdisk
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("ramdisk_size"))?;
writer.write_all(&BOOT_MAGIC)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(kernel_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(ramdisk_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.kernel.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.ramdisk.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.os_version)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.header_size())?;
@@ -673,7 +725,7 @@ impl BootImageV3Through4 {
// The VTS signature is always a fixed size.
if size > HDR_V4_SIGNATURE_SIZE {
return Err(Error::IntegerTooLarge("signature_size"));
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("signature_size"));
}
padding::write_zeros(&mut sig_writer, HDR_V4_SIGNATURE_SIZE)?;
@@ -688,15 +740,21 @@ impl BootImageV3Through4 {
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, PAGE_SIZE.into())?;
writer.write_all(&self.kernel)?;
writer
.write_all(&self.kernel)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("kernel", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, PAGE_SIZE.into())?;
writer.write_all(&self.ramdisk)?;
writer
.write_all(&self.ramdisk)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("ramdisk", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, PAGE_SIZE.into())?;
if !skip_v4_sig {
if let Some(sig) = v4_signature {
writer.write_all(&sig)?;
writer
.write_all(&sig)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("signature", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, PAGE_SIZE.into())?;
}
}
@@ -910,9 +968,17 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
}
let page_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if page_size == 0 {
return Err(Error::InvalidFieldValue("page_size", 0));
}
let kernel_addr = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let ramdisk_addr = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let vendor_ramdisk_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if vendor_ramdisk_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("vendor_ramdisk_size"));
}
let cmdline = reader
.read_string_padded(VENDOR_BOOT_ARGS_SIZE)
@@ -925,7 +991,12 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("name", e))?;
let header_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let dtb_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if dtb_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("dtb_size"));
}
let dtb_addr = reader.read_u64::<LittleEndian>()?;
struct V4Data {
@@ -938,14 +1009,18 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
let table_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let table_entry_num = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let table_entry_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let bootconfig_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if bootconfig_size > BOOTCONFIG_MAX_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("bootconfig_size"));
}
if table_entry_size != VENDOR_RAMDISK_TABLE_ENTRY_V4_SIZE {
return Err(Error::InvalidFieldValue(
"vendor_ramdisk_table_entry_size",
table_entry_size,
));
} else if table_size != table_entry_num * table_entry_size {
} else if table_entry_num.checked_mul(table_entry_size) != Some(table_size) {
return Err(Error::InvalidFieldValue(
"vendor_ramdisk_table_size",
table_size,
@@ -972,8 +1047,10 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
let mut ramdisks = vec![];
let mut vendor_ramdisk_data = vec![0u8; vendor_ramdisk_size.to_usize().unwrap()];
reader.read_exact(&mut vendor_ramdisk_data)?;
let mut vendor_ramdisk_data = vec![0u8; vendor_ramdisk_size as usize];
reader
.read_exact(&mut vendor_ramdisk_data)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("vendor_ramdisk_data", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
// For v3, this is just one big ramdisk. For v4, we have to wait until
@@ -984,8 +1061,10 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
vendor_ramdisk_data = vec![];
}
let mut dtb = vec![0u8; dtb_size.to_usize().unwrap()];
reader.read_exact(&mut dtb)?;
let mut dtb = vec![0u8; dtb_size as usize];
reader
.read_exact(&mut dtb)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("dtb", e))?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
if let Some(v4) = &mut v4_data {
@@ -994,6 +1073,10 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
for _ in 0..v4.vendor_ramdisk_table_entry_num {
let ramdisk_size = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
if ramdisk_size > vendor_ramdisk_size {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("ramdisk_size"));
}
let ramdisk_offset = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
let ramdisk_type = reader.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?;
@@ -1010,7 +1093,7 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
return Err(Error::InvalidFieldValue("ramdisk_offset", ramdisk_offset));
}
let mut ramdisk = vec![0u8; ramdisk_size.to_usize().unwrap()];
let mut ramdisk = vec![0u8; ramdisk_size as usize];
ramdisk_reader.read_exact(&mut ramdisk)?;
ramdisks.push(ramdisk);
@@ -1033,7 +1116,7 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, page_size.into())?;
v4.v4_extra.bootconfig = reader
.read_string_padded(v4.bootconfig_size.to_usize().unwrap())
.read_string_padded(v4.bootconfig_size as usize)
.map_err(|e| Error::ReadFieldError("bootconfig", e))?;
}
@@ -1070,27 +1153,29 @@ impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
return Err(Error::InvalidData("v3 only supports one ramdisk"));
}
let mut writer = CountingWriter::new(writer);
let vendor_ramdisk_size = self.ramdisks.iter().map(|r| r.len()).sum::<usize>();
if vendor_ramdisk_size > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("vendor_ramdisk_size"));
} else if self.dtb.len() > COMPONENT_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("dtb_size"));
} else if self.page_size == 0 {
return Err(Error::InvalidFieldValue("page_size", 0));
}
let vendor_ramdisk_size = self
.ramdisks
.iter()
.map(|r| r.len())
.sum::<usize>()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("vendor_ramdisk_size"))?;
let dtb_size = self
.dtb
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("dtb_size"))?;
if let Some(v4) = &self.v4_extra {
if v4.bootconfig.len() > BOOTCONFIG_MAX_SIZE as usize {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("bootconfig_size"));
}
}
let mut writer = CountingWriter::new(writer);
writer.write_all(&VENDOR_BOOT_MAGIC)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.header_version())?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.page_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.kernel_addr)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.ramdisk_addr)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(vendor_ramdisk_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(vendor_ramdisk_size as u32)?;
writer
.write_string_padded(&self.cmdline, VENDOR_BOOT_ARGS_SIZE)
@@ -1103,7 +1188,7 @@ impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("name", e))?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.header_size())?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(dtb_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(self.dtb.len() as u32)?;
writer.write_u64::<LittleEndian>(self.dtb_addr)?;
if let Some(v4) = &self.v4_extra {
@@ -1111,38 +1196,37 @@ impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
.ramdisks
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("vendor_ramdisk_table_entry_num"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("vendor_ramdisk_table_entry_num"))?;
let vendor_ramdisk_table_size = vendor_ramdisk_table_entry_num
.checked_mul(VENDOR_RAMDISK_TABLE_ENTRY_V4_SIZE)
.and_then(|v| v.to_u32())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("vendor_ramdisk_table_size"))?;
let bootconfig_size = v4
.bootconfig
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("bootconfig"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("vendor_ramdisk_table_size"))?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(vendor_ramdisk_table_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(vendor_ramdisk_table_entry_num)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(VENDOR_RAMDISK_TABLE_ENTRY_V4_SIZE)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(bootconfig_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(v4.bootconfig.len() as u32)?;
}
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
for ramdisk in &self.ramdisks {
writer.write_all(ramdisk)?;
writer
.write_all(ramdisk)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("vendor_ramdisk_data", e))?;
}
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
writer.write_all(&self.dtb)?;
writer
.write_all(&self.dtb)
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("dtb", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
if let Some(v4) = &self.v4_extra {
let mut ramdisk_offset = 0;
for (ramdisk, meta) in self.ramdisks.iter().zip(&v4.ramdisk_metas) {
let ramdisk_size = ramdisk.len().to_u32().unwrap();
let ramdisk_size = ramdisk.len() as u32;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(ramdisk_size)?;
writer.write_u32::<LittleEndian>(ramdisk_offset)?;
@@ -1160,7 +1244,9 @@ impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
}
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
writer.write_all(v4.bootconfig.as_bytes())?;
writer
.write_all(v4.bootconfig.as_bytes())
.map_err(|e| Error::WriteFieldError("bootconfig", e))?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, self.page_size.into())?;
}
@@ -1169,6 +1255,7 @@ impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for VendorBootImageV3Through4 {
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type")]
pub enum BootImage {
V0Through2(BootImageV0Through2),
V3Through4(BootImageV3Through4),
+29 -3
View File
@@ -8,15 +8,24 @@ use std::io::{self, Read, Seek, Write};
use byteorder::{LittleEndian, WriteBytesExt};
use flate2::{read::GzDecoder, write::GzEncoder, Compression};
use lz4_flex::frame::FrameDecoder;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use thiserror::Error;
use xz2::{
read::XzDecoder,
stream::{Check, Stream},
write::XzEncoder,
};
static GZIP_MAGIC: &[u8; 2] = b"\x1f\x8b";
static LZ4_LEGACY_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"\x02\x21\x4c\x18";
static XZ_MAGIC: &[u8; 6] = b"\xfd\x37\x7a\x58\x5a\x00";
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Unknown compression format")]
UnknownFormat,
#[error("XZ stream error")]
XzStream(#[from] xz2::stream::Error),
#[error("I/O error")]
Io(#[from] io::Error),
}
@@ -96,30 +105,34 @@ impl<W: Write> Write for Lz4LegacyEncoder<W> {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub enum CompressedFormat {
None,
Gzip,
Lz4Legacy,
Xz,
}
pub enum CompressedReader<R: Read> {
None(R),
Gzip(GzDecoder<R>),
Lz4(FrameDecoder<R>),
Xz(XzDecoder<R>),
}
impl<R: Read + Seek> CompressedReader<R> {
pub fn new(mut reader: R, raw_if_unknown: bool) -> Result<Self> {
let mut magic = [0u8; 4];
let mut magic = [0u8; 6];
reader.read_exact(&mut magic)?;
reader.rewind()?;
if &magic[0..2] == GZIP_MAGIC {
Ok(Self::Gzip(GzDecoder::new(reader)))
} else if &magic == LZ4_LEGACY_MAGIC {
} else if &magic[0..4] == LZ4_LEGACY_MAGIC {
Ok(Self::Lz4(FrameDecoder::new(reader)))
} else if &magic == XZ_MAGIC {
Ok(Self::Xz(XzDecoder::new(reader)))
} else if raw_if_unknown {
Ok(Self::None(reader))
} else {
@@ -132,6 +145,7 @@ impl<R: Read + Seek> CompressedReader<R> {
Self::None(_) => CompressedFormat::None,
Self::Gzip(_) => CompressedFormat::Gzip,
Self::Lz4(_) => CompressedFormat::Lz4Legacy,
Self::Xz(_) => CompressedFormat::Xz,
}
}
@@ -140,6 +154,7 @@ impl<R: Read + Seek> CompressedReader<R> {
Self::None(r) => r,
Self::Gzip(r) => r.into_inner(),
Self::Lz4(r) => r.into_inner(),
Self::Xz(r) => r.into_inner(),
}
}
}
@@ -150,6 +165,7 @@ impl<R: Read> Read for CompressedReader<R> {
Self::None(r) => r.read(buf),
Self::Gzip(r) => r.read(buf),
Self::Lz4(r) => r.read(buf),
Self::Xz(r) => r.read(buf),
}
}
}
@@ -158,6 +174,7 @@ pub enum CompressedWriter<W: Write> {
None(W),
Gzip(GzEncoder<W>),
Lz4Legacy(Lz4LegacyEncoder<W>),
Xz(XzEncoder<W>),
}
impl<W: Write> CompressedWriter<W> {
@@ -168,6 +185,11 @@ impl<W: Write> CompressedWriter<W> {
Ok(Self::Gzip(GzEncoder::new(writer, Compression::default())))
}
CompressedFormat::Lz4Legacy => Ok(Self::Lz4Legacy(Lz4LegacyEncoder::new(writer)?)),
CompressedFormat::Xz => {
// Some kernels are compiled without support for the default CRC64.
let stream = Stream::new_easy_encoder(6, Check::Crc32)?;
Ok(Self::Xz(XzEncoder::new_stream(writer, stream)))
}
}
}
@@ -176,6 +198,7 @@ impl<W: Write> CompressedWriter<W> {
Self::None(_) => CompressedFormat::None,
Self::Gzip(_) => CompressedFormat::Gzip,
Self::Lz4Legacy(_) => CompressedFormat::Lz4Legacy,
Self::Xz(_) => CompressedFormat::Xz,
}
}
@@ -184,6 +207,7 @@ impl<W: Write> CompressedWriter<W> {
Self::None(w) => Ok(w),
Self::Gzip(w) => w.finish(),
Self::Lz4Legacy(w) => w.finish(),
Self::Xz(w) => w.finish(),
}
}
}
@@ -194,6 +218,7 @@ impl<W: Write> Write for CompressedWriter<W> {
Self::None(w) => w.write(buf),
Self::Gzip(w) => w.write(buf),
Self::Lz4Legacy(w) => w.write(buf),
Self::Xz(w) => w.write(buf),
}
}
@@ -202,6 +227,7 @@ impl<W: Write> Write for CompressedWriter<W> {
Self::None(w) => w.flush(),
Self::Gzip(w) => w.flush(),
Self::Lz4Legacy(w) => w.flush(),
Self::Xz(w) => w.flush(),
}
}
}
+551 -133
View File
@@ -4,18 +4,25 @@
*/
use std::{
borrow::Cow,
collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
fmt,
io::{self, Read, Write},
io::{self, Cursor, Read, Write},
ops::Range,
sync::atomic::AtomicBool,
};
use bstr::ByteSlice;
use num_traits::ToPrimitive;
use num_traits::{ToPrimitive, Zero};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
escape,
format::padding,
stream::{CountingReader, CountingWriter, FromReader, ToWriter, WriteZerosExt},
octal,
stream::{
self, CountingReader, CountingWriter, FromReader, ReadDiscardExt, ToWriter, WriteZerosExt,
},
util::NumBytes,
};
@@ -35,12 +42,20 @@ const C_ISCTG: u32 = 0o110000;
const IO_BLOCK_SIZE: u64 = 512;
/// The threshold when reading data where memory allocation switches from
/// allocating the exact size to resizing as necessary.
const VEC_CAP_THRESHOLD: usize = 16384;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Unknown magic: {0:?}")]
UnknownMagic([u8; 6]),
#[error("Hard links are not supported: {:?}", .0.as_bstr())]
HardLinksNotSupported(Vec<u8>),
#[error("Entry of type {0} should not have data: {:?}", .1.as_bstr())]
EntryHasData(CpioEntryType, Vec<u8>),
#[error("No inodes available for device {0:x},{1:x}")]
DeviceFull(u32, u32),
#[error("{0:?} field exceeds integer bounds")]
IntegerTooLarge(&'static str),
#[error("I/O error")]
@@ -86,32 +101,200 @@ fn write_int(mut writer: impl Write, mut value: u32) -> io::Result<()> {
writer.write_all(&buf)
}
fn file_type(mode: u32) -> u32 {
mode & 0o170000
/// Read a chunk of bytes from the reader. If `size` is less than
/// [`VEC_CAP_THRESHOLD`], then the buffer is allocated with the exact size.
/// Otherwise, the buffer starts with a capacity of [`VEC_CAP_THRESHOLD`] and
/// grows as necessary. This avoids allocating excessive memory when the entry
/// specifies an excessively large value that's not backed by actual data.
fn read_data(reader: impl Read, size: usize, cancel_signal: &AtomicBool) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let buf = Vec::with_capacity(size.min(VEC_CAP_THRESHOLD));
let mut cursor = Cursor::new(buf);
stream::copy_n(reader, &mut cursor, size as u64, cancel_signal)?;
Ok(cursor.into_inner())
}
#[derive(Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CpioEntryNew {
pub ino: u32,
pub mode: u32,
pub uid: u32,
pub gid: u32,
pub nlink: u32,
pub mtime: u32,
pub dev_maj: u32,
pub dev_min: u32,
pub rdev_maj: u32,
pub rdev_min: u32,
pub chksum: u32,
pub name: Vec<u8>,
pub content: Vec<u8>,
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub enum CpioEntryType {
Pipe,
Char,
Directory,
Block,
Regular,
Symlink,
Socket,
Reserved,
Unknown(u16),
}
impl fmt::Debug for CpioEntryNew {
impl CpioEntryType {
pub fn from_mode(mode: u32) -> Self {
match mode & 0o170000 {
S_IFIFO => Self::Pipe,
S_IFCHR => Self::Char,
S_IFDIR => Self::Directory,
S_IFBLK => Self::Block,
S_IFREG => Self::Regular,
S_IFLNK => Self::Symlink,
S_IFSOCK => Self::Socket,
C_ISCTG => Self::Reserved,
m => Self::Unknown(m as u16),
}
}
pub fn to_mode(self) -> u32 {
match self {
Self::Pipe => S_IFIFO,
Self::Char => S_IFCHR,
Self::Directory => S_IFDIR,
Self::Block => S_IFBLK,
Self::Regular => S_IFREG,
Self::Symlink => S_IFLNK,
Self::Socket => S_IFSOCK,
Self::Reserved => C_ISCTG,
Self::Unknown(m) => m.into(),
}
}
}
impl fmt::Display for CpioEntryType {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("CpioEntryNew")
.field("ino", &self.ino)
.field("mode", &self.mode)
match self {
Self::Pipe => write!(f, "pipe"),
Self::Char => write!(f, "character device"),
Self::Directory => write!(f, "directory"),
Self::Block => write!(f, "block device"),
Self::Regular => write!(f, "regular file"),
Self::Symlink => write!(f, "symbolic link"),
Self::Socket => write!(f, "socket"),
Self::Reserved => write!(f, "reserved"),
Self::Unknown(m) => write!(f, "unknown ({m:o})"),
}
}
}
impl Default for CpioEntryType {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Unknown(0)
}
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(untagged)]
pub enum CpioEntryData {
/// Size of entry's data. [`CpioReader`] and [`CpioWriter`] use this for
/// [`CpioEntryType::Regular`] entries to allow for lazy reads and writes.
Size(u32),
/// Entry's data. For [`CpioEntryType::Symlink`] entries, this is the
/// link target. For [`CpioEntryType::Regular`] entries, this is the file
/// content. [`CpioReader`] will never use this when reading regular files.
/// [`CpioWriter`] will write this immediately and lazy writes will not be
/// allowed.
Data(#[serde(with = "escape")] Vec<u8>),
}
impl fmt::Debug for CpioEntryData {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
Self::Size(s) => f.debug_tuple("Size").field(s).finish(),
Self::Data(d) => f.debug_tuple("Data").field(&NumBytes(d.len())).finish(),
}
}
}
impl Default for CpioEntryData {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Size(0)
}
}
impl CpioEntryData {
pub fn size(&self) -> Result<u32> {
let size = match self {
Self::Size(s) => *s,
Self::Data(d) => d
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("data_size"))?,
};
Ok(size)
}
fn is_size(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, CpioEntryData::Size(_))
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct CpioEntry {
/// File path.
#[serde(with = "escape")]
pub path: Vec<u8>,
/// File data.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "CpioEntryData::is_size")]
pub data: CpioEntryData,
/// Inode number.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub inode: u32,
/// File type portion of the `st_mode`-style mode.
pub file_type: CpioEntryType,
/// Permissions portion of the `st_mode`-style mode.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero", with = "octal")]
pub file_mode: u16,
/// Owner user ID.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub uid: u32,
/// Owner group ID.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub gid: u32,
/// Number of paths referencing the inode.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub nlink: u32,
/// Modification timestamp in Unix time.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub mtime: u32,
/// Major ID (class of device) for the device containing the inode.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub dev_maj: u32,
/// Minor ID (specific device instance) for the device containing the inode.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub dev_min: u32,
/// Major ID (class of device) represented by this entry. This is only
/// relevant for [`CpioEntryType::Char`] and [`CpioEntryType::Block`].
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub rdev_maj: u32,
/// Minor ID (specific device instance) represented by this entry. This is
/// only relevant for [`CpioEntryType::Char`] and [`CpioEntryType::Block`].
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub rdev_min: u32,
/// CRC32 checksum.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Zero::is_zero")]
pub crc32: u32,
}
impl fmt::Debug for CpioEntry {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("CpioEntry")
.field("path", &self.path.as_bstr())
.field("data", &self.data)
.field("inode", &self.inode)
.field("file_type", &self.file_type)
.field("file_mode", &self.file_mode)
.field("uid", &self.uid)
.field("gid", &self.gid)
.field("nlink", &self.nlink)
@@ -120,84 +303,89 @@ impl fmt::Debug for CpioEntryNew {
.field("dev_min", &self.dev_min)
.field("rdev_maj", &self.rdev_maj)
.field("rdev_min", &self.rdev_min)
.field("chksum", &self.chksum)
.field("name", &self.name.as_bstr())
.field("content", &NumBytes(self.content.len()))
.field("crc32", &self.crc32)
.finish()
}
}
impl fmt::Display for CpioEntryNew {
impl fmt::Display for CpioEntry {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
let file_type_str = match file_type(self.mode) {
S_IFIFO => Cow::Borrowed("pipe"),
S_IFCHR => Cow::Borrowed("character device"),
S_IFDIR => Cow::Borrowed("directory"),
S_IFBLK => Cow::Borrowed("block device"),
S_IFREG => Cow::Borrowed("regular file"),
S_IFLNK => Cow::Borrowed("symbolic link"),
S_IFSOCK => Cow::Borrowed("socket"),
C_ISCTG => Cow::Borrowed("reserved"),
m => Cow::Owned(format!("unknown ({m:o})")),
};
writeln!(f, "Filename: {:?}", self.name.as_bstr())?;
writeln!(f, "Filetype: {file_type_str}")?;
writeln!(f, "Inode: {}", self.ino)?;
writeln!(f, "Mode: {:o}", self.mode)?;
writeln!(f, "UID: {}", self.uid)?;
writeln!(f, "GID: {}", self.gid)?;
writeln!(f, "Links: {}", self.nlink)?;
writeln!(f, "Modified: {}", self.mtime)?;
writeln!(f, "Device: {:x},{:x}", self.dev_maj, self.dev_min)?;
writeln!(f, "Device ID: {:x},{:x}", self.rdev_maj, self.rdev_min)?;
writeln!(f, "Checksum: {:x}", self.chksum)?;
writeln!(f, "Content: {:?}", NumBytes(self.content.len()))?;
writeln!(f, "Path: {:?}", self.path.as_bstr())?;
match &self.data {
CpioEntryData::Size(s) => {
writeln!(f, "Data: {:?}", &NumBytes(*s))?;
}
CpioEntryData::Data(d) => {
if self.file_type == CpioEntryType::Symlink {
writeln!(f, "Data: {:?}", d.as_bstr())?;
} else {
writeln!(f, "Data: {:?}", &NumBytes(d.len()))?;
}
}
}
writeln!(f, "Inode: {}", self.inode)?;
writeln!(f, "Type: {}", self.file_type)?;
writeln!(f, "Mode: {:o}", self.file_mode)?;
writeln!(f, "UID: {}", self.uid)?;
writeln!(f, "GID: {}", self.gid)?;
writeln!(f, "Links: {}", self.nlink)?;
writeln!(f, "Modtime: {}", self.mtime)?;
writeln!(f, "Idevice: {:x},{:x}", self.dev_maj, self.dev_min)?;
writeln!(f, "Rdevice: {:x},{:x}", self.rdev_maj, self.rdev_min)?;
write!(f, "CRC32: {:x}", self.crc32)?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl CpioEntryNew {
impl CpioEntry {
pub fn new_trailer() -> Self {
Self {
path: CPIO_TRAILER.to_vec(),
// Must be 1 for CRC format.
nlink: 1,
name: CPIO_TRAILER.to_vec(),
..Default::default()
}
}
pub fn new_symlink(link_target: &[u8], name: &[u8]) -> Self {
pub fn new_symlink(path: &[u8], link_target: &[u8]) -> Self {
Self {
mode: S_IFLNK | 0o777,
path: path.to_owned(),
data: CpioEntryData::Data(link_target.to_owned()),
file_type: CpioEntryType::Symlink,
file_mode: 0o777,
nlink: 1,
name: name.to_owned(),
content: link_target.to_owned(),
..Default::default()
}
}
pub fn new_directory(name: &[u8]) -> Self {
pub fn new_directory(path: &[u8], mode: u16) -> Self {
Self {
mode: S_IFDIR,
path: path.to_owned(),
file_type: CpioEntryType::Directory,
file_mode: mode,
nlink: 1,
name: name.to_owned(),
..Default::default()
}
}
pub fn new_file(name: &[u8]) -> Self {
pub fn new_file(path: &[u8], mode: u16, data: CpioEntryData) -> Self {
Self {
mode: S_IFREG,
path: path.to_owned(),
data,
file_type: CpioEntryType::Regular,
file_mode: mode,
nlink: 1,
name: name.to_owned(),
..Default::default()
}
}
pub fn is_trailer(&self) -> bool {
self.path == CPIO_TRAILER
}
}
impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for CpioEntryNew {
impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for CpioEntry {
type Error = Error;
fn from_reader(reader: R) -> Result<Self> {
@@ -210,39 +398,61 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for CpioEntryNew {
return Err(Error::UnknownMagic(magic));
}
let ino = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let inode = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let mode = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let uid = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let gid = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let nlink = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let mtime = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let filesize = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let file_size = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let dev_maj = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let dev_min = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let rdev_maj = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let rdev_min = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let namesize = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let chksum = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let path_size = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let crc32 = read_int(&mut reader)?;
let mut name = vec![0u8; namesize.to_usize().unwrap()];
reader.read_exact(&mut name)?;
if name.last() != Some(&b'\0') {
let mut path = read_data(
&mut reader,
path_size.to_usize().unwrap(),
&AtomicBool::new(false),
)?;
if path.last() != Some(&b'\0') {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
"Filename is not NULL-terminated",
)
.into());
}
name.pop();
path.pop();
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, 4)?;
let mut content = vec![0u8; filesize.to_usize().unwrap()];
reader.read_exact(&mut content)?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, 4)?;
let file_type = CpioEntryType::from_mode(mode);
let data = match file_type {
// Handled by CpioReader for streaming reads.
CpioEntryType::Regular => CpioEntryData::Size(file_size),
// Symlinks store the target in the file data.
CpioEntryType::Symlink => {
let content = read_data(
&mut reader,
file_size.to_usize().unwrap(),
&AtomicBool::new(false),
)?;
padding::read_discard(&mut reader, 4)?;
CpioEntryData::Data(content)
}
// No other entry type should have data.
t if file_size != 0 => return Err(Error::EntryHasData(t, path)),
_ => CpioEntryData::Size(0),
};
Ok(Self {
ino,
mode,
path,
data,
inode,
file_type,
file_mode: (mode & 0o7777) as u16,
uid,
gid,
nlink,
@@ -251,76 +461,236 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for CpioEntryNew {
dev_min,
rdev_maj,
rdev_min,
chksum,
name,
content,
crc32,
})
}
}
impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for CpioEntryNew {
impl<W: Write> ToWriter<W> for CpioEntry {
type Error = Error;
fn to_writer(&self, writer: W) -> Result<()> {
let mut writer = CountingWriter::new(writer);
let filesize = self
.content
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("filesize"))?;
let namesize = self
.name
let path_size = self
.path
.len()
.checked_add(1)
.and_then(|s| s.to_u32())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("filesize"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("path_size"))?;
if self.chksum == 0 {
let file_size = self.data.size()?;
if file_size != 0
&& self.file_type != CpioEntryType::Regular
&& self.file_type != CpioEntryType::Symlink
{
return Err(Error::EntryHasData(self.file_type, self.path.clone()));
}
if self.crc32 == 0 {
writer.write_all(MAGIC_NEW)?;
} else {
writer.write_all(MAGIC_NEW_CRC)?;
}
write_int(&mut writer, self.ino)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.mode)?;
let mode = self.file_type.to_mode() | u32::from(self.file_mode & 0o7777);
write_int(&mut writer, self.inode)?;
write_int(&mut writer, mode)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.uid)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.gid)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.nlink)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.mtime)?;
write_int(&mut writer, filesize)?;
write_int(&mut writer, file_size)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.dev_maj)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.dev_min)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.rdev_maj)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.rdev_min)?;
write_int(&mut writer, namesize)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.chksum)?;
write_int(&mut writer, path_size)?;
write_int(&mut writer, self.crc32)?;
writer.write_all(&self.name)?;
writer.write_all(&self.path)?;
writer.write_zeros_exact(1)?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, 4)?;
writer.write_all(&self.content)?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, 4)?;
if let CpioEntryData::Data(d) = &self.data {
writer.write_all(d)?;
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, 4)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
pub fn load(mut reader: impl Read, include_trailer: bool) -> Result<Vec<CpioEntryNew>> {
let mut entries = vec![];
pub struct CpioReader<R: Read> {
reader: R,
include_trailer: bool,
range: Option<Range<u64>>,
done: bool,
}
loop {
let entry = CpioEntryNew::from_reader(&mut reader)?;
if file_type(entry.mode) != S_IFDIR && entry.nlink > 1 {
return Err(Error::HardLinksNotSupported(entry.name));
impl<R: Read> CpioReader<R> {
pub fn new(reader: R, include_trailer: bool) -> Self {
Self {
reader,
include_trailer,
range: None,
done: false,
}
}
pub fn into_inner(self) -> R {
self.reader
}
fn skip_data(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
if let Some(range) = &mut self.range {
// This cannot overflow because cpio file sizes are 32 bit.
let n = range.end - range.start + padding::calc(range.end, 4);
self.reader.read_discard_exact(n)?;
self.range = None;
}
if entry.name == CPIO_TRAILER {
if include_trailer {
entries.push(entry);
Ok(())
}
pub fn next_entry(&mut self) -> Result<Option<CpioEntry>> {
if self.done {
return Ok(None);
}
self.skip_data()?;
let entry = CpioEntry::from_reader(&mut self.reader)?;
if entry.is_trailer() {
self.done = true;
if !self.include_trailer {
return Ok(None);
}
break;
} else if let CpioEntryData::Size(s) = entry.data {
self.range = Some(0..u64::from(s));
}
Ok(Some(entry))
}
}
impl<R: Read> Read for CpioReader<R> {
fn read(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
let Some(range) = &mut self.range else {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"No entry opened",
));
};
let to_read = (range.end - range.start).min(buf.len() as u64) as usize;
let n = self.reader.read(&mut buf[..to_read])?;
range.start += n as u64;
Ok(n)
}
}
pub struct CpioWriter<W: Write> {
writer: CountingWriter<W>,
pad_to_block_size: bool,
range: Option<Range<u64>>,
max_inode: u32,
}
impl<W: Write> CpioWriter<W> {
pub fn new(writer: W, pad_to_block_size: bool) -> Self {
Self {
writer: CountingWriter::new(writer),
pad_to_block_size,
range: None,
max_inode: 0,
}
}
fn finish_entry(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
if let Some(range) = &mut self.range {
// This cannot overflow because cpio file sizes are 32 bit.
let n = range.end - range.start + padding::calc(range.end, 4);
self.writer.write_zeros_exact(n)?;
self.range = None;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn start_entry(&mut self, entry: &CpioEntry) -> Result<()> {
self.finish_entry()?;
entry.to_writer(&mut self.writer)?;
if let CpioEntryData::Size(s) = entry.data {
self.range = Some(0..u64::from(s));
}
self.max_inode = self.max_inode.max(entry.inode);
Ok(())
}
pub fn finish(mut self) -> Result<W> {
self.finish_entry()?;
self.start_entry(&CpioEntry::new_trailer())?;
// Pad until the end of the block.
if self.pad_to_block_size {
padding::write_zeros(&mut self.writer, IO_BLOCK_SIZE)?;
}
Ok(self.writer.finish().0)
}
}
impl<W: Write> Write for CpioWriter<W> {
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
let Some(range) = &mut self.range else {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"No entry started",
));
};
let to_write = (range.end - range.start).min(buf.len() as u64) as usize;
let n = self.writer.write(&buf[..to_write])?;
range.start += n as u64;
Ok(n)
}
fn flush(&mut self) -> io::Result<()> {
self.writer.flush()
}
}
pub fn load(
reader: impl Read,
include_trailer: bool,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<Vec<CpioEntry>> {
let mut cpio_reader = CpioReader::new(reader, include_trailer);
let mut entries = vec![];
while let Some(mut entry) = cpio_reader.next_entry()? {
stream::check_cancel(cancel_signal)?;
if entry.file_type != CpioEntryType::Directory && entry.nlink > 1 {
return Err(Error::HardLinksNotSupported(entry.path.clone()));
}
if let CpioEntryData::Size(s) = entry.data {
let data = read_data(&mut cpio_reader, s.to_usize().unwrap(), cancel_signal)?;
entry.data = CpioEntryData::Data(data);
}
entries.push(entry);
@@ -329,35 +699,83 @@ pub fn load(mut reader: impl Read, include_trailer: bool) -> Result<Vec<CpioEntr
Ok(entries)
}
pub fn sort(entries: &mut [CpioEntryNew]) {
entries.sort_by(|a, b| a.name.cmp(&b.name));
pub fn sort(entries: &mut [CpioEntry]) {
entries.sort_by(|a, b| a.path.cmp(&b.path));
}
pub fn reassign_inodes(entries: &mut [CpioEntryNew]) {
let mut inode = 300000;
for entry in entries {
entry.ino = inode;
inode += 1;
}
}
pub fn save(writer: impl Write, entries: &[CpioEntryNew], pad_to_block_size: bool) -> Result<()> {
let mut writer = CountingWriter::new(writer);
for entry in entries {
entry.to_writer(&mut writer)?;
/// Assign inodes to entries. If `missing_only` is true, then inodes are only
/// assigned if the inode field in an entry is set to 0.
///
/// New inodes are assigned starting immediately after the highest inode number
/// for a given ([`CpioEntry::dev_maj`], [`CpioEntry::dev_min`]) pair. If there
/// are no existing inodes assigned for a device, then the numbers begin at
/// 300000.
pub fn assign_inodes(entries: &mut [CpioEntry], missing_only: bool) -> Result<()> {
fn next_non_zero(i: u32) -> u32 {
if i == u32::MAX {
1
} else {
i.wrapping_add(1)
}
}
let mut trailer = CpioEntryNew::new_trailer();
// 1 higher than the highest inode if possible.
trailer.ino = entries.iter().map(|e| e.ino).max().map_or(0, |i| i + 1);
trailer.to_writer(&mut writer)?;
// (dev maj, dev min) -> (inode set, last assigned inode)
let mut inodes: HashMap<(u32, u32), (HashSet<u32>, u32)> = HashMap::new();
// Pad until the end of the block.
if pad_to_block_size {
padding::write_zeros(&mut writer, IO_BLOCK_SIZE)?;
if missing_only {
for entry in &mut *entries {
if entry.inode != 0 {
let key = (entry.dev_maj, entry.dev_min);
let (set, last) = inodes.entry(key).or_default();
set.insert(entry.inode);
*last = (*last).max(entry.inode);
}
}
}
for entry in entries {
if entry.inode == 0 {
let key = (entry.dev_maj, entry.dev_min);
let (set, last) = inodes
.entry(key)
.or_insert_with(|| (HashSet::new(), 299999));
let mut unused = next_non_zero(*last);
while set.contains(&unused) {
if unused == *last {
return Err(Error::DeviceFull(entry.dev_maj, entry.dev_min));
}
unused = next_non_zero(unused);
}
entry.inode = unused;
set.insert(unused);
*last = unused;
}
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn save(
writer: impl Write,
entries: &[CpioEntry],
pad_to_block_size: bool,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<()> {
let mut cpio_writer = CpioWriter::new(writer, pad_to_block_size);
for entry in entries {
stream::check_cancel(cancel_signal)?;
cpio_writer.start_entry(entry)?;
// CpioEntryData::Data will have already been written.
}
cpio_writer.finish()?;
Ok(())
}
+42 -36
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use thiserror::Error;
use crate::{
format::verityrs,
stream::{self, FromReader, ReadSeek, ToWriter, WriteSeek, WriteZerosExt},
stream::{self, FromReader, ReadSeekReopen, ToWriter, WriteSeekReopen, WriteZerosExt},
util::NumBytes,
};
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ const FEC_HEADER_SIZE: usize = 60;
const FEC_MAGIC: u32 = 0xFECFECFE;
const FEC_VERSION: u32 = 0;
const FEC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE: u32 = 16384;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("FEC with parity byte count of {0} is not supported")]
@@ -61,8 +63,8 @@ pub enum Error {
InvalidHeaderFecSize { value: usize, available: usize },
#[error("Expected FEC digest {expected}, but have {actual}")]
InvalidFecDigest { expected: String, actual: String },
#[error("{0:?} field exceeds integer bounds")]
IntegerTooLarge(&'static str),
#[error("{0:?} field is out of bounds")]
FieldOutOfBounds(&'static str),
#[error("I/O error")]
Io(#[from] io::Error),
}
@@ -158,6 +160,8 @@ impl Fec {
input: file_size,
block: block_size,
});
} else if block_size > FEC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE {
return Err(Error::FieldOutOfBounds("block_size"));
}
let rs_k = 255 - parity;
@@ -168,6 +172,17 @@ impl Fec {
let blocks = div_ceil(file_size, u64::from(block_size));
let rounds = div_ceil(blocks, u64::from(rs_k));
// Check upfront so we don't need to do checked multiplication later.
rounds
.checked_mul(u64::from(parity))
.and_then(|s| s.checked_mul(u64::from(block_size)))
.and_then(|s| s.to_usize())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("fec_data_size"))?;
rounds
.checked_mul(u64::from(rs_k))
.and_then(|s| s.checked_mul(u64::from(block_size)))
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("fec_grid_size"))?;
Ok(Self {
file_size,
block_size,
@@ -404,7 +419,7 @@ impl Fec {
/// This function is multithreaded and uses rayon's global thread pool.
pub fn generate(
&self,
open_input: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
input: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let fec_size = self.fec_size();
@@ -415,7 +430,7 @@ impl Fec {
.map(|(round, buf)| -> Result<()> {
stream::check_cancel(cancel_signal)?;
let reader = open_input()?;
let reader = input.reopen_boxed()?;
self.generate_one_round(reader, round as u64, buf)
})
.collect::<Result<()>>()?;
@@ -430,7 +445,7 @@ impl Fec {
/// This function is multithreaded and uses rayon's global thread pool.
pub fn verify(
&self,
open_input: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
input: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
fec: &[u8],
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<()> {
@@ -448,7 +463,7 @@ impl Fec {
.map(|(round, buf)| -> Result<()> {
stream::check_cancel(cancel_signal)?;
let reader = open_input()?;
let reader = input.reopen_boxed()?;
self.verify_one_round(reader, round as u64, buf)
})
.collect::<Result<()>>()?;
@@ -469,8 +484,8 @@ impl Fec {
/// This function is multithreaded and uses rayon's global thread pool.
pub fn repair(
&self,
open_input: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
open_output: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn WriteSeek>> + Sync,
input: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
output: &(dyn WriteSeekReopen + Sync),
fec: &[u8],
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<u64> {
@@ -489,8 +504,8 @@ impl Fec {
.map(|(round, buf)| -> Result<u64> {
stream::check_cancel(cancel_signal)?;
let reader = open_input()?;
let writer = open_output()?;
let reader = input.reopen_boxed()?;
let writer = output.reopen_boxed()?;
self.repair_one_round(reader, writer, round as u64, buf)
})
.collect::<Result<Vec<u64>>>()?
@@ -527,16 +542,16 @@ impl FecImage {
/// Generate FEC data for a file. `parity` is the number of parity bytes per
/// 255-byte Reed-Solomon codeword.
pub fn generate(
open_input: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
input: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
parity: u8,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<Self> {
let data_size = {
let mut file = open_input()?;
let mut file = input.reopen_boxed()?;
file.seek(SeekFrom::End(0))?
};
let fec = Fec::new(data_size, FEC_BLOCK_SIZE as u32, parity)?;
let fec_data = fec.generate(open_input, cancel_signal)?;
let fec_data = fec.generate(input, cancel_signal)?;
Ok(Self {
fec: fec_data,
@@ -549,11 +564,11 @@ impl FecImage {
/// [`Self::repair()`] if performing a repair is not necessary.
pub fn verify(
&self,
open_input: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
input: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<()> {
let fec = Fec::new(self.data_size, FEC_BLOCK_SIZE as u32, self.parity)?;
fec.verify(open_input, &self.fec, cancel_signal)
fec.verify(input, &self.fec, cancel_signal)
}
/// Repair a file using this instance's FEC data. The maximum correctable
@@ -573,12 +588,12 @@ impl FecImage {
/// that multiple threads will always read and write disjoint file offsets.
pub fn repair(
&self,
open_input: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
open_output: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn WriteSeek>> + Sync,
input: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
output: &(dyn WriteSeekReopen + Sync),
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
) -> Result<u64> {
let fec = Fec::new(self.data_size, FEC_BLOCK_SIZE as u32, self.parity)?;
fec.repair(open_input, open_output, &self.fec, cancel_signal)
fec.repair(input, output, &self.fec, cancel_signal)
}
/// Build one instance of the FEC header. The caller is responsible for
@@ -588,7 +603,7 @@ impl FecImage {
.fec
.len()
.to_u32()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("fec_size"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("fec_size"))?;
let mut writer = Cursor::new([0u8; FEC_HEADER_SIZE]);
@@ -649,12 +664,12 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for FecImage {
let parity = header_reader
.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?
.to_u8()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("parity"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("parity"))?;
let fec_size = header_reader
.read_u32::<LittleEndian>()?
.to_usize()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("fec_size"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("fec_size"))?;
let actual_fec_size = fec.len() - FEC_BLOCK_SIZE;
if fec_size != actual_fec_size {
return Err(Error::InvalidHeaderFecSize {
@@ -749,18 +764,15 @@ mod tests {
let num_codewords = fec.rounds as usize * block_size as usize;
// Generate FEC data.
let fec_data = fec
.generate(|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())), &cancel_signal)
.unwrap();
let fec_data = fec.generate(&file, &cancel_signal).unwrap();
// Verify that there are no errors.
fec.verify(|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())), &fec_data, &cancel_signal)
.unwrap();
fec.verify(&file, &fec_data, &cancel_signal).unwrap();
// Verify that errors are detected.
corrupt_byte(&mut file, 0);
assert_matches!(
fec.verify(|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())), &fec_data, &cancel_signal,),
fec.verify(&file, &fec_data, &cancel_signal),
Err(Error::HasErrors)
);
@@ -770,13 +782,7 @@ mod tests {
}
// Verify that all the single-byte errors can be fixed.
fec.repair(
|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())),
|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())),
&fec_data,
&cancel_signal,
)
.unwrap();
fec.repair(&file, &file, &fec_data, &cancel_signal).unwrap();
let repaired_digest = {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
@@ -811,7 +817,7 @@ mod tests {
file.write_all(&buf).unwrap();
}
let image = FecImage::generate(|| Ok(Box::new(file.reopen())), 2, &cancel_signal).unwrap();
let image = FecImage::generate(&file, 2, &cancel_signal).unwrap();
let mut fec_file = Cursor::new(Vec::new());
image.to_writer(&mut fec_file).unwrap();
+125 -29
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ use std::{
use cms::signed_data::SignedData;
use const_oid::{db::rfc5912, ObjectIdentifier};
use memchr::memmem;
use prost::Message;
use ring::digest::Context;
use rsa::{Pkcs1v15Sign, RsaPrivateKey};
use sha1::Sha1;
@@ -24,9 +25,8 @@ use zip::{result::ZipError, write::FileOptions, CompressionMethod, ZipArchive, Z
use crate::{
crypto,
format::payload::{self, PayloadHeader},
protobuf::build::tools::releasetools::{mod_OtaMetadata::OtaType, OtaMetadata},
protobuf::build::tools::releasetools::{ota_metadata::OtaType, OtaMetadata},
stream::{self, FromReader, HashingReader, HashingWriter},
util,
};
pub const PATH_METADATA: &str = "META-INF/com/android/metadata";
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ const ZIP_EOCD_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"PK\x05\x06";
const COMMENT_MESSAGE: &[u8] = b"signed by avbroot\0";
const LEGACY_SEP: &str = "|";
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Cannot find OTA signature footer magic")]
@@ -64,6 +66,10 @@ pub enum Error {
UnsupportedDigestAlgorithm(ObjectIdentifier),
#[error("Unsupported signature algorithm: {0}")]
UnsupportedSignatureAlgorithm(ObjectIdentifier),
#[error("Invalid legacy metadata line: {0:?}")]
InvalidLegacyMetadataLine(String),
#[error("Unsupported legacy metadata field: {key:?} = {value:?}")]
UnsupportedLegacyMetadataField { key: String, value: String },
#[error("Expected entry offsets {expected:?}, but have {actual:?}")]
MismatchedPropertyFiles { expected: String, actual: String },
#[error("Property files {0:?} exceed {1} byte reserved space")]
@@ -76,8 +82,8 @@ pub enum Error {
CmsSign(#[from] crypto::Error),
#[error("Payload error")]
Payload(#[from] payload::Error),
#[error("Protobuf error")]
Protobuf(#[from] quick_protobuf::Error),
#[error("Failed to decode protobuf message")]
ProtobufDecode(#[from] prost::DecodeError),
#[error("SPKI error")]
Spki(#[from] pkcs8::spki::Error),
#[error("x509 DER error")]
@@ -92,21 +98,111 @@ pub enum Error {
type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, Error>;
pub fn parse_protobuf_metadata(data: &[u8]) -> Result<OtaMetadata> {
Ok(OtaMetadata::decode(data)?)
}
/// Synthesize protobuf structure from legacy plain-text metadata.
pub fn parse_legacy_metadata(data: &str) -> Result<OtaMetadata> {
let mut metadata = OtaMetadata::default();
for line in data.split('\n') {
if line.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let (key, value) = line
.split_once('=')
.ok_or_else(|| Error::InvalidLegacyMetadataLine(line.to_owned()))?;
let unsupported = || Error::UnsupportedLegacyMetadataField {
key: key.to_owned(),
value: value.to_owned(),
};
// Booleans are represented by the presence or absence of `<key>=yes`.
let parse_yes = || match value {
"yes" => Ok(true),
_ => Err(unsupported()),
};
let parse_list = || {
value
.split(LEGACY_SEP)
.map(|s| s.to_owned())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
};
match key {
"ota-type" => {
match OtaType::from_str_name(value).ok_or_else(unsupported)? {
t @ (OtaType::Ab | OtaType::Block) => metadata.set_type(t),
// Not allowed by AOSP in the legacy format.
_ => return Err(unsupported()),
}
}
"ota-wipe" => metadata.wipe = parse_yes()?,
"ota-retrofit-dynamic-partitions" => {
metadata.retrofit_dynamic_partitions = parse_yes()?
}
"ota-downgrade" => metadata.downgrade = parse_yes()?,
"ota-required-cache" => {
metadata.required_cache = value.parse().map_err(|_| unsupported())?;
}
"post-build" => {
let p = metadata.postcondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.build = parse_list();
}
"post-build-incremental" => {
let p = metadata.postcondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.build_incremental = value.to_owned();
}
"post-sdk-level" => {
let p = metadata.postcondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.sdk_level = value.to_owned();
}
"post-security-patch-level" => {
let p = metadata.postcondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.security_patch_level = value.to_owned();
}
"post-timestamp" => {
let p = metadata.postcondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.timestamp = value.parse().map_err(|_| unsupported())?;
}
"pre-device" => {
let p = metadata.precondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.device = parse_list();
}
"pre-build" => {
let p = metadata.precondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.build = parse_list();
}
"pre-build-incremental" => {
let p = metadata.precondition.get_or_insert_with(Default::default);
p.build_incremental = value.to_owned();
}
"spl-downgrade" => metadata.spl_downgrade = parse_yes()?,
k if k.ends_with("-property-files") => {
metadata
.property_files
.insert(key.to_owned(), value.to_owned());
}
_ => {
// Ignore. Some OEMs insert values that aren't defined in AOSP.
}
}
}
Ok(metadata)
}
/// Generate the legacy plain-text and modern protobuf serializations of the
/// given metadata instance.
fn serialize_metadata(metadata: &OtaMetadata) -> Result<(String, Vec<u8>)> {
const SEP: &str = "|";
use std::fmt::Write;
let mut pairs = BTreeMap::<String, String>::new();
match metadata.type_pb {
OtaType::AB => {
pairs.insert("ota-type".to_owned(), "AB".to_owned());
}
OtaType::BLOCK => {
pairs.insert("ota-type".to_owned(), "BLOCK".to_owned());
}
_ => {}
// Other types are not allowed by AOSP in the legacy format.
if let t @ (OtaType::Ab | OtaType::Block) = metadata.r#type() {
pairs.insert("ota-type".to_owned(), t.as_str_name().to_owned());
}
if metadata.wipe {
pairs.insert("ota-wipe".to_owned(), "yes".to_owned());
@@ -127,7 +223,7 @@ fn serialize_metadata(metadata: &OtaMetadata) -> Result<(String, Vec<u8>)> {
);
if let Some(p) = &metadata.postcondition {
pairs.insert("post-build".to_owned(), p.build.join(SEP));
pairs.insert("post-build".to_owned(), p.build.join(LEGACY_SEP));
pairs.insert(
"post-build-incremental".to_owned(),
p.build_incremental.clone(),
@@ -141,9 +237,9 @@ fn serialize_metadata(metadata: &OtaMetadata) -> Result<(String, Vec<u8>)> {
}
if let Some(p) = &metadata.precondition {
pairs.insert("pre-device".to_owned(), p.device.join(SEP));
pairs.insert("pre-device".to_owned(), p.device.join(LEGACY_SEP));
if !p.build.is_empty() {
pairs.insert("pre-build".to_owned(), p.build.join(SEP));
pairs.insert("pre-build".to_owned(), p.build.join(LEGACY_SEP));
pairs.insert(
"pre-build-incremental".to_owned(),
p.build_incremental.clone(),
@@ -157,11 +253,11 @@ fn serialize_metadata(metadata: &OtaMetadata) -> Result<(String, Vec<u8>)> {
pairs.extend(metadata.property_files.clone());
let legacy_metadata = pairs
.into_iter()
.map(|(k, v)| format!("{k}={v}\n"))
.collect::<String>();
let modern_metadata = util::write_protobuf(metadata)?;
let legacy_metadata = pairs.into_iter().fold(String::new(), |mut output, (k, v)| {
let _ = writeln!(output, "{k}={v}");
output
});
let modern_metadata = metadata.encode_to_vec();
Ok((legacy_metadata, modern_metadata))
}
@@ -286,9 +382,9 @@ fn add_payload_metadata_entry(
/// Add metadata files to the output OTA zip. `zip_entries` is the list of
/// [`ZipEntry`] already written to `zip_writer`. `next_offset` is the current
/// file offset (where the next zip entry's local header begins).
/// `metadata_pb_raw` is the serialized OTA metadata protobuf message from the
/// original OTA. `payload_metadata_size` is the size of the new payload's
/// metadata and metadata signature regions.
/// `metadata` is the OTA metadata protobuf message from the original OTA.
/// `payload_metadata_size` is the size of the new payload's metadata and
/// metadata signature regions.
///
/// The zip file's backing file position MUST BE set to where the central
/// directory would start.
@@ -296,10 +392,10 @@ pub fn add_metadata(
zip_entries: &[ZipEntry],
zip_writer: &mut ZipWriter<impl Write>,
next_offset: u64,
metadata_pb_raw: &[u8],
metadata: &OtaMetadata,
payload_metadata_size: u64,
) -> Result<OtaMetadata> {
let mut metadata: OtaMetadata = util::read_protobuf(metadata_pb_raw)?;
let mut metadata = metadata.clone();
let options = FileOptions::default().compression_method(CompressionMethod::Stored);
let mut zip_entries = zip_entries.to_owned();
@@ -521,9 +617,9 @@ pub fn parse_zip_ota_info(
let metadata = {
let mut entry = zip.by_name(PATH_METADATA_PB)?;
let mut buf = vec![0u8; entry.size() as usize];
entry.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
util::read_protobuf::<OtaMetadata>(&buf)?
let mut buf = Vec::new();
entry.read_to_end(&mut buf)?;
OtaMetadata::decode(buf.as_slice())?
};
let certificate = {
+50 -49
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use base64::Engine;
use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt};
use bzip2::write::BzDecoder;
use num_traits::ToPrimitive;
use quick_protobuf::MessageWrite;
use prost::Message;
use rayon::prelude::{IntoParallelIterator, IntoParallelRefIterator, ParallelIterator};
use ring::digest::{Context, Digest};
use rsa::{traits::PublicKeyParts, Pkcs1v15Sign, RsaPrivateKey};
@@ -30,19 +30,20 @@ use xz2::{
use crate::{
crypto,
protobuf::chromeos_update_engine::{
mod_InstallOperation, mod_Signatures::Signature, DeltaArchiveManifest, Extent,
install_operation::Type, signatures::Signature, DeltaArchiveManifest, Extent,
InstallOperation, PartitionInfo, PartitionUpdate, Signatures,
},
stream::{
self, CountingReader, CountingWriter, FromReader, HashingWriter, ReadDiscardExt, ReadSeek,
SharedCursor, WriteSeek,
self, CountingReader, CountingWriter, FromReader, HashingWriter, ReadDiscardExt,
ReadSeekReopen, Reopen, SharedCursor, WriteSeek,
},
util,
};
const OTA_MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"CrAU";
const OTA_HEADER_SIZE: usize = OTA_MAGIC.len() + 8 + 8 + 4;
const MANIFEST_MAX_SIZE: usize = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum Error {
#[error("Unknown magic: {0:?}")]
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ pub enum Error {
actual: String,
},
#[error("Unsupported partition operation: {0:?}")]
UnsupportedOperation(mod_InstallOperation::Type),
UnsupportedOperation(Type),
#[error("Expected sha256 {expected:?}, but have {actual:?}")]
MismatchedDigest {
expected: Option<String>,
@@ -84,12 +85,12 @@ pub enum Error {
MissingPartitions(HashSet<String>),
#[error("{0:?} field is missing")]
MissingField(&'static str),
#[error("{0:?} field exceeds integer bounds")]
IntegerTooLarge(&'static str),
#[error("{0:?} field is out of bounds")]
FieldOutOfBounds(&'static str),
#[error("Crypto error")]
Crypto(#[from] crypto::Error),
#[error("Protobuf error")]
Protobuf(#[from] quick_protobuf::Error),
#[error("Failed to decode protobuf message")]
ProtobufDecode(#[from] prost::DecodeError),
#[error("XZ stream error")]
XzStream(#[from] xz2::stream::Error),
#[error("RSA error")]
@@ -139,12 +140,19 @@ impl<R: Read> FromReader<R> for PayloadHeader {
let manifest_size = reader
.read_u64::<BigEndian>()?
.to_usize()
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("manifest_size"))?;
.and_then(|s| {
if s <= MANIFEST_MAX_SIZE {
Some(s)
} else {
None
}
})
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("manifest_size"))?;
let metadata_signature_size = reader.read_u32::<BigEndian>()?;
let mut manifest_raw = vec![0u8; manifest_size];
reader.read_exact(&mut manifest_raw)?;
let manifest: DeltaArchiveManifest = util::read_protobuf(&manifest_raw)?;
let manifest = DeltaArchiveManifest::decode(manifest_raw.as_slice())?;
// Skip manifest signatures.
reader.read_discard_exact(metadata_signature_size.into())?;
@@ -175,6 +183,7 @@ fn sign_digest(digest: &[u8], key: &RsaPrivateKey) -> Result<Signatures> {
data: Some(digest_signed),
// Always fits in even a u16.
unpadded_signature_size: Some(unpadded_size as u32),
..Default::default()
};
let signatures = Signatures {
@@ -320,14 +329,14 @@ impl<W: Write> PayloadWriter<W> {
ring::digest::digest(&ring::digest::SHA256, b"").as_ref(),
&key,
)?;
let dummy_sig_size = dummy_sig.get_size();
let dummy_sig_size = dummy_sig.encoded_len();
// Fill out the new payload signature information.
header.manifest.signatures_offset = Some(blob_size);
header.manifest.signatures_size = Some(dummy_sig_size as u64);
// Build new manifest.
let manifest_raw_new = util::write_protobuf(&header.manifest)?;
let manifest_raw_new = header.manifest.encode_to_vec();
// Excludes signatures (hashes are for signing).
let mut h_partial = Context::new(&ring::digest::SHA256);
@@ -355,7 +364,7 @@ impl<W: Write> PayloadWriter<W> {
// in the payload hash.
let metadata_hash = h_partial.clone().finish();
let metadata_sig = sign_digest(metadata_hash.as_ref(), &key)?;
let metadata_sig_raw = util::write_protobuf(&metadata_sig)?;
let metadata_sig_raw = metadata_sig.encode_to_vec();
write_hash!(inner, [h_full], &metadata_sig_raw)?;
Ok(Self {
@@ -383,7 +392,7 @@ impl<W: Write> PayloadWriter<W> {
// Append payload signature.
let payload_partial_hash = self.h_partial.clone().finish();
let payload_sig = sign_digest(payload_partial_hash.as_ref(), &self.key)?;
let payload_sig_raw = util::write_protobuf(&payload_sig)?;
let payload_sig_raw = payload_sig.encode_to_vec();
write_hash!(self.inner, [self.h_full], &payload_sig_raw)?;
// Everything before the blob.
@@ -591,18 +600,12 @@ impl<W: Write> CompressedPartitionWriter<W> {
num_blocks: Some(self.written / u64::from(self.block_size)),
};
let operation = InstallOperation {
type_pb: mod_InstallOperation::Type::REPLACE_XZ,
// Must be manually updated by the caller.
data_offset: None,
data_length: Some(size_compressed),
src_extents: vec![],
src_length: None,
dst_extents: vec![extent],
dst_length: None,
data_sha256_hash: Some(digest_compressed.as_ref().to_vec()),
src_sha256_hash: None,
};
// data_offset must be manually updated by the caller.
let mut operation = InstallOperation::default();
operation.set_type(Type::ReplaceXz);
operation.data_length = Some(size_compressed);
operation.dst_extents.push(extent);
operation.data_sha256_hash = Some(digest_compressed.as_ref().to_vec());
partition.operations.clear();
partition.operations.push(operation);
@@ -676,7 +679,7 @@ pub fn verify_payload(
)?;
let buf = writer.into_inner();
util::read_protobuf::<Signatures>(&buf)?
Signatures::decode(buf.as_slice())?
};
// Check the metadata signatures.
@@ -728,7 +731,7 @@ pub fn verify_payload(
)?;
let buf = writer.into_inner();
util::read_protobuf::<Signatures>(&buf)?
Signatures::decode(buf.as_slice())?
};
// Check the payload signatures.
@@ -779,19 +782,19 @@ pub fn apply_operation(
let out_offset = start_block
.checked_mul(block_size.into())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("out_offset"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("out_offset"))?;
let out_data_length = num_blocks
.checked_mul(block_size.into())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("out_data_length"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("out_data_length"))?;
writer.seek(SeekFrom::Start(out_offset))?;
let mut hasher = Context::new(&ring::digest::SHA256);
match op.type_pb {
match op.r#type() {
// Handle ZERO/DISCARD specially since they don't require access to
// the payload blob.
mod_InstallOperation::Type::ZERO | mod_InstallOperation::Type::DISCARD => {
Type::Zero | Type::Discard => {
stream::copy_n_inspect(
io::repeat(0),
&mut writer,
@@ -809,12 +812,12 @@ pub fn apply_operation(
.ok_or_else(|| Error::MissingField("data_length"))?;
let in_offset = blob_offset
.checked_add(data_offset)
.ok_or_else(|| Error::IntegerTooLarge("in_offset"))?;
.ok_or_else(|| Error::FieldOutOfBounds("in_offset"))?;
reader.seek(SeekFrom::Start(in_offset))?;
match other {
mod_InstallOperation::Type::REPLACE => {
Type::Replace => {
stream::copy_n_inspect(
&mut reader,
&mut writer,
@@ -823,7 +826,7 @@ pub fn apply_operation(
cancel_signal,
)?;
}
mod_InstallOperation::Type::REPLACE_BZ => {
Type::ReplaceBz => {
let mut decoder = BzDecoder::new(&mut writer);
stream::copy_n_inspect(
&mut reader,
@@ -834,7 +837,7 @@ pub fn apply_operation(
)?;
decoder.finish()?;
}
mod_InstallOperation::Type::REPLACE_XZ => {
Type::ReplaceXz => {
let mut decoder = XzDecoder::new(&mut writer);
stream::copy_n_inspect(
&mut reader,
@@ -845,7 +848,7 @@ pub fn apply_operation(
)?;
decoder.finish()?;
}
_ => return Err(Error::UnsupportedOperation(op.type_pb)),
_ => return Err(Error::UnsupportedOperation(op.r#type())),
}
}
}
@@ -853,9 +856,7 @@ pub fn apply_operation(
let expected_digest = op.data_sha256_hash.as_deref();
let digest = hasher.finish();
if expected_digest != Some(digest.as_ref())
&& op.type_pb != mod_InstallOperation::Type::ZERO
{
if expected_digest != Some(digest.as_ref()) && op.r#type() != Type::Zero {
return Err(Error::MismatchedDigest {
expected: expected_digest.map(hex::encode),
actual: hex::encode(digest.as_ref()),
@@ -870,7 +871,7 @@ pub fn apply_operation(
/// multithreaded and uses rayon's global thread pool. `open_payload` will be
/// called from multiple threads.
pub fn extract_image_to_memory(
open_payload: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
payload: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
header: &PayloadHeader,
partition_name: &str,
cancel_signal: &AtomicBool,
@@ -887,13 +888,13 @@ pub fn extract_image_to_memory(
.operations
.par_iter()
.map(|op| -> Result<()> {
let reader = open_payload()?;
let writer = stream.reopen();
let reader = payload.reopen_boxed()?;
let writer = stream.reopen()?;
apply_operation(
reader,
writer,
header.manifest.block_size,
header.manifest.block_size(),
header.blob_offset,
op,
cancel_signal,
@@ -910,7 +911,7 @@ pub fn extract_image_to_memory(
/// is done multithreaded and uses rayon's global thread pool. `open_payload`
/// and `open_output` will be called from multiple threads.
pub fn extract_images<'a>(
open_payload: impl Fn() -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> + Sync,
payload: &(dyn ReadSeekReopen + Sync),
open_output: impl Fn(&str) -> io::Result<Box<dyn WriteSeek>> + Sync,
header: &PayloadHeader,
partition_names: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a str>,
@@ -937,13 +938,13 @@ pub fn extract_images<'a>(
operations
.into_par_iter()
.map(|(name, op)| -> Result<()> {
let reader = open_payload()?;
let reader = payload.reopen_boxed()?;
let writer = open_output(name)?;
apply_operation(
reader,
writer,
header.manifest.block_size,
header.manifest.block_size(),
header.blob_offset,
op,
cancel_signal,
+1
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ pub mod cli;
pub mod crypto;
pub mod escape;
pub mod format;
pub mod octal;
pub mod protobuf;
pub mod stream;
pub mod util;
+53
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 Andrew Gunnerson
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
*/
//! Hack to format an integer as an octal string because toml_edit can't output
//! octal-formatted integers and many other toml parsers can't parse it either.
use std::{
fmt::{self, Octal},
marker::PhantomData,
};
use num_traits::{Num, PrimInt};
use serde::{de::Visitor, Deserializer, Serializer};
pub fn serialize<S, T>(data: &T, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
where
S: Serializer,
T: PrimInt + Octal,
{
serializer.serialize_str(&format!("{data:o}"))
}
pub fn deserialize<'de, D, T>(deserializer: D) -> Result<T, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
T: PrimInt,
<T as Num>::FromStrRadixErr: fmt::Display,
{
struct OctalStrVisitor<T>(PhantomData<T>);
impl<'de, T> Visitor<'de> for OctalStrVisitor<T>
where
T: PrimInt,
<T as Num>::FromStrRadixErr: fmt::Display,
{
type Value = T;
fn expecting(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "a string containing an octal number")
}
fn visit_str<E>(self, data: &str) -> Result<Self::Value, E>
where
E: serde::de::Error,
{
T::from_str_radix(data, 8).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
}
}
deserializer.deserialize_str(OctalStrVisitor(PhantomData))
}
+11 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1,11 @@
include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/protobuf/mod.rs"));
pub mod build {
pub mod tools {
pub mod releasetools {
include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/build.tools.releasetools.rs"));
}
}
}
pub mod chromeos_update_engine {
include!(concat!(env!("OUT_DIR"), "/chromeos_update_engine.rs"));
}
+70 -17
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
use std::{
fs::File,
io::{self, Cursor, Read, Seek, SeekFrom, Write},
io::{self, BufReader, BufWriter, Cursor, Read, Seek, SeekFrom, Write},
sync::{
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
Arc, Mutex, RwLock,
@@ -30,6 +30,28 @@ pub trait WriteSeek: Write + Seek {}
impl<W: Write + Seek> WriteSeek for W {}
/// A trait for seekable and reopenable readers.
pub trait ReadSeekReopen: ReadSeek {
fn reopen_boxed(&self) -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>>;
}
impl<R: ReadSeek + Reopen + 'static> ReadSeekReopen for R {
fn reopen_boxed(&self) -> io::Result<Box<dyn ReadSeek>> {
Ok(Box::new(self.reopen()?))
}
}
/// A trait for seekable and reopenable writers.
pub trait WriteSeekReopen: WriteSeek {
fn reopen_boxed(&self) -> io::Result<Box<dyn WriteSeek>>;
}
impl<W: WriteSeek + Reopen + 'static> WriteSeekReopen for W {
fn reopen_boxed(&self) -> io::Result<Box<dyn WriteSeek>> {
Ok(Box::new(self.reopen()?))
}
}
/// Common function for reading a structure from a reader.
pub trait FromReader<R: Read>: Sized {
type Error;
@@ -168,6 +190,25 @@ impl<W: Write> WriteStringExt for W {
}
}
/// Extensions for file-like types to reopen themselves.
pub trait Reopen: Sized {
/// Open a new handle to the same file. The new handle is independently
/// seekable and the file offset is initially set to 0.
fn reopen(&self) -> io::Result<Self>;
}
impl<R: Read + Reopen> Reopen for BufReader<R> {
fn reopen(&self) -> io::Result<Self> {
Ok(BufReader::new(self.get_ref().reopen()?))
}
}
impl<W: Write + Reopen> Reopen for BufWriter<W> {
fn reopen(&self) -> io::Result<Self> {
Ok(BufWriter::new(self.get_ref().reopen()?))
}
}
/// A reader wrapper that implements [`Seek`], but only for reporting the
/// current file position.
pub struct CountingReader<R: Read> {
@@ -325,6 +366,14 @@ impl<R: Read + Seek> SectionReader<R> {
}
}
impl<R: Read + Seek + Reopen> Reopen for SectionReader<R> {
fn reopen(&self) -> io::Result<Self> {
let inner = self.inner.reopen()?;
Self::new(inner, self.start, self.size)
}
}
impl<R: Read + Seek> Read for SectionReader<R> {
fn read(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
let to_read = self.size.saturating_sub(self.pos).min(buf.len() as u64) as usize;
@@ -417,13 +466,6 @@ impl PSeekFile {
}
}
pub fn reopen(&self) -> Self {
Self {
file: self.file.clone(),
offset: 0,
}
}
pub fn set_len(&self, size: u64) -> io::Result<()> {
let file_locked = self.file.read().unwrap();
file_locked.set_len(size)
@@ -458,6 +500,15 @@ impl PSeekFile {
}
}
impl Reopen for PSeekFile {
fn reopen(&self) -> io::Result<Self> {
Ok(Self {
file: self.file.clone(),
offset: 0,
})
}
}
impl Read for PSeekFile {
fn read(&mut self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<usize> {
let n = self.read_at(buf)?;
@@ -530,12 +581,14 @@ impl SharedCursor {
..Default::default()
}
}
}
pub fn reopen(&self) -> Self {
Self {
impl Reopen for SharedCursor {
fn reopen(&self) -> io::Result<Self> {
Ok(Self {
inner: self.inner.clone(),
offset: 0,
}
})
}
}
@@ -668,8 +721,8 @@ mod tests {
use super::{
CountingReader, CountingWriter, HashingReader, HashingWriter, HolePunchingWriter,
PSeekFile, ReadDiscardExt, ReadStringExt, SectionReader, SharedCursor, WriteStringExt,
WriteZerosExt,
PSeekFile, ReadDiscardExt, ReadStringExt, Reopen, SectionReader, SharedCursor,
WriteStringExt, WriteZerosExt,
};
const FOOBAR_SHA256: [u8; 32] = [
@@ -848,8 +901,8 @@ mod tests {
fn pseek_file() {
let raw_file = tempfile::tempfile().unwrap();
let mut a = PSeekFile::new(raw_file);
let mut b = a.reopen();
let mut c = b.reopen();
let mut b = a.reopen().unwrap();
let mut c = b.reopen().unwrap();
b.write_all(b"foobar").unwrap();
c.write_all(b"hello").unwrap();
@@ -868,8 +921,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn shared_cursor() {
let mut a = SharedCursor::default();
let mut b = a.reopen();
let mut c = b.reopen();
let mut b = a.reopen().unwrap();
let mut c = b.reopen().unwrap();
b.write_all(b"foobar").unwrap();
c.write_all(b"hello").unwrap();
+14 -16
View File
@@ -3,19 +3,19 @@
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
*/
use std::fmt;
use std::{fmt, path::Path};
use quick_protobuf::{BytesReader, MessageRead, MessageWrite, Writer};
use num_traits::PrimInt;
pub const ZEROS: [u8; 16384] = [0u8; 16384];
/// A small wrapper to format a number as a size in bytes.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct NumBytes(pub usize);
pub struct NumBytes<T: PrimInt>(pub T);
impl fmt::Debug for NumBytes {
impl<T: PrimInt + fmt::Debug> fmt::Debug for NumBytes<T> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
if self.0 == 1 {
if self.0 == T::one() {
write!(f, "<{:?} byte>", self.0)
} else {
write!(f, "<{:?} bytes>", self.0)
@@ -37,16 +37,14 @@ pub fn is_zero(mut buf: &[u8]) -> bool {
true
}
/// Read a protobuf message with no leading size field.
pub fn read_protobuf<'a, M: MessageRead<'a>>(data: &'a [u8]) -> quick_protobuf::Result<M> {
let mut reader = BytesReader::from_bytes(data);
M::from_reader(&mut reader, data)
}
/// Get the non-empty parent of a path. If the path has no parent in the string,
/// then `.` is returned. This does not perform any filesystem operations.
pub fn parent_path(path: &Path) -> &Path {
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
if !parent.as_os_str().is_empty() {
return parent;
}
}
/// Write a protobuf message with no leading size field.
pub fn write_protobuf<M: MessageWrite>(message: &M) -> quick_protobuf::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(message.get_size());
let mut writer = Writer::new(&mut buf);
message.write_message(&mut writer)?;
Ok(buf)
Path::new(".")
}
+2 -10
View File
@@ -138,10 +138,7 @@ fn round_trip_appended_hash_tree_image() {
// Verify the hash tree and FEC data.
match header.appended_descriptor().unwrap() {
AppendedDescriptorRef::HashTree(d) => {
d.verify(|| Ok(Box::new(reader.reopen())), &cancel_signal)
.unwrap();
}
AppendedDescriptorRef::HashTree(d) => d.verify(&reader, &cancel_signal).unwrap(),
AppendedDescriptorRef::Hash(_) => panic!("Expected hash tree descriptor"),
}
@@ -166,12 +163,7 @@ fn round_trip_appended_hash_tree_image() {
d.fec_offset = 0;
d.fec_size = 0;
d.update(
|| Ok(Box::new(writer.reopen())),
|| Ok(Box::new(writer.reopen())),
&cancel_signal,
)
.unwrap();
d.update(&writer, &writer, &cancel_signal).unwrap();
}
AppendedDescriptorMut::Hash(_) => panic!("Expected hash tree descriptor"),
}
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 Andrew Gunnerson
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
*/
use std::io::{self, Cursor};
use avbroot::{
self,
format::cpio::{CpioEntryType, CpioReader, CpioWriter},
util,
};
#[test]
fn round_trip_archive() {
let data = include_bytes!(concat!(
env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"),
"/tests/data/archive.cpio",
));
assert_ne!(data.len() % 512, 0);
for pad_to_block_size in [false, true] {
println!("Pad to block size: {pad_to_block_size}");
let reader = Cursor::new(data);
let mut cpio_reader = CpioReader::new(reader, false);
let writer = Cursor::new(Vec::new());
let mut cpio_writer = CpioWriter::new(writer, pad_to_block_size);
while let Some(entry) = cpio_reader.next_entry().unwrap() {
cpio_writer.start_entry(&entry).unwrap();
if entry.file_type == CpioEntryType::Regular {
io::copy(&mut cpio_reader, &mut cpio_writer).unwrap();
}
}
let writer = cpio_writer.finish().unwrap();
let new_data = writer.get_ref().as_slice();
if pad_to_block_size {
assert!(new_data.starts_with(data));
assert!(util::is_zero(&new_data[data.len()..]));
assert_eq!(new_data.len() % 512, 0);
} else {
assert_eq!(new_data, data);
}
}
}
Binary file not shown.
+36
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,37 @@ vulnerability = "deny"
unmaintained = "deny"
yanked = "deny"
notice = "deny"
ignore = [
# https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071
#
# This is a side-channel vulnerability where secrets can be leaked to an
# attacker that is able to measure the timing of a large number of RSA
# operations. As of 2023-12-03, there is no released version of the rsa
# crate that contains a fix.
#
# For avbroot specifically, this vulnerability is not too critical for a
# couple reasons:
#
# 1. avbroot performs RSA signing only at the end of lengthy processes
# that involve a lot of disk I/O. It's very expensive to run avbroot
# the millions of times needed to capture a sufficient amount of timing
# data.
# 2. During a single run of avbroot, it will only perform RSA signing a
# handful of times. To get sufficient measurements, the attacker would
# need to rerun avbroot. If they are able to rerun avbroot, then they
# are also able to just read and steal the private key directly.
#
# avbroot has no network capabilities, so this is not inherently remotely
# exploitable.
"RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
]
[licenses]
include-dev = true
unlicensed = "deny"
allow = [
"Apache-2.0",
"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
"BSD-3-Clause",
"ISC",
"MIT",
@@ -26,11 +52,21 @@ license-files = [
[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn"
multiple-versions-include-dev = true
deny = [
# https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538
{ name = "serde_derive", version = ">=1.0.172,<1.0.184" },
]
[bans.build]
executables = "deny"
include-dependencies = true
include-workspace = true
bypass = [
# Copies of unmodified crashwrangler objects for old macOS versions.
{ name = "honggfuzz", allow-globs = ["honggfuzz/third_party/mac/CrashReport_*.o"] },
]
[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ avbroot = { path = "../avbroot" }
clap = { version = "4.4.1", features = ["derive"] }
ctrlc = "3.4.0"
hex = { version = "0.4.3", features = ["serde"] }
ring = "0.16.20"
ring = "0.17.0"
serde = { version = "1.0.188", features = ["derive"] }
tempfile = "3.8.0"
toml_edit = { version = "0.19.14", features = ["serde"] }
toml_edit = { version = "0.20.1", features = ["serde"] }
# https://github.com/zip-rs/zip/pull/383
[dependencies.zip]
+62 -62
View File
@@ -1,86 +1,86 @@
[magisk]
"url" = "https://github.com/topjohnwu/Magisk/releases/download/v26.0/Magisk-v26.0.apk"
"hash" = "9e14d3d3ca1f1a2765f8ca215ebbf35ea5fd2896fb147eea581fcaa3b4e77d25"
"url" = "https://github.com/topjohnwu/Magisk/releases/download/v26.3/Magisk.v26.3.apk"
"hash" = "30ff6ec0709412adfcd0b735c0eb1f61cd9d589af4bdef4cf03c09b986b5acce"
# Google Pixel 7 Pro
# What's unique: init_boot (boot v4) + vendor_boot (vendor v4)
[device.cheetah]
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/cheetah-ota-tq2a.230305.008.c1-6ac5ff2e.zip"
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/cheetah-ota-tq3a.230901.001-6b881553.zip"
sections = [
{ start = 0, end = 151715 },
{ start = 21683150, end = 23179365 },
{ start = 2043499985, end = 2043508325 },
{ start = 2315331822, end = 2333060126 },
{ start = 2344084950, end = 2344090066 },
{ start = 0, end = 152523 },
{ start = 21750700, end = 23251455 },
{ start = 2044485458, end = 2044493782 },
{ start = 2316042420, end = 2333812318 },
{ start = 2344911202, end = 2344916318 },
]
hash.original.full = "6ac5ff2e14dc16755ea4ea30e6dbe25103b889a36a465194ef943bd0d665b91c"
hash.original.stripped = "549522015f0369a3b89385f532ab62235b47c2c39540bd0adaaf6acc81fdda94"
hash.patched.full = "b380720852e2a1e994bcf38064f577bac68b18e799cf8166cb6a7edb8a661cb4"
hash.patched.stripped = "560cdf4d7b25fb5bc650f96ae5a3c7593ac229a364bb39887287cfb734f6b377"
hash.avb_images."init_boot.img" = "fac9305ce22b897fbfb193968d5346f4c70f6c18c3060bb106226f134ce5f433"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "0b3d719b751dd43bbec95d02b1bf57b5dae62e42a52502895892a207b773e77d"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "cf8c77dcf0a4474d49b5bdc2a44bdb3646464d5212fbe12aa5d3c5f531742f4f"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_vendor.img" = "660d8f61acd95a4f8ad416b4cbe126e9c039706462b4236ad723953c72ac49a8"
hash.avb_images."vendor_boot.img" = "c788d4d8eb7926ad1bfa2a9c000343c3c73cedc580449f5270a711feb620f033"
hash.original.full = "6b881553f012d582080642d660e1cf5c9e6fe41e9f1c6ab12ae87fab7894e307"
hash.original.stripped = "9befd7887a125ebd8e9ae0555469dababe6bc04b0aa41aa2562036782a6d87e0"
hash.patched.full = "91e15447ade648c10bce599e75569ce55edc18798b11a704586acf3b51ae7971"
hash.patched.stripped = "84b069ac7f20115ac0b19d7e319bb86d00b9f3f64e0c7a51612f99d6cae297bb"
hash.avb_images."init_boot.img" = "3bedb41be98c46241f11219021dfbb799a6d5c89e6e00d45a66f9a5b42e7dfbc"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "e8e6e898ca73807edb43af0a0e86d4a94b14256def89581970287a9b1bf7a3ee"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "dbb63e08f26f46ccda501d99058d513ff71e3d6302c14d587442b666ff08862a"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_vendor.img" = "6ffa0a10e72c3371653be80de1380832b4d7f8bbf38a2bd861d44a4097a57117"
hash.avb_images."vendor_boot.img" = "dd58e8d46dd26198edf14f72d17a3315ff4c2aeb65b98dbd06369ca2a6e365a3"
# Google Pixel 6a
# What's unique: boot (boot v4, no ramdisk) + vendor_boot (vendor v4, 2 ramdisks)
[device.bluejay]
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/bluejay-ota-tq2a.230305.008.e1-915f9087.zip"
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/bluejay-ota-tq3a.230901.001-1f1f0abe.zip"
sections = [
{ start = 0, end = 140787 },
{ start = 1060207, end = 21612852 },
{ start = 1886150700, end = 1886158844 },
{ start = 2069112987, end = 2092260102 },
{ start = 2098778558, end = 2098783674 },
{ start = 0, end = 142587 },
{ start = 1062619, end = 21678441 },
{ start = 1920893927, end = 1920902079 },
{ start = 2103596124, end = 2126776858 },
{ start = 2133324030, end = 2133329146 },
]
hash.original.full = "915f9087b627b6961be9bb447dc63a7a1083b536753a78715e98641eaeb9c9d1"
hash.original.stripped = "a3ee5b6e39e687665c31790118ab9f47715b0b8285ae9847dbf81307f963db14"
hash.patched.full = "bfa7b26d90bdc889a7a199439e1564b219e5e2dbfddc1657bc1c6b73229be67e"
hash.patched.stripped = "4e56ee4a8554f2b08ffc2f1470ad60b9b63d2b6fb469ed1f7c4b1204bbf8ad7d"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "a1a705092e7034d20b83c94d78291418e13c343b1573c1b11e0fc884fc00ae62"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "3c123705be57ab142d2b43beef9b123eaad129df17a523b59b1d63b9122d28b0"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "285b83e4290f3257dc3678f0c3191794830bb2d72fb0969b69fc8f09d7ddff12"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_vendor.img" = "981f736586b91a9f4c93c4208a0d191a35ff15118c6fa505d755ee7fda8b2477"
hash.avb_images."vendor_boot.img" = "ceffcb4fdb33aa3bb2c70621060acd5af612206b21cc413d5c2d39fee25144ab"
hash.original.full = "1f1f0abe67a6f6f47287be6dafec2c12628de6a715b82ca7beddaf67ad22aca5"
hash.original.stripped = "38b15f5efdc7e056bc799859ba72ef9a73e93c61292c59f85fb4b9c31acc5f82"
hash.patched.full = "65f7e29591fb48ad9c7c3233df4d76bb6986aef96b94c06b73213477bc7486d8"
hash.patched.stripped = "cf77b5e307ce4d2a62e742cd3a300964de6c693880cbfa90dcd0bfec66bd1976"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "a19cb4d4fcc7f3e7d3046c3d19e2f243fb02513ca848ff92ad70d1ada55c4e65"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "2d817e35f7b6cdc2edce58ef249a966fc677085b70a4aced4c829320aeef0be2"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "98a050f0d53a016fbb78147b1b4a9bca3fde615aa4da34bf62c2e07a395104b5"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_vendor.img" = "fac530f47f237e76f3c7c3cdfe96308170dd8e8f0b227d81114a489c69ba763c"
hash.avb_images."vendor_boot.img" = "b3c596360f38cd0d6212341571acf3c2d977921f8bf163d7da27978a353da9f7"
# Google Pixel 4a 5G
# What's unique: boot (boot v3) + vendor_boot (vendor v3)
[device.bramble]
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/bramble-ota-tq2a.230305.008.c1-a925dd09.zip"
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/bramble-ota-tq3a.230901.001-6d107ffa.zip"
sections = [
{ start = 0, end = 140531 },
{ start = 496187, end = 11655082 },
{ start = 1650283561, end = 1650287993 },
{ start = 1884739919, end = 1908081011 },
{ start = 1910894027, end = 1910899144 },
{ start = 0, end = 142225 },
{ start = 497945, end = 11647087 },
{ start = 1683478307, end = 1683482723 },
{ start = 1917281683, end = 1940628772 },
{ start = 1943442548, end = 1943447665 },
]
hash.original.full = "a925dd09c8d613d46cf72677c16f4fadee18bc21734d57047c6ccf31f672507b"
hash.original.stripped = "79322b0b417359e8f072032de676d7e5bd2715a3b3554c48ed5cc9e9a25c6866"
hash.patched.full = "cf79cd60acd3635f5085d8bb411d4a8dc4d7e62440f62a14e7ea12f5a9b7cd8a"
hash.patched.stripped = "b684a78fe08014f1633e74d1f380e137823ba77a47ddf428bc649364f5548b75"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "2bbf2c6d2f82d454426b26ac3b4887b26ca0591b458e6cf137207ecbb8f7649d"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "ab3b2487671b3fc28e163898621d6c068164d335b6ddd9b94e4fde9471c95d66"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "2fcd52d7462916a8510bbb07f2f5a14200afe2de97568396fe75e04c5c283152"
hash.avb_images."vendor_boot.img" = "e27f157c4ebf4e958165997a4b87d4de1cfc34f4dea423a153327a27b053cac7"
hash.original.full = "6d107ffac1cd3da2c972112acc75957ed725e5c13d57ca724d9bcca5404fcebd"
hash.original.stripped = "5b889bdab3bb12ddcd3c243a56e1c58bedada8831069f49d56fe5098fb141e35"
hash.patched.full = "8725e03798539070d7075a07c80fb1403652a2b446d5c460d636a32b7368c9a2"
hash.patched.stripped = "c4b5cfa84dc8c15f3ac9661d768062546fa36ca82cdeb6dd943347be0422903c"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "8e7278a2e8ae44ffc5475717eb0e1aa56bfb7650aef34375b0fe92f790835f95"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "b036132b867f52a86eef79716261f35b1eb50e843dc4fe42f72cce67b24ae2db"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "9a7c6fd654e7a92aeffbdbd55ea0d87eee36f4c235e1b505423ad8a13a751a00"
hash.avb_images."vendor_boot.img" = "6e83d22371af4a26aef2c64cc4235f83b03978b91aef69c34eec1985e9942139"
# Google Pixel 4a
# What's unique: boot (boot v2)
[device.sunfish]
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/sunfish-ota-tq2a.230305.008.c1-174fd16b.zip"
url = "https://dl.google.com/dl/android/aosp/sunfish-ota-tq3a.230805.001-01fd34b2.zip"
sections = [
{ start = 0, end = 129700 },
{ start = 476996, end = 34035261 },
{ start = 1624751947, end = 1624756371 },
{ start = 1823132563, end = 1823137581 },
{ start = 0, end = 131325 },
{ start = 478553, end = 34014760 },
{ start = 1658403115, end = 1658407531 },
{ start = 1855778567, end = 1855783585 },
]
hash.original.full = "174fd16b47ef994ea8f3cb0f3fb456df2654b0aa1f9ea6fb8e54e5c6319f2601"
hash.original.stripped = "943ce3ae2aac8a0ccd4a7e9d4e38a9c495c39639f2621c6853be4c7a3fa0fc26"
hash.patched.full = "cdfffa731f0aca0ab9eff1e7d7bfee8c4716054d64cf0a47e50f50da6cbdb849"
hash.patched.stripped = "35b720058c460dd28b00f40bed4bcd1d133522d42d00ba048172b3092a7444ee"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "22182f2efc7043f35d79e71abb400ce919c6b3b8419405e16469644932367ee6"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "4cbe171bb37515f59cd4082cc2d982ca1edfeba9db09dd62c8959dd318423888"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "7cdb590bfc1056a5a8c7606ff05e99eb344efe108296682698b5cfe83905e0cd"
hash.original.full = "01fd34b206152a3559039161c9874ab03df37da4268b86a9e0be899de5fc0af7"
hash.original.stripped = "cc311b5bd46e06cfdefbade794d33aa9bc3ceda4ad4f38bfe9f0dfc17033d207"
hash.patched.full = "f2ac798b31a94dc251ca4ce370ebfb3073170d4a34431829df9ed0742149ffe7"
hash.patched.stripped = "4387a5ba30c925f56c67eeaf6512757d5c1e07dfd2a8a99be14e06db8ba2dde7"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "506a955080b6cfa2039ef85923e8a4e717ef6c1dc478538599c7ba26ee21e525"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "3679c7224e3e3e0793b4d1a031e116098460a6b4c5f3f88d5a3a0a4c65b21582"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "1d3efa00fd1d44a594c7317072468fa95c23d83d2759d6d6e757783ceeabc594"
# OnePlus 10 Pro
# Build NE2215_11_C.26
@@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ sections = [
]
hash.original.full = "929f892fbd70699cf7f118a119aac1ae1b86351e1ada17715666fa4401e63472"
hash.original.stripped = "4eabaf79b6c2b5df305e3ecdc2b9570c0dd27350b4e8d6434584000c4989ff3d"
hash.patched.full = "3453b2eda97ca1ba7367fa9d0dd37b21a5065e2e57cc3bbe9a6f135349d42d0b"
hash.patched.stripped = "1a41e435bdbf4302761e719e218e8682145644c0fe276739c3265f392adbd74d"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "f5dc3b147c54589be8db00ca15257a3688424a9eb88bd9c2cec82ebf4f6bf859"
hash.avb_images."recovery.img" = "a42c0bf4f023cd24394184a33ee113783a9c89a7cc4c0c582a5f72cc23b72309"
hash.patched.full = "ec576b7430e5a2788e89f8bbe37ee81b116386d9b101865d3b75eb9c51a0db4c"
hash.patched.stripped = "ddd0cf1b42564f8c2980320c14f8e0eb125412eb7a13ae8fb52d35424546c235"
hash.avb_images."boot.img" = "480d7cf519326fcaa5106ecfbbeb907309068635f7f6a25e5e4571d525c4926a"
hash.avb_images."recovery.img" = "eeb0f67e2084174fced510f4b59a82022559ffbe1c20d2c0ea4757fcd989a3af"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta.img" = "c022cf79da301a8430af5c49704944c490707fa0306031fe3ea22c39ce4734f6"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_system.img" = "749616b7f04487c05e9e363ad2071a0ab3bae29d497daf1f1a7695f7c8cfa82a"
hash.avb_images."vbmeta_vendor.img" = "a6037fce745384425fb12745b8568386b84fb57ca6f94f6e47bcf754de341ae4"
+4 -3
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use std::{
};
use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
use avbroot::stream::PSeekFile;
use avbroot::stream::{PSeekFile, Reopen};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Minimum download chunk size per task.
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ fn download_range(
.read_timeout(TIMEOUT)
.header(
"Range",
&format!("bytes={}-{}", initial_range.start, initial_range.end - 1),
format!("bytes={}-{}", initial_range.start, initial_range.end - 1),
)
.send()
.and_then(|r| r.error_for_status())
@@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ fn download_ranges(
}
if let Some(thread_range) = remaining.pop_front() {
let file_cloned = file.reopen();
// PSeekFile's reopen can't fail.
let file_cloned = file.reopen().unwrap();
let thread_range_cloned = thread_range.clone();
let tx_cloned = tx.clone();
+7 -8
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result};
use avbroot::{
cli::ota::{ExtractCli, PatchCli, VerifyCli},
format::{ota, payload::PayloadHeader},
stream::{self, FromReader, HashingReader, PSeekFile, SectionReader},
protobuf::chromeos_update_engine::install_operation::Type,
stream::{self, FromReader, HashingReader, PSeekFile, Reopen, SectionReader},
};
use clap::Parser;
use tempfile::TempDir;
@@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ fn strip_image(
let mut raw_reader = File::open(input)
.map(PSeekFile::new)
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to open for reading: {input:?}"))?;
let mut zip_reader = ZipArchive::new(BufReader::new(raw_reader.reopen()))
let mut zip_reader = ZipArchive::new(BufReader::new(raw_reader.reopen()?))
.with_context(|| format!("Failed to read zip: {input:?}"))?;
let payload_entry = zip_reader
.by_name(ota::PATH_PAYLOAD)
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ fn strip_image(
// Open the payload data directly.
let mut payload_reader = SectionReader::new(
BufReader::new(raw_reader.reopen()),
BufReader::new(raw_reader.reopen()?),
payload_offset,
payload_size,
)?;
@@ -116,18 +117,16 @@ fn strip_image(
.context("Failed to load OTA payload header")?;
let required_images =
avbroot::cli::ota::get_required_images(&header.manifest, "@gki_ramdisk", true)?
avbroot::cli::ota::get_required_images(&header.manifest, Some("@gki_ramdisk"), None)?
.into_values()
.collect::<HashSet<_>>();
let mut data_holes = vec![];
use avbroot::protobuf::chromeos_update_engine::mod_InstallOperation::Type;
for p in &header.manifest.partitions {
if !required_images.contains(&p.partition_name) {
for op in &p.operations {
match op.type_pb {
Type::ZERO | Type::DISCARD => continue,
match op.r#type() {
Type::Zero | Type::Discard => continue,
_ => {
let start = payload_offset
+ header.blob_offset
+4
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
/hfuzz_target/
HONGGFUZZ.REPORT.TXT
*.honggfuzz.cov
*.fuzz
+18
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
[package]
name = "fuzz"
version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
repository.workspace = true
publish = false
# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html
# There's currently no good way to exclude a workspace member for a specific
# platform, so we just compile empty stubs on Windows (which isn't supported by
# honggfuzz).
# https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/issues/5220
# https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/issues/6179
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
avbroot = { path = "../avbroot" }
honggfuzz = "0.5.55"
+53
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
# Fuzzing
While avbroot's parsers are all memory-safe, it is still possible for panics or crashes to occur, for example due to excessive memory allocation, integer overflow, or division by zero. Fuzzing helps to identify these issues by randomizing inputs in a way that tries to increase code coverage.
## Running the fuzzers
1. Install the cargo honggfuzz commands.
```bash
cargo install honggfuzz
```
2. Pick a fuzz target to run. A fuzz target is the name of the source file in [`src/bin/`](./src/bin) without the `.rs` extension.
The list of targets can be queried programmatically with:
```bash
cargo read-manifest | jq -r '.targets[].name'
```
3. Run the fuzzer.
```bash
cargo hfuzz run <fuzz target>
```
This will run forever until it is manually killed. At the top of the screen, a summary section like the following is shown:
```
Iterations : 31,243 [31.24k]
Mode [1/3] : Feedback Driven Dry Run [2486/4085]
Target : hfuzz_target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/bootimage
Threads : 8, CPUs: 16, CPU%: 800% [50%/CPU]
Speed : 36,126/sec [avg: 31,243]
Crashes : 53 [unique: 1, blocklist: 0, verified: 0]
Timeouts : 0 [1 sec]
Corpus Size : 1,424, max: 24,576 bytes, init: 4,085 files
Cov Update : 0 days 00 hrs 00 mins 00 secs ago
Coverage : edge: 897/224,621 [0%] pc: 2 cmp: 34,736
```
When a crash occurs, the `Crashes` counter will increment and the input data that triggered the crash will be written to `hfuzz_workspace/<fuzz target>/*.fuzz`. New files are only written for unique crashes.
4. If a crash occurs, run the following command to trigger the crash in a debugger.
```bash
cargo hfuzz run-debug <fuzz target> \
hfuzz_workspace/<fuzz_target>/<input file>.fuzz
```
This defaults to using `rust-lldb`. To use `rust-gdb` instead, set the `HFUZZ_DEBUGGER` environment variable to `rust-gdb`.
Alternatively, just feed the input file to the appropriate avbroot command directly (eg. `avbroot boot info -i hfuzz_workspace/<fuzz_target>/<input file>.fuzz` for boot images).
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/vbmeta_appended_hash.img
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/vbmeta_appended_hash_tree.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/vbmeta_root.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/boot_v0.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/boot_v1.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/boot_v2.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/boot_v3.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/boot_v4.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/boot_v4_vts.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/vendor_v3.img
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
../../../../avbroot/tests/data/vendor_v4.img
Binary file not shown.
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
#[cfg(not(windows))]
mod fuzz {
use std::io::Cursor;
use avbroot::format::avb;
use honggfuzz::fuzz;
pub fn main() {
loop {
fuzz!(|data: &[u8]| {
let reader = Cursor::new(data);
let _ = avb::load_image(reader);
});
}
}
}
fn main() {
#[cfg(not(windows))]
fuzz::main();
}
+21
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
#[cfg(not(windows))]
mod fuzz {
use std::io::Cursor;
use avbroot::{format::bootimage::BootImage, stream::FromReader};
use honggfuzz::fuzz;
pub fn main() {
loop {
fuzz!(|data: &[u8]| {
let reader = Cursor::new(data);
let _ = BootImage::from_reader(reader);
});
}
}
}
fn main() {
#[cfg(not(windows))]
fuzz::main();
}
+22
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
#[cfg(not(windows))]
mod fuzz {
use std::{io::Cursor, sync::atomic::AtomicBool};
use avbroot::format::cpio;
use honggfuzz::fuzz;
pub fn main() {
loop {
fuzz!(|data: &[u8]| {
let cancel_signal = AtomicBool::new(false);
let reader = Cursor::new(data);
let _ = cpio::load(reader, true, &cancel_signal);
});
}
}
}
fn main() {
#[cfg(not(windows))]
fuzz::main();
}
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
#[cfg(not(windows))]
mod fuzz {
use std::{io::Cursor, sync::atomic::AtomicBool};
use avbroot::{
format::fec::FecImage,
stream::{FromReader, SharedCursor, WriteZerosExt},
};
use honggfuzz::fuzz;
pub fn main() {
loop {
fuzz!(|data: &[u8]| {
let cancel_signal = AtomicBool::new(false);
let reader = Cursor::new(data);
if let Ok(fec) = FecImage::from_reader(reader) {
let mut input = SharedCursor::new();
// Allow verify() to get further, but don't blow up the host
// with excessive memory usage.
if fec.data_size < 64 * 1024 * 1024 {
input.write_zeros_exact(fec.data_size).unwrap();
}
let _ = fec.verify(&input, &cancel_signal);
}
});
}
}
}
fn main() {
#[cfg(not(windows))]
fuzz::main();
}
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
/libs/
/obj/
+7
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
LOCAL_PATH := $(call my-dir)
include $(CLEAR_VARS)
LOCAL_MODULE := init
LOCAL_SRC_FILES := init.c
LOCAL_LDFLAGS := -static
include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
+327
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 Andrew Gunnerson
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifndef DEBUG_PREFIX
#define DEBUG_PREFIX ""
#endif
#define AVBROOT_DIR DEBUG_PREFIX "/avbroot"
#define DEV_DIR DEBUG_PREFIX "/dev"
#define SAFE_DIR DEBUG_PREFIX "/acct"
#define STAGE1_DIR DEBUG_PREFIX "/first_stage_ramdisk"
#define DEV_KMSG DEV_DIR "/kmsg"
#define DEV_NULL DEV_DIR "/null"
#define INIT DEBUG_PREFIX "/init"
#define INIT_ORIG AVBROOT_DIR "/init.orig"
#define OTACERTS DEBUG_PREFIX "/system/etc/security/otacerts.zip"
#define OTACERTS_AVBROOT AVBROOT_DIR "/otacerts.zip"
#define OTACERTS_TMPFS SAFE_DIR "/otacerts.zip"
#define LOG(level, fmt, ...) \
fprintf(stderr, "<%d>[%d] " fmt, level, getpid(), ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define LOGE(...) LOG(3, __VA_ARGS__)
#define LOGI(...) LOG(6, __VA_ARGS__)
// Best effort attempt to output to the kernel log.
static void prepare_output()
{
mknod(DEV_NULL, S_IFCHR | 0666, makedev(1, 3));
mknod(DEV_KMSG, S_IFCHR | 0600, makedev(1, 11));
int fd = open(DEV_NULL, O_RDWR);
if (fd >= 0) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
close(fd);
}
fd = open(DEV_KMSG, O_WRONLY);
if (fd >= 0) {
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
close(fd);
}
unlink(DEV_NULL);
unlink(DEV_KMSG);
setlinebuf(stdout);
}
static void auto_close(int *fd)
{
if (*fd >= 0) {
int saved_errno = errno;
close(*fd);
errno = saved_errno;
}
}
static int copy_file(const char *source, const char *target)
{
__attribute__((cleanup(auto_close))) int fd_source =
open(source, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd_source < 0) {
LOGE("%s: Failed to open file: %s\n", source, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
struct stat sb;
if (fstat(fd_source, &sb) < 0) {
LOGE("%s: Failed to stat file: %s\n", source, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
__attribute__((cleanup(auto_close))) int fd_target =
open(target, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC,
sb.st_mode & ~S_IFMT);
if (fd_target < 0) {
LOGE("%s: Failed to open file: %s\n", target, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
uint64_t remain = sb.st_size;
while (remain > 0) {
size_t to_copy = remain > 0x7ffff000 ? 0x7ffff000 : remain;
ssize_t n = sendfile(fd_target, fd_source, NULL, to_copy);
if (n < 0) {
LOGE("%s -> %s: Failed to copy data: %s\n",
source, target, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
remain -= n;
}
return 0;
}
// Mount a tmpfs at SAFE_DIR and copy the files we need to it. AOSP init will
// preserve mount points when switching roots (first /first_stage_ramdisk and
// then the system partition), so we'll be able to access the files during the
// stage 1 -> stage 2 transition. The safe directory must be a directory that
// exists in the system partition and is unused for stage 1 init.
static int prepare_safe_dir()
{
int flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC;
if (mount("avbroot", SAFE_DIR, "tmpfs", flags, "mode=755") < 0) {
LOGE("%s: Failed to mount tmpfs: %s\n", SAFE_DIR, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (copy_file(OTACERTS_AVBROOT, OTACERTS_TMPFS) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (mount(NULL, SAFE_DIR, NULL, MS_REMOUNT | MS_RDONLY | flags, NULL) < 0) {
LOGE("%s: Failed to remount read-only: %s\n",
SAFE_DIR, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
// Trace the parent process across execve() calls until otacerts.zip exists.
// Then, bind mount the replacement and detach. Only the parent (TID 1) needs to
// be traced. All other threads and child processes are irrelevant since we only
// care about the transition point between stage 1 and stage 2 init.
static int trace_parent()
{
bool first_group_stop = true;
pid_t parent_pid = getppid();
LOGI("Tracing parent PID: %d\n", parent_pid);
long options = PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD | PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC;
if (ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, parent_pid, NULL, options) < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to trace process: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
while (1) {
int status;
if (waitpid(parent_pid, &status, __WALL | __WNOTHREAD) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR) {
continue;
} else {
LOGE("waitpid failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
#ifdef __GLIBC__
enum __ptrace_request
#else
int
#endif
action = PTRACE_CONT;
int forward_signal = 0;
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
LOGE("%d exited with status %d\n", parent_pid, WEXITSTATUS(status));
break;
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
LOGE("%d killed by signal %d\n", parent_pid, WTERMSIG(status));
break;
} else if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
int ptrace_event = status >> 16;
int signal = WSTOPSIG(status);
switch (ptrace_event) {
case PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC: {
LOGI("Tracee is about to exec\n");
// If /first_stage_ramdisk exists, then init hasn't switched
// roots yet. otacerts.zip may still exist on devices that
// use shared ramdisks for normal and recovery boot.
if ((access(STAGE1_DIR, F_OK) != 0 && errno == ENOENT)
&& access(OTACERTS, F_OK) == 0) {
LOGI("Conditions satisfied; applying override\n");
action = PTRACE_DETACH;
if (mount(OTACERTS_TMPFS, OTACERTS, NULL,
MS_BIND | MS_RDONLY, "") < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to bind mount %s -> %s: %s\n",
OTACERTS_TMPFS, OTACERTS, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (umount2(SAFE_DIR, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to detach mount %s: %s\n",
SAFE_DIR, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
} else {
LOGE("Conditions not yet satisfied\n");
}
break;
}
case PTRACE_EVENT_STOP: {
if (signal == SIGSTOP || signal == SIGTSTP
|| signal == SIGTTIN || signal == SIGTTOU) {
if (first_group_stop) {
LOGI("Resuming tracee\n");
kill(parent_pid, SIGCONT);
first_group_stop = false;
} else {
action = PTRACE_LISTEN;
}
} else {
// We get spurious SIGTRAP signals when SIGCONT'ing a
// process. rr seem to be running into this as well:
// https://github.com/mozilla/rr/issues/2095
// strace handles PTRACE_EVENT_STOP + non-group-stop signal
// by restarting the process with PTRACE_SYSCALL:
// https://github.com/strace/strace/blob/b1e1eb7731e50900bb4591a3a71b96ab37e106a8/strace.c#L2360
// https://github.com/strace/strace/blob/b1e1eb7731e50900bb4591a3a71b96ab37e106a8/strace.c#L2408-L2409
}
break;
}
default: {
if (signal == (SIGTRAP | 0x80)) {
// Syscall enter/exit stop
} else {
// Signal delivery stop
forward_signal = signal;
}
break;
}
}
if (ptrace(action, parent_pid, NULL, forward_signal) < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to perform action %d (signal %d): %s\n",
action, forward_signal, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (action == PTRACE_DETACH) {
LOGI("Detaching tracee\n");
break;
}
} else {
LOGE("Invalid waitpid status: 0x%x\n", status);
}
}
return 0;
}
static int prepare_tracing()
{
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to fork: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
} else if (pid == 0) {
int ret = trace_parent();
if (ret < 0) {
// Make sure parent doesn't hang forever.
kill(getppid(), SIGCONT);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} else {
LOGI("Waiting for tracer to be ready\n");
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
LOGI("Tracer is ready\n");
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
{
(void) argc;
prepare_output();
if (rename(INIT_ORIG, INIT) < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to restore original init: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (prepare_safe_dir() < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to set up safe directory %s\n", SAFE_DIR);
} else if (prepare_tracing() < 0) {
LOGE("Failed to set up tracer child process\n");
} else {
LOGI("Exec hook is ready\n");
}
LOGI("Executing %s\n", INIT);
execve(INIT, argv, envp);
LOGE("Failed to exec %s: %s\n", INIT, strerror(errno));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
id=com.chiller3.avbroot.clearotacerts
name=clearotacerts
version=v2.1.0
versionCode=131328
version=v2.3.3
versionCode=131843
author=chenxiaolong
description=Block A/B OTAs by clearing verification certificates
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
id=com.chiller3.avbroot.oemunlockonboot
name=oemunlockonboot
version=v2.1.0
versionCode=131328
version=v2.3.3
versionCode=131843
author=chenxiaolong
description=Enable OEM unlocking on every boot
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ clap = { version = "4.4.1", features = ["derive"] }
human-sort = "0.2.2"
regex = { version = "1.9.4", default-features = false, features = ["perf", "std"] }
tempfile = "3.8.0"
toml_edit = "0.19.14"
toml_edit = "0.20.1"
walkdir = "2.3.3"
# https://github.com/zip-rs/zip/pull/383
+2 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ fn check_brackets(line: &str) -> Result<()> {
fn update_changelog_links(path: &Path, base_url: &str) -> Result<()> {
let re_standalone_link = Regex::new(r"\[([^\]]+)\]($|[^\(\[])")?;
let re_auto_link = Regex::new(r"^(Issue|PR) #([0-9]+)?$")?;
let re_auto_link = Regex::new(r"^(Discussion|Issue|PR) #([0-9]+)?$")?;
let mut links = BTreeMap::<LinkRef, String>::new();
let raw_reader = File::open(path)?;
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ fn update_changelog_links(path: &Path, base_url: &str) -> Result<()> {
let number: u32 = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str().parse()?;
let link = match link_type {
"Discussion" => format!("{base_url}/discussions/{number}"),
"Issue" => format!("{base_url}/issues/{number}"),
"PR" => format!("{base_url}/pull/{number}"),
t => bail!("Unknown link type in {link_ref:?}: {t:?}"),
+1 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ fn update_cargo_version(version: &str) -> Result<()> {
let data = fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
let mut document: Document = data.parse()?;
document["workspace"]["package"]["version"] = value(version.clone());
document["workspace"]["package"]["version"] = value(version);
fs::write(path, document.to_string())?;