Four projects were cloned for comparison (reverse-skill, awesome-game-security,
android-reverse-engineering-claude-skill, MobileRE-Skill) and read for what they do that this
repository does not. None is vendored and none becomes a runtime dependency: what crosses over is a
phase order, a checklist or a command pattern, with the source URL and the retrieval date recorded in
the file that absorbed it.
The rule applied to every candidate: does this make a judgement easier or a verification harder? The
repository is a decision-and-verification layer, and the four things kept are all of that kind.
new scripts/scan_leaks.py target identity scanned before publishing, with an explicit
do-not-anonymize list and four RESULT=/exit states
new references/precedents/ the positive half of the record: route including dead ends, a
grade per assertion, measured pits, and a write-back checklist
new scripts/svc_scan.py does a libc-level hook structurally see this call at all
new scripts/anti_detect_probe.js observer-only: name the check, and report the environment it reads
new references/desensitization-and-leak-scans.md
new references/dart-aot.md sections the 32-bit snapshot's real string-record format
check_repo.py now delegates the identity scan to scripts/scan_leaks.py and runs it over
git ls-files, so the gate reads content instead of layout for the first time. An explicit file list
cannot be narrowed by the default work-area exemptions -- that defect was caught by the gate itself.
Two claims that this repository had already written down turned out to be wrong, and both are
recorded as refuted rather than quietly rewritten:
dart-aot.md the armv7 string table was documented as [len*2 u32le][UTF-16LE]. It is not. The same
extractor keeps 4,980 chained entries on arm64 and zero on armv7, and the byte layer
shows the 32-bit record is [header u32][byte-count u32le][UTF-8 payload]: two adjacent
literals carry 0x46 (70) and 0x48 (72), exactly their byte lengths. The zero was a
format mismatch, not an empty table. The engine-version banner on the same target is
66 bytes of "0.0.1" with a blank build id, so the documented regex returns a
version-shaped lie.
leak scan the pass that added the scanner found 26 strong hits inside its own evidence file on
the day it was written -- the fixture's literal match values, quoted to prove the
rules fire. The corpus may contain values; the published surface may not.
Measured, not asserted. The check that fires was named on a public MASTG target: three arms with one
variable, the control alive at the end and the probe arm dead in about 300 ms, with strstr("frida") at
t=303 ms and no tombstone. Reproducibility is bounded honestly -- one full sequence in three arms, on
a target whose whole window is sub-second. svc_scan.py's two independent decoders agree on an
identical 214-site set, and ptrace-free dumping gained a negative boundary: a target whose dex is
deflated inside its APK has no whole-image dex in memory to export, for reasons that say nothing about
protection.
Also in this pass: the detector-locating pipeline (detection-and-anti-analysis.md Step 3) with its
branch conditions; the layered Java-to-svc descent and the dump's honesty boundary in
advanced-unpacking.md; a sourced capability-gap list in toolchain.md where every row is graded
URL-verified or measured; the RESULT=-token convention; and SKILL.md opening with an immediate-action
block, because the symptom index and the gates were sitting in the part of a long file nobody reads.
Gates: check_repo.py 0 problem, check_refs.py 0 dangling / 0 warning, check_budget.py 0 failure /
0 warning / 1 pre-existing note. The scan reports RESULT=leaks_found_strong_only, exit 0: four
endpoint/weak hits, all of them addresses from the RFC 5737 documentation range in usage examples.
Public targets under the existing routes, recorded per row in tests/benchmark.md with each row's own strength label: the MASTG crackmes (equal-length patch -> repack -> re-sign with a zero-change control, and the anti-debug race with its time-to-death baseline), DexPatcher's ezAndroid sample, two real split APK sets, and a self-built extraction-skeleton set. Hardening-shape discrimination now separates Java2C from an extraction shell, a VMP and JNI sinking.
New: java2c_probe.py and java2c-and-jni-sinking.md; split-apk.md with repack.py growing set inventory, unified re-signing and merge; protobuf_decode_raw.py cross-checked against the official runtime; vmp_diff_harness.py and its cost table; kernelsu_syscall_mask.py with three kernel-side templates; stalker_trace.js gains Stalker.exclude() and a zero-event warning.
Corrections, each because a measurement contradicted a recorded conclusion: the trivial-body ratio is bimodal rather than a threshold and the old threshold claim was deleted; a Dex-VMP verdict was withdrawn after dexdump contradicted a hand-written opcode table; the assumption that Stalker.exclude() fixes zero-event delivery is disproved (it keeps the process alive, nothing more); and a repack.py signing-path claim expired mid-pass when a second writer added one.
Emulated and kernel-side routes are labelled unverified where no toolchain or device could run them; each evidence file states what was not run.
inliver233